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ABSTRACT 
This thesis utilises radical feminism to assess whether it could be argued that marriage in the 
UK context has moved beyond a sexual definition: beyond consummation. The research 
looks at alternative relationship forms that have emerged to challenge sexual requirements in 
relationship law, including civil partnerships, same sex marriage and the marriages and civil 
partnerships of transsexuals. The thesis argues that through incorporating a nullity clause in 
matrimonial law on the basis of non-consummation, the law effectively requires sex from its 
heterosexual married citizens. The thesis demonstrates the patriarchal values underlying the 
consummation requirement and concludes that the challenges that have emerged have not 
served to dismantle the requirement. We have not moved beyond marriage or consummation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Marriage, it seemed to me, demanded a surrender of individual 
personality that I was not prepared to make.1 
 
This thesis seeks to establish an analysis of consummation, through the lens of second 
wave radical feminism, in order to uncover the way in which law views contemporary 
relationship forms. Sexual intercourse has become so “sacred that it is almost 
impossible to imagine any serious challenge being made to it. What we have seen...is 
the total and compulsory enforcement of that sexual practice upon women so that 
women are allowed absolutely no... escape from it.”2 This thesis addresses this 
compulsory enforcement through an examination of the first, legally compulsory 
instance of sex in heterosexual marriage. This chapter provides an outline of the main 
arguments presented in this thesis, a background to the consummation requirement, an 
outline of the key research questions to be explored, and the aims of undertaking this 
research and its originality. I explain here the methodology I will utilise and briefly 
outline radical feminism.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Auchmuty, R. ‘Same-sex Marriage Revived: Feminist Critique and Legal Strategy’ (2004) 14 
Feminism and Psychology 1 pgs 101-126 pg 104; Jeffreys, S. Anticlimax- A feminist perspective on the 
sexual revolution London, The Women’s Press, 1993 at pg 29  
2
 Jeffreys, S., ‘Sexology and Antifeminism’ in Leidholdt, D. & Raymond, J.G., The Sexual Liberals & 
the Attack on Feminism New York, Pergamon Press 1990 pgs 14-27 pg 17 
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i: Background 
This thesis argues that the legal anomaly of consummation3 which is currently 
required of opposite-sex couples but not of same-sex couples, creates a hierarchy of 
relationships premised upon conjugality and is therefore discriminatory. 
Simultaneously, I argue the legal and religious concept of consummation is harmful to 
women, as the patriarchal basis of consummation law presents it as something that is 
done to women. The law in the UK allows a marriage to be declared voidable on the 
basis of non-consummation, but does not allow a civil partnership or same sex 
marriage to be nullified on the same basis. I argue that a legally valid marriage union 
requires consummation, and for women, this requires more than Auchmuty’s 
“surrender of individual personality”.4 The thesis establishes the sexual criteria law 
and society use in order to distinguish legally valid relationships, while providing 
analysis in regard to how a relationship can be deemed to acquire legal legitimacy 
through the consummation act.  
 
I review the legal changes5 that have emerged in the UK with regard to relationship 
legislation and the impact these have had upon understandings of consummation and 
the role of women in marital sex. Whilst attempts have been made to try and equalise 
the legal standing of different relationship forms (including same-sex relationships 
and relationships involving transsexuals), there still exists a legal inequality regarding 
the intimate sexual relationship between couples across differing groups. 
Heterosexual married couples have to consummate their union, same-sex couples (in a 
                                                 
3
 At its most basic, consummation could be described as the first occurrence of sexual intercourse 
between married couples after the legally recognised marriage ceremony. This thesis demonstrates that 
there are in fact many underlying requirements and assumptions about consummation.  
4
 Auchmuty loc cit n1  
5
 For example, the introduction of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 and the Gender Recognition Act 
2004, and the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013.   
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civil partnership or same-sex marriage) do not, and transsexual people who have not 
undergone sex reassignment surgery can enter marriage (or civil partnership) unions 
in their new gender, without the physical capacity to consummate. I demonstrate that 
consummation is required of marriage, and the definition of consummation is narrow, 
requiring a specific sexual act to legitimise the relationship. I examine whether or not 
the failure to extend this to same-sex couples (in marriage and civil partnership), and 
the legislative silence on the issue as regards transsexuals signifies a legal move 
beyond consummation.   
 
S12 (a) and (b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 19736 (hereafter MCA 1973) 
encompasses the relevant consummation legislation, stating that an unconsummated 
marriage between a man and a woman is voidable on two grounds: the incapacity of 
one party to consummate, or the wilful refusal of one party to consummate. This 
means that a court must declare the marriage void, by declaring a decree of nullity, 
which can only occur at the insistence of one party to the marriage, and during the 
parties’ lifetime.7 A decree of nullity “declares that the marriage itself is void, i.e. no 
valid marriage ever existed, or voidable, i.e. the marriage was valid unless annulled.”8 
This is not replicated in same-sex marriage, explained in Chapter 5. The two types of 
nullity can be distinguished in the following ways: 
 
A void marriage is one that is legally invalid because, for example:  
                                                 
6
 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973  
7
 There are circumstances where a decree will be barred: s13 (1)(a)&(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973 states that the marriage will not be nullified due to incapacity or wilful refusal if the parties both 
understood, prior to the marriage, that there would not be a sexual relationship.  
8Judicial & Court Statistics 2007 www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm74/7467/7467.pdf  
(accessed 14/04/09)  
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(a) either party was under the age of sixteen at the time of the 
marriage 
(b) either party was already married 
 
Examples of voidable marriages are those:  
(a) not consummated due to incapacity or wilful refusal (most 
nullities are on these grounds) 
(b) where one party was suffering from a venereal disease in a 
communicable form, or was pregnant by someone else at the 
time of marriage.9  
 
When considering consummation, “the act is all”10 and needs to occur after the 
marriage ceremony. Historically, heterosexual marriage had been the only legally 
recognised union between adults, and defines the penetrative sex capable of satisfying 
the consummation requirement, leading commentators to argue that the prioritisation 
of marriage has served to promote heterosexual relationships as the norm.11 Marriage 
past and present has been detrimental and disadvantageous for women. In the past, 
women and their possessions were legally viewed as the property of their husbands 
“which stresses the cultural, economic, political and legal supremacy of the 
husband.”12 Women were regarded as having granted their implied consent to sexual 
intercourse whenever their husband wanted. Consummation is a continuation of this 
                                                 
9
 Idem 
10
 Moran, L.J., ‘A study in the history of male sexuality in law: non-consummation’ (1990) 1 Law and 
Critique 2 pgs 155-171 pg 165; N v. M [1853] 2 Rob Ecc 623; see Chapter 2 below.   
11
 Miriam, K., ‘Toward a Phenomenology of Sex-Right: Reviving Radical Feminist Theory of 
Compulsory Heterosexuality’ (2007) 22 Hypatia 1 pgs 210-228; Stychin, C.F, ‘Not (Quite) a Horse and 
Carriage’ (2006) 14 Feminist Legal Studies pgs 79-86 
12
 Barnett, H., Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence London, Cavendish 1998 pg 35  
 13
treatment of women. It is something that is done by a man, to a woman, in a specific 
way, which serves to render the woman’s body the husband’s sexual property.  
 
Same-sex couples have also been disadvantaged under the law. The enactment of 
Civil Partnership Act (hereafter CPA) came in 2004.13 This thesis demonstrates that 
legal developments for same-sex couples are not as progressive as they first seem. 
The passing of the Gender Recognition Act14 (hereafter GRA) has meant that 
transgender people have been able to legally register their ‘acquired’ gender (retaining 
the gender binary), and also marry or create a civil partnership, effectively 
maintaining existing relationship structures. The CPA has allowed for marriage-like 
unions for same-sex couples, with 6,795 civil partnerships taking place in 2011.15 The 
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act (hereafter M(SSC)A) allows for same-sex couples 
to marry, perhaps indicating a progressive move away from homophobic legislation.16  
  
I address whether or not the nature of marriage and the consummation requirement 
has been challenged and changed in light of civil partnership, same-sex marriage, 
transsexual marriage and claims by unmarried siblings to access legal provisions. In 
order to answer these research questions, my research looks at whether or not sexual, 
married relationships should be legally privileged over non-sexual, unmarried ones. 
Traditional marriage for the purposes of this research is defined by the case of Hyde v. 
Hyde and Woodmansee,17 which defines legal (Judeo-Christian) marriage as the 
                                                 
13
 Homosexual acts between men were illegal until their partial decriminalisation under the Sexual 
Offences Act 1967. Lesbianism was not acknowledged.  
14
 Gender Recognition Act 2004 
15
 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/vsob2/civil-partnership-statistics--united-kingdom/2011/sb-civil-
partnerships-in-the-uk--2011.html (accessed 18/9/13)  
16
 This is still a point of contention among scholars and the public- see Chapter 5 below. 
17
 Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee [1866] LR 1 P&D 130 
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“voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.”18 
Through an analysis of the consummation requirement, this thesis examines whether 
one should still use this definition of marriage today. Even a superficial knowledge of 
marriage demonstrates that this traditional definition is not reflective of contemporary 
circumstances.  
 
The GRA now provides recognition that transgender people can legally change their 
gender, without undergoing sex reassignment, thereby maintaining existing gender 
categories.19 Ignoring at this point the obvious gender implications this raises in terms 
of consummation, the GRA influences this research in two ways. Firstly, it could be 
argued that it has diminished any legal significance consummation has, as non-
operative transgender people are physically unable to consummate in the required 
way. Secondly, it could be argued that this is a human rights issue that has had to be 
absorbed into marriage law, and actually serves to create a further step in the 
hierarchy of relationships. The very fact that the consummation requirement has not 
been amended in light of this change reinforces the procreative purpose of marriage. 
There is no legislative definition of consummation other than to state that it is 
required, but a case law definition has emerged, often from cases in which a partner 
has undergone a sex reassignment and where a dispute arises as to whether or not the 
couple can be said to have truly consummated the relationship.20  
 
                                                 
18
 Ibid at 133  
19
 An (American) example demonstrates the unusual situations this can create: ‘Pregnant US man hails 
‘miracle’’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7330196.stm (accessed 15/04/09)   
20
 These cases will be developed further in later chapters- D-e v. A-g (falsely calling herself D-e) [1845] 
1 Rob Ecc 280; Corbett v. Corbett (Otherwise Ashley)[1970] 2 W.L.R. 1306, (1971) P. 83; Bellinger v. 
Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21, (2003) WL 1610368  
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The case law presented in Chapter 2 demonstrates the intimate examination courts 
have undertaken in assessing marital sexual relations, and analyses the definition of 
consummation found in D-e v. A-g,21 where a doctor was called upon to provide 
extensive evidence regarding the ‘quality’ of the consummation act and concluded 
that “sexual intercourse, in the proper meaning of the term, is ordinary and complete 
intercourse; it does not mean partial and imperfect intercourse.”22 This somewhat 
ambiguous definition of marital sex has set the bench mark against which subsequent 
cases of non-consummation have been judged. The case of R v. R23 further clarified 
that ‘ordinary and complete’ intercourse does not require the emission of semen. 
Further,  
 
full and complete penetration is an essential ingredient to complete 
intercourse, and the penetration must not be for a very short moment 
(W v. W [1967] 3 All ER 178). A marriage may be consummated 
although artificial methods of contraception are used (Baxter v. 
Baxter [1948] AC 274). Clearly, therefore, the possibility of 
conception is not necessary for consummation. So long as the 
penetration is not of a transient nature, coitus interruptus will not 
bar consummation (Cackett v. Cackett [1950] P 253).24  
 
These cases provide just a glimpse of the search to define consummation, and are 
analysed in Chapter 2. With courts having taken such an intimate, personal and 
                                                 
21
 D-e v. A-g (falsely calling herself D-e)[1845]  
22
 Idem 
23
 R v. R (Otherwise F) [1952] 1 All ER 1194  
24
 Hopkins, F. Formation and Annulment of Marriage London, Oyez, 1976 pg 61  
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heteronormatively25 defined examination of consummation, the introduction of the 
GRA, CPA and M(SSC)A were huge steps for English law. It had been argued that 
civil partnership would provide marriage like status to same-sex couples, although 
there has been some debate26 as to whether or not civil partnership truly is marriage, 
marriage in all but name, or something completely different. The recent enactment of 
the M(SSC)A demonstrates that civil partnership is not equal (Chapter 5).   
 
I examine whether one can conclude from this that we have moved beyond 
consummation: perhaps its legal significance is now mute? Civil partnerships and 
same-sex marriages cannot be dissolved on the basis of adultery, but heterosexual 
marriages can. Some commentators27 have argued that perhaps this confirms that civil 
partnership and homosexual sex acts, are not taken as seriously as marriage and that 
‘unnatural’ sexual acts cannot be defined for adultery purposes. If this is the case, 
they also cannot be defined for the purposes of consummation. On the other hand, the 
failure to mirror a consummation requirement could signify the beginning of the end 
for sexually prioritised relationships.  
 
                                                 
25
 I use the word ‘heteronormative’ to indicate that heterosexual couples have always been regarded by 
the norm. As such, all attempts by the courts and legislature to define consummation have been 
premised on this assumption.  
26
 Barker, N., ‘Sex and the Civil Partnership Act: The Future of (Non) Conjugality?’ (2006) 14 
Feminist Legal Studies pgs 241-259; Bottomley, A. & Wong, S., ‘Special Issue: Domestic partnerships: 
stretching the marriage model?’ (2006) 14 Feminist Legal Studies 2 pgs 141-143; Crompton, L., ‘Civil 
Partnerships Bill 2004: The Illusion of Equality’ (2004) 34 Family Law pgs 888-891; Feldblum, C.R., 
‘Gay is good: The moral case for marriage equality and more’ (2005) 17 Yale Journal of Law and 
Feminism pgs 139-184; Rainscourt, K., ‘The limitations of the Civil Partnership Act 2004: an analysis 
of cross-border recognition of same-sex marriage’ (2006) 25 Civil Justice Quarterly 150-154    
27
 Clarke, V. ‘Lesbian and Gay Marriage: Transformation or Normalization?’ (2003)  13 Feminism and 
Psychology 4 pgs 519-529; Jeffreys, S ‘The Need to Abolish Marriage’ (2004) 14 Feminism and 
Psychology 2 pgs 327-331.  
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Another family structure legally disadvantaged on the basis of its (absence of) sexual 
activity is that of persons who live in familial relationships. The case of Burden28 
involved two elderly sisters who argued that it is discriminatory to omit familial 
relationships from the definitions of civil partnership, as when one of the sisters died, 
the other would have to pay inheritance tax, where-as same-sex couples would not. 
The European Court held that the sisters could not be considered civil partners within 
the meaning of the CPA, and that this was not a breach of their rights, as civil 
partnership was created to provide rights for same-sex couples only. Rees-Mogg 
argues that the Act itself “is avowedly discriminatory. Same-sex couples gain 
substantial tax advantages, equal to those of a married couple. Members of the same 
family are not allowed to enter into civil partnerships with each other; nor are 
unmarried heterosexual couples.”29 This case is examined in Chapter 6, to understand 
the value placed upon sexual activity within relationships.  
 
Given the recent legal developments briefly outlined above, and the relatively small 
amount of case-law engaging with ss12 (a) and (b) MCA 1973, one could argue that 
the research presented here is no longer valid or necessary; law and society have 
moved beyond focusing on the moment of consummation. There has been no recent 
case law on this issue, but consummation is still of importance. The MCA 1973 is still 
the current law on this matter. As the following chapters demonstrate, almost all of 
the available commentary and literature discussing consummation is written from a 
medical perspective.30 The research presented here aims to add to the very limited 
                                                 
28
 Burden and Burden v. United Kingdom app no: 13378/05 [2008] 
29
 www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/william_rees_mogg/article1329412.ece (accessed 
9/2/08) 
30
 Friedman, L.J. Virgin Wives: A Study of Unconsummated Marriages London, Tavistock, 1962; 
Loewenfeld, L.A. On conjugal happiness experience, reflections and advice of a medical man (3rd ed) 
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socio-legal research available discussing the effect of the consummation requirement 
upon understandings of marriage, society, and in particular, upon women. Research 
into the consummation requirement should not be founded in medicine alone, which 
has focused upon solving sexual problems to allow consummation to occur. Rather, a 
socio-legal31 analysis of the consummation requirement will provide an invaluable 
observation of societal views on many issues;  
 
as a polysemic political space consummation has been and continues 
to be conceived of in a variety of ways: as an issue of property 
relations, as a matter of kinship, as a topic relating to the 
transmission of names, as an affair concerned with status and 
hierarchy, as the object of the problematic of the ‘flesh’32…. it is 
within this setting of consummation as a diverse field of many 
possible meanings that it emerges as a matter within the domain of 
sexuality.33  
 
It is within the domain of sexuality and gender, that this research positions itself.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
London, Bale and Danielsson, 1913, translated by Krohn, R.E.S; Chesser, E. Love Without Fear: A 
Plain Guide To Sex Technique For Every Married Adult (New and Revised ed) London, Jarrolds, 1966.  
31
 Traditional legal research known as black letter law has historically comprised of case law, statute 
and textbooks. The research analysed and presented here is of a socio-legal nature. ‘Socio-legal’ 
denotes research which is fundamentally of a ‘law in context’ approach, which has grown out of law 
schools. In the UK, most ‘socio-legal research’ is conducted by legal academics. In the methodology 
section below, I analyse the compatibility of this ‘law in context’ approach with feminist research 
ideals. Banakar, R., & Travers, M. (eds) Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research Oxford, Hart, 
2005; Salter, M. & Mason, J. Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of 
Legal Research Essex, Pearson Education, 2007; Wheeler, S. & Thomas, P. ‘Socio-Legal Studies’ in 
Hayton, D. (ed) Law’s Future(s): British Legal Developments in the 21st Century Oxford, Hart, 2000, 
pgs267-279; Goodrich, P. Law in the Courts of Love London, Routledge, 1996  
32
 For example Michael Novak’s argument about the primacy of ‘one flesh’ within marriage debates; 
Novak, M., ‘What Marriage Is’ (2004) 156 Public Interest pgs 24-30 pg 27   
33
 Moran op cit n10 pg 170-171  
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Whilst the law does not require consummation for a legitimate marriage as such, (it is 
merely a ground upon which a marriage can be declared voidable), the assumption is 
that marriages which do not end upon this ground, have been sexual. In this way, the 
value of consummation does not just remain within the gender and sexuality field. 
These other qualities of consummation are important; “the convergence of these 
different associations, particularly as a matter of the flesh, as a question of social 
hierarchy, [and] as an issue of government, [mean that] consummation is a matrix of 
already embodied power relations.”34 This point is further explored in Chapters 2 and 
3 where I define consummation, and critique its use as a method to define 
relationships and sexuality. A consummation requirement has far-reaching 
consequences, the most important of which is its capacity to create and define the 
arena of legitimate sexuality; 
 
non-consummation marks a point of convergence, a strategic 
situation where sexuality is deployed. It is a matrix that is a relation 
of integration, an effective conjunction, where a knowledge 
(sexuality) outwith the law, is conjoined in law, utilized in securing 
a closure in a series of episodes. It is through such conjunctions that 
a deployment of sexuality emerges within the law.35  
 
Consummation links law and sex. Sexuality and sexual relations are a legal and a 
private issue. This divide between sex in marriage as a public concern and a private 
act is also a focus of this thesis. I argue that a sexual imperative within relationships 
                                                 
34
 Ibid pg 171 
35
 Ibid pg 170  
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should not be legislated, evidenced with the ever increasing discourse surrounding 
sexuality issues. Mainstream discourse such as that produced by the government or 
the church36 has been used to shape the way in which we view gender and sexuality 
as unchanging concepts which determine our identity.37 However, “through the lives, 
struggles and the work of women and men speaking through the many feminisms, 
lesbian perspectives and gay studies the political nature of identity and its place 
within a dominant discourse of sexuality is experienced and questioned.”38 I utilise 
this feminist perspective to provide original analysis, through engaging with radical 
feminist texts and rehabilitating this theory with current legal developments, whilst 
also taking note of points of contention with alternative perspectives. Effectively, I 
wish to both rehabilitate radical feminism, whilst applying it to new social 
phenomena, such as developments in legal provision for same sex couples. I briefly 
provide an outline of feminist theory below and in more detail in Chapter 1.  
 
Feminist theory in general argues to varying extents that women have been 
subordinated in law, and that all areas of society promote patriarchy.39 Moran has 
used case law to argue that when examining incapacity cases (where it is claimed the 
male is incapable), the court focuses “upon the body and in particular upon matters 
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relating to the production of knowledge of the male body.”40 He argues that “as 
nature gone wrong, the failure to consummate the marriage has a new urgency both 
for the individual and for the realisation of social order.”41 This thesis also argues that 
consummation impacts social order, but reaches that conclusion through an 
understanding of the woman’s perspective of marriage and consummation. 
Previously, when consummation had not occurred, the onus (blame) was placed on 
the woman,42 and would lead the courts to reduce wives to intrusive medical 
examinations, which had to be conducted by surgeons rather than midwives, perhaps 
because evidence from a fellow woman would be unacceptable.43 
 
For the most part, feminist theory has focused upon the impact of social phenomena 
upon women. There have been those that conceptualise sex (and consummation) as 
structured for the sexual gratification of men only,44 for the subordination of women, 
for procreation45 and for the continuation of legitimate inheritance, and further to 
reinforce the privileged legal and social position of heterosexual relationships.46 It has 
been argued that “sexual pleasure in marriage is to be achieved through contact with 
the body of another but the other is not to be of the same sex… heterosexuality in 
marriage is thus legally compulsory in that the institution of marriage is preserved 
and reserved for women and men…”47 This heteronormativity is encapsulated within 
definitions of consummation and can only be fulfilled by a sexual relationship 
between a husband and his wife.  
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Whilst this research deals predominantly with consummation, it does not focus 
specifically on the moment of consummation within a scientific or medical analysis. 
My focus is what consummation symbolises, in terms of our societal development as 
regards sexual relations and gender expectations. I focus upon the way in which 
consummation is a legal, religious and sexual phenomenon, all of which conspire to 
create a heteronormative society, in which the conjugal family has been prioritised. I 
examine why society has created a hierarchy of relationships, with (hetero)sexual 
relationships at the top, based upon the presumed sexual activity and permanence of 
the relationship.  
 
ii: Research questions, aims and originality 
The research presented looks to fill a gap in current understandings of many issues. 
Firstly, there is very little existing literature available exclusively about 
consummation, and the literature that does exist is dated, perhaps as a result of the 
“demise of a feminist sexual politics as an optimistic feature of the women’s liberation 
movement.”48 Secondly, there is no current literature that compares the role of 
consummation alone within civil partnership, marriage and transsexual marriage. 
Lastly, I seek to demonstrate the effective role radical feminism can play in this type 
of analysis, arguing that sexual politics should still be a part of feminist theory, and 
demonstrating that radical feminism can still provide a useful platform from which 
law and society can be engaged, in order to remove a legal sexual requirement.   
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The purpose of this thesis is to determine what legally constitutes “ordinary and 
complete”49 consummation, and why this is a necessary legal concept in twenty-first 
century English law. Having established the legal and social importance of 
consummation for a valid marriage, I then examine the reasons for its omission from 
the CPA, the M(SSC)A and the impact of the GRA on a transsexual person’s ability 
to fully consummate a marriage union. Utilising radical feminism to examine these 
recent legal changes, (M(SSC)A in particular), also contributes to the originality of 
my work, for this has not yet been done. Bringing together all my research, I argue 
that a ‘meaningful’ relationship does not need to be a sexual one, but if it is, the state 
should not concern itself with legislating this. There is no legal magic that occurs in 
the moment of consummation which makes a consummated marriage any more 
enduring than an unconsummated one. The union has already been created through a 
ceremony, vows and signatures, and sex should not be of legislative importance. 
 
One could argue that this thesis could be written from any feminist perspective 
(outlined in Chapter 1), and perhaps more convincingly from third wave feminism.  
However, as explained throughout, I feel that part of the originality of the research 
presented here is the application/rehabilitation of radical feminism to new legal 
phenomena, and the strength of the argument radical feminism creates, for the 
removal of the consummation requirement and sexual relationships from law. The use 
of radical feminism aside, there also remains the originality of comparing all legally 
recognised relationship forms in one piece of research. There is no academic work 
which explicitly looks at consummation (or its absence) across all relationship forms. 
The aim of this original outlook is to not only demonstrate the viability of radical 
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feminism, in light of new legal phenomena, but also, in providing an overview of all 
(legal) relationship forms, I am able to more clearly and firmly argue that we have not 
moved beyond legislating sexual relationships, even when new legislation does not 
speak of sexual relationships.  
 
iii: Theoretical framework 
In utilising feminist legal method, second wave feminism and in particular radical 
feminism, I work within the feminist belief that we must move beyond assumptions 
of law as neutral and objective. These feminists call for ‘feminist jurisprudence’, 
which signals “the shift away from a concentration on law reform and ‘adding 
women’ into legal considerations to a concern with fundamental issues like legal 
logic, legal values, justice, neutrality and objectivity.”50 This thesis does not argue for 
women to be ‘added’ to a male legal concept of consummation, but rather highlights 
the patriarchal reasoning behind the requirement, and argues for a feminist reading of 
the consummation requirement.  
 
Chapter 1 provides analysis of radical feminism and feminist’s views regarding the 
issues my thesis raises. I provide here a brief overview of radical feminism and my 
reasons for using this theory. Radical feminists have produced extensive literature 
relating to marriage, gender, same-sex partnerships and transgender issues, all key 
focuses of my research.51 I use this thesis to ‘map’ progress in feminist theory, and to 
argue that radical feminists are still actively working to “develop a politics of 
intimacy that is self-respecting, self-enhancing and generat[ing] social change. The 
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politics of intimacy for heterosexual radical feminists continues to be a site of 
resistance and change, enriching our understanding of the personal as political.”52 
Developments in feminist theory are generally referred to as waves,53 and each wave 
influences the one that follows. The third wave emerged as a backlash to second wave 
feminism, and presents itself as the format in which feminism has finally got it 
right.54  
 
This thesis looks to demonstrate that radical feminism still has something to say, and 
should not be considered something of the past. Though radical feminism can be seen 
as old fashioned, it is the perfect theoretical perspective for this research as “central to 
radical feminist perspectives is the belief that if sexuality is socially constructed, then 
it can be reconstructed in new and different ways, sexuality need not be coercive or 
oppressive, it can be challenged and changed.”55 This research aims to revise and 
update theories of consummation in light of relatively recent legal changes, whilst 
drawing on elements of radical feminism, all with the underlying belief that “women 
are, as a group, worse off than men, because their interests routinely fail to be given 
equal consideration.”56 The interests of women in consummation are deemed to be 
the interests of men. Chapter 2 shows marriages that have endured for many years, 
and have even produced offspring, have been held voidable on the absence of a 
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consummative act. Legally speaking, a woman’s role in the marriage is determined by 
her ability/willingness to engage in a form of sexual activity deemed acceptable by 
the court. I explore the traditions of radical feminism and feminist views about 
consummation, marriage and civil partnerships throughout this thesis, and utilise 
analysis of doctrine, legal sources and socio-legal texts.   
 
Radical feminism occurred in the second wave. Waves refer both to time and 
ideological differences, so the second wave refers to the 1960s-1980s and the 
ideology of women at that time. The emergence of ‘third wave’ feminism could be 
seen to suggest that the second wave had ended. I argue that the second wave has not 
ended and is well placed to analyse issues of gender, sexuality and the family.57 The 
central tenet of second wave feminism is the fundamental belief that women should 
unify because they are women. Class, race and faith for example were held to be 
secondary to being a woman.58 If the second wave is over, then the identity of 
‘woman’ is no longer the key unifying label. Rather, if each individual woman “is 
fragmented and likely to have multiple identities that change over time, it would be 
difficult to find a straightforward link between experience and political activity or to 
conceive of a politics based on collective interests as a sex- both of which had been 
crucial for ‘second wave’ feminism.”59  
 
Barker argues that feminist waves are not independent and complete movements and 
the second wave is an ongoing theoretical framework; “rather than focusing on 
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theoretical distinctions between the waves, I am using the wave metaphor as a 
conceptual tool that illustrates the passing of time whilst emphasising the connectivity 
between past and present.”60 I follow this analysis and argue that the move to an 
individualistic third wave has been premature. Thompson argues that ‘women’ is a 
necessary defining label, but “it is not sufficient as the unifying factor of feminist 
politics. It is the opposition to male domination which makes feminism relevant to 
women wherever they are situated, however differently they are excluded from 
recognition as human.”61 Second wave feminism continues to be of importance to 
women of today, as women unify against continuing male domination.  
 
I do not seek to phrase this research as a story of nostalgia for a lost theory.62 Third 
wave feminism’s premature presentation as the culmination of all feminism before it 
declares one type of feminism ‘good’ and others ‘bad’. Rather, each preceding 
element of feminist theory still has a role in contemporary issues. This is not to argue 
that third wave feminism is of no use, but radical feminism is still of value when it 
comes to looking at gender and sexuality issues, and to declare otherwise is to do a 
disservice to women and their needs.63 Researchers still engage with second wave 
feminism, and it impacts upon the third wave as well. Radical feminism still is, and 
should not be referred to as something of the past. Hannam explains, “young women 
who have benefited from social changes since ‘second wave feminism’ focus on the 
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body and sexuality as areas where struggle still has to take place.”64 In this respect, 
whereas other social phenomena may have moved beyond second wave feminism, we 
arguably still need to engage with second wave theories in areas of the body, 
sexuality, and in this case, consummation.  
 
The second wave established itself in the USA and spread across the world in the 
1960s with ‘bra-burning’ women demanding equal rights with men. Women had been 
steadily entering the workforce balancing home and work life, and there was a need 
for new and progressive legislation.65 The basis of second wave feminist work is that 
women are ‘women’ predominantly as a result of nurture rather than nature.66 It was 
within this wave that arguments which explained women’s construction as ‘Other’ 
emerged. This states that society, law and gender for example, are all built around 
men, and as women are not men, they are ‘other’. The male body is the comparator. 
The best known second wave feminist de Beauvoir argued that, 
 
one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman. No biological, 
psychological, or economic fate determines the figure that the 
human female presents in society; it is civilization as a whole that 
produces this creature, intermediate between male and eunuch, 
which is described as feminine. Only the intervention of someone 
else can establish an individual as an Other.67 
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Hannam explains that de Beauvoir’s theories “coupled with her assertion that women 
were as capable of choice as men, provided feminists with a new way of 
understanding the social position of women.”68 Women are different in physical 
appearance, but there is no reason other than the way we are raised and treated to 
account for our second class status. The conceptualisation of ‘women’ as ‘other’ has 
meant that being a ‘woman’ has further unified the members of the struggle. Women 
experience “oppression as women, not as members of other groups such as their 
social class. Hence, the explanation for women’s oppression is seen as lying in sexual 
oppression. Women are oppressed because of their sex.”69   
 
During early feminist action, awareness-raising groups were mixed- allowing both 
men and women to participate. The women in these groups found themselves 
relegated to tasks such as catering and minute taking. “It is hardly surprising, 
therefore, that women began to meet together in autonomous single-sex groups to 
discuss issues that concerned them and to raise their own demands.”70 New feminist 
methods also developed to publicise and explore issues affecting women. One such 
second wave method is consciousness-raising groups which encouraged women to 
discuss their life experiences. Through these open and frank conversations, women 
discovered that their experiences were not unique or strange, but were rather common 
place amongst most women. Consciousness-raising ensured women’s thoughts and 
feelings were at the forefront of the struggle and began to realise that ‘private’ issues 
such as body image, sexuality and relationships needed to be made political.71 
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Consciousness-raising has produced a body of work which extensively examines “the 
ways contemporary sexuality disqualifies and victimizes, [and] demonstrates the 
violence in the idea of sexuality and the violence perpetrated in the name of 
sexuality.”72 In exposing these issues, we can “offer many insights which reveal the 
contingent and contested nature of sexuality. They open a window through which the 
timeless, necessary, inevitable and exhaustive quality of the discourse of sexuality 
may be problematized.”73 Critics of consciousness-raising claim it is ‘group therapy’ 
for women speaking about personal grievances, but the hope is that vocalising these 
issues will lead towards an “understanding that these may not simply be a result of 
their personal situations. It was a way of discovering what they had in common as 
women, whatever their differences of class or race or personal experience.”74 
 
Critics of consciousness-raising and the omission of class and race from the second 
wave argue that radical feminism is dominated by the concerns of white middle-class 
women.75 Critical race theory suggests all theories of society should account for race- 
both that of the speaker and of those they are speaking about. However, this theory 
also has its pitfalls, some of which are similar to those levelled against radical 
feminism. This theory is often quite biographical, which is also a criticism of 
consciousness-raising. Critical race theory often ignores issues of multiculturalism, 
and the potential complexity and multiplicity of identity and subordination.76 It could 
be seen as essentialist, as race labels are used to unify groups of people, a criticism 
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also thrown at radical feminism, for its use of ‘woman’ as a unifying label.77 
“[L]esbian feminists and black feminists, [have] challenged the claims of the 
women’s liberation movement to speak for all women and sought to bring their own 
experiences and priorities to the fore.”78 Whilst I acknowledge the different slant that 
class and race can bring to some issues, they are not of importance to this thesis. The 
consummation requirement affects all married women of all races and classes who 
live and marry under English law.    
 
Furthermore I dismiss the use of some further theories that could be deemed relevant. 
These omissions are made, as they are made in any theory, and speak to “the 
boundaries established by any conceptual or theoretical framework, which distinguish 
that which is addressed and that which is constructed as outside the limits of the 
theory at hand.”79 The rejection of queer theory is explained in Chapter 1, but 
amounts to my preference to engage with theory which utilises identity theory to both 
categorize, and universalise experience.80 The omission of masculinities studies is 
also justified later. There also exists a growing literature within the sociology of 
heterosexuality. This theory has added to the diverse spectrum of feminist views on 
sexuality. Jackson (who self identifies as a radical feminist), explains that feminist 
theory tends to categorise sexuality in one of three ways; 
1. centrality of male domination 
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2. variability/plasticity of sexuality 
3. construction of individual desires81 
She would prefer that all theory engages with all three of these views, but most theory 
concentrates upon one aspect. I too fall into this trap, as radical feminism focuses 
predominantly upon the first view, to the exclusion of the others. It could be argued 
that dominant discourses “around sexuality have been framed from a predominantly 
white and middle class as well as male and heterosexual perspective.”82  
 
Ingraham argues that the heterosexual imaginary “conceals the operation of 
heterosexuality in structuring gender and closes off any critical analysis of 
heterosexuality as an organizing institution.”83 Ingraham argues heterosexuality is 
taken as natural and unchallenged, whereas gender is seem as socially constructed. I 
do not explicitly address the consummation requirement from a purely sociological 
perspective, but radical feminism is in fact the predecessor of this view.84 As shown 
throughout this thesis, radical feminism argues that although there are biological 
differences between men and women, the meaning of these differences has been 
prescribed by patriarchy and heteronormativity. If heterosexuality is unchallenged, 
then gender stereotypes will remain unchallenged. In challenging consummation, this 
thesis challenges one of the cornerstones of heterosexuality.  
 
iv: Methodology 
                                                 
81
 Jackson, S. ‘Theorizing Heterosexuality: Gender, Power and Pleasure’ (1994) 2 Strathclyde Papers 
on Sociology & Social Policy pgs1-29, pg1 
82
 Ibid pg4 
83
 Ingraham op cit n79 pg203-4 
84
 Idem  
 33
Traditional legal methods use deduction, induction, analogy, hypotheticals and 
engage with policy and principles to research legal problems. Feminist legal method 
engages with a different set of principles when examining socio-legal phenomena, as 
legal methods have traditionally been male methods.85 Socio-legal feminist interests 
include medical care issues, employment issues, child issues, and sexuality issues, 
and their research “aims to understand the nature of gender inequality and focuses on 
gender politics, power relations and sexuality. Feminism is also based on experiences 
of gender roles and relations.”86  
 
The ‘law in context’ approach of socio-legal studies could be said of other research 
methods too. Socio-legal research sits well as a feminist research method, as this type 
of engagement with the law can open other avenues of research and analysis. Socio-
legal research allows feminists to not only look at what the law says, but also how it 
says it and why. Its benefit also lies in its ability to be utilised for both theoretical and 
empirical research. The key use of socio-legal research as it relates to radical 
feminism is that it does not simply state that the solution to gender-biased law is to 
read it as gender neutral, but rather, to unearth the origins of the sexism of law. Socio-
legal research allows women to argue that law is not simply a collection of rules, but 
that it can be a site of struggle, and its production of gender and identity can be 
challenged.87 The utility of socio-legal research for the purposes of the research 
presented here is that I utilise the key concern of socio-legal research; 
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socio-legal scholarship locates legal practices within the context of 
the other social practices which constitute their immediate 
environment. Thus it comprehends a complex of administrative, 
commercial, economic, medical, psychiatric and other disciplinary 
practices, wherever they impinge upon or interact with law... socio-
legal studies subject legal practices to a... empirical inquiry which 
scrutinizes not merely the legal articulation of the relevant rules and 
processes but the meaning and effects of those rules and processes 
as interpreted and enforced, and as experienced by their subjects.88  
 
This is relevant to my research as consummation does not stand alone in law, but is 
impacted by medicine and religion, for example, as demonstrated throughout this 
research.  
 
Feminist research generally begins through the expression of a hope: “the political 
commitment to produce useful knowledge that will make a difference to women’s 
lives through social and individual change.”89 Bartlett argues that feminist research 
should ask “about the gender implications of a social practice or rule: have women 
been left out of consideration? If so, in what way; how might that omission be 
corrected? What difference would it make to do so?”90 With this in mind, feminist 
research provides innovative responses to socio-legal issues that affect women on the 
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ground, whilst facing questions about which women are conducting the research, and 
which women they are studying. Feminist research is therefore hard to generalize. 
Issues of geography, race, ethnicity and sexuality have all produced alternatives to 
radical feminist research.  
 
It could be argued that feminist theory in general, but radical feminism in particular 
has no academic value, as radical feminism is often seen as a political standpoint 
rather than an academic perspective.91 It has also been felt by some radical feminists 
that engaging in academic discourse could be seen as collusion with the patriarchal 
system that keeps women oppressed. Yet many of the activists of the 1970s are now 
respected academics and their focus still remains women’s issues. It is within this 
mindset that I present this academic work whilst arguing that it incorporates the main 
tenets of radical feminism.  
 
Feminists feel that part of the process of socio-legal research is to have acknowledged 
the fact that women are not listened to. By encouraging conversation about women’s 
experiences, women realise that their experiences are collective, and they are able to 
express this within the positive atmosphere of consciousness-raising groups. In this 
way, feminism does not emerge from a “body of theory but rather on instances of the 
experience of power and lack of power.”92  
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I engage with socio-legal research through the utilisation of existing radical feminist 
research regarding gender and sexuality for example which has developed through 
consciousness-raising.93 This thesis aims to be the ‘next-step’, using existing 
theoretical data available from radical feminists to analyse consummation and its links 
to existing theories of power, domination and gender and sexuality. The methodology 
here is theoretical analysis used to demonstrate the way in which legislatively, 
consummation is presented as inoffensive, gender neutral and as a means through 
which to exit a marriage.   
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ONE  
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE: FEMINIST THEORY 
 
This chapter provides an outline of the extremely broad theoretical contentions of feminist 
theory. I examine what constitutes feminism, and whether it is academic theory, or political 
practice. I then outline the history of feminism using the ‘waves’ metaphor. I provide a 
comprehensive overview of radical feminism’s views on patriarchy, domination and power; 
the private/public divide and gender and sexuality issues, whilst highlighting criticisms that 
have been levelled at radical feminists. Radical feminist views on consummation are 
critiqued in Chapter 3.   
 
Radical feminism argues that the problems women face within the law lie with the whole 
system of law and society, starting with the very fact that law makers are men, and that men 
and women are not equal sexually, socially or legally. Radical feminism was the first stream 
of feminist thought to dramatically break with earlier feminist theories which had tried to 
work within existing social relations and institutions. Radical feminists believe that 
patriarchy is all-pervasive, thereby affecting women at the very basic level of their thoughts, 
setting the way in which women think. This view of patriarchy flows through all feminist 
theory, but most strongly through radical feminist theory which aims to uncover male 
domination as a power relation “while struggling for a world where women are recognized as 
human beings in their own right.”1 The use of terms such as ‘domination’ is not to indicate 
that all women are completely powerless to men. If this were the case, feminism would not 
have been able to emerge. Rather, “it is used for the sake of clarity, in order to designate as 
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clearly as possible what it is that feminism is opposing... Feminism says that male 
domination constitutes the conditions under which we live, but that it ought not to be so.”2  
  
Reference to patriarchy throughout this research is used within the meaning outlined above. 
Radical feminists argue that sometimes “qualifying feminism with any of a variety of pre-
existing frameworks serves to disguise the core meaning of feminism.”3 Feminism is not just 
a political struggle, it is a struggle in the “domain of meaning.”4 Whilst feminists are 
concerned with issues such as rape, children and employment, their analysis means that these 
matters have a different meaning. The focus is always upon the woman, and ‘women’ as a 
unifying label. Consequentially, meaning is everywhere, and so too is the possibility of 
feminist struggle. The politics of feminists are “not confined to the kinds of issues 
conventionally defined as ‘political’, but…can happen anywhere with whatever tools are 
closest to hand…[F]eminism is available wherever women are, and advances wherever 
women do.”5   
 
1.1: What is feminism? Theory or practice?  
Throughout history there has been a quest to determine the role of women within society. 
“However, it is eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth century feminist campaigns for the 
elimination of discriminatory laws which prevented women from participating fully in civic 
life which mark the origins of contemporary feminist thought.”6 It is generally accepted that 
this campaign for women is feminism. Feminists “on the whole... tend, often quite 
                                                 
2
 Idem  
3
 Ibid pg 1 
4
 Ibid pg 16  
5
 Idem pg 16  
6
 Barnett, H., Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence London, Cavendish 1998 pg 3  
39 
 
deliberately, not to say what they mean by feminism.”7 Mackinnon is arguably the most 
influential and well known radical feminist.8 She claims that a theory can be considered 
feminist “to the extent it is persuaded that women have been unjustly unequal to men because 
of the social meaning of their bodies. Feminist theory is critical of gender as a determinant of 
life chances, finding that it is women who differentially suffer from the distinction of sex.”9 
She argues that radical feminism sees women as women, not as part of another group, or 
gender neutral. Harris states that all Mackinnon serves to do is ignore other differences, and 
re-discover white women.10  
 
Thompson speaks of feminism as a ‘social enterprise’, a framework that is anxious to address 
social wrongs both morally and politically. It is an ethical stance “in that it starts from and 
continually returns to questions of good value, of... right and wrong, of what is worthwhile 
and significant and what is not.”11 She breaks with the tendency to avoid definition and 
claims feminism is “the struggle against male supremacy and the struggle for a human status 
for women identifying with women.”12 Fineman and other feminists use this starting point to 
claim that the legal theories advanced are “perspective scholarship” which denotes “an ever-
growing body of work connected by the fact that it challenges the traditional notion that law 
is a neutral, objective, rational set of rules, unaffected in content and form by the passions 
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and perspectives of those who possess and wield the power inherent in law and legal 
institutions.”13  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 show that the law regarding consummation has also been presented as 
neutral, rational and objective, but in reality is a reflection of the passion of men who wield 
power in law and legal institutions.14 Feminists examine power structures in society to 
determine modes of patriarchy as domination. They highlight the public/private dichotomy; 
an ideological construct “which confines important aspects of the subordination of women to 
the domain of the ‘private’, and allows some of the most violent manifestations of the power 
of men over women to go unrecognized and unchecked.”15 Feminist politics tries to make the 
private political and public, in an effort to challenge the dichotomy and its effects upon the 
social and personal development of women. “Feminism means the personal is political”16 and 
the political is academic.  
 
MacKinnon claims that the liberation of women, including in law, is “first practice, then 
theory…Feminism was a practice long before it was a theory… This distinguishes it from 
academic feminism.”17 But Bottomley et al argue that feminist theory is now worthy of 
                                                 
13
 Fineman, M.A., The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies London, 
Routledge, 1995 pg 24; Smart, C., Law, Crime & Sexuality: Essays in Feminism London, Sage 1995 at pg 189 
Law is more than sexist, the aims and characteristics of law are male.   
14
 Rationality and objectivity are associated with male traits, and so is the law: Smart, C., ‘Law’s Power, the 
Sexed Body, and Feminist Discourse’ (1990) 17 Journal of Law and Society 2 pgs 194-210 pg 204; Smart op cit 
n12 pg 162  
15
 Thompson op cit n1 pg 7; Barnett op cit n6 pg 168  
16
 Herbert, N., 1992 as quoted in Thompson op cit n1 pg 32. ‘The personal is political’ means that “what we do 
everyday matters.” MacKinnon, C.A., ‘Liberalism and the Death of Feminism’ in Leidholdt, D. & Raymond, 
J.G., The Sexual Liberals & the Attack on Feminism New York, Pergamon Press 1990 pgs 3-13 pg 5 
17
 MacKinnon, C., ‘From Practice to Theory, or What is a White Woman Anyway?’ in Bell, D. & Klein, R , S 
(eds) Radically Speaking: Feminism Reclaimed London, Zed Books, 1996 pgs 45- 54 pg 46; Bottomley, A., 
Gibson, S. & Meteyard, B. ‘Dworkin; Which Dworkin? Taking Feminism Seriously’ (1987) 14 Journal of Law 
and Society 1 pgs 47- 60 pg 47; Smart op cit n13 pg 194; Rowland, R. & Klein, R. ‘Radical Feminism: History, 
Politics, Action’ in Bell, D. & Klein, R. Radically Speaking: Feminism Reclaimed London, Zed Books 1996 pgs 
9-36   
41 
 
academic recognition as it has matured, as has the general “political and academic climate.”18 
Brooks argues that this ‘divide’ between theory and practice is actually a “falsely constructed 
binarism,”19 perhaps silencing the criticism of radical feminism as intellectually inferior, and 
acknowledging that thesis’ such as this can be written from a feminist perspective, and be 
considered academic. Whilst recognising “that the divide between theory and practice is to 
some extent a falsely constructed binarism, there remains the need to engage in a discourse 
that recognises the reality of exactly how the two inform each other.”20 It is for this reason 
that I engage with feminist research as an academic perspective. Although consummation is 
not currently a ‘political’ issue, feminism exists in the debates around consummation, 
because women are involved in consummation, it is done to them, and their participation is 
almost unquestioned as a result of the absorption of patriarchal ideals of sex and marriage. 
 
Consummation is a real life experience for women, and radical feminism “has concentrated 
on creating its theory in the writing of women’s lives and the political analysis of women’s 
oppression.”21 Making issues political and academic is beneficial because it pushes them into 
the public arena, and onto the public agenda. Women cannot be ‘equal’ with men as long as 
there is no equality among men. In feminist terms, what women want is a human status 
where rights, benefits and dignities are gained at no one’s expense, and where duties and 
obligations do not fall disproportionately on the shoulders of women.”22 MacKinnon says 
women who work in the legal field need to articulate “the theory of women’s practice- 
women’s resistance, visions, consciousness, injuries, notions of community, experience of 
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inequality…As our theoretical question becomes “what is the theory of women’s practice”, 
our theory becomes a way of moving against and through the world, and methodology 
becomes technology.”23  
 
 
1.2: Feminist waves 
As a result of changing views and social conditions, differences have emerged between 
feminist theories over time. The development of feminist theory has not been a linear 
process, but is often presented as one which “charts the story as one of progress beyond 
falsely boundaried categories and identities.”24 These changing perspectives within feminism 
are referred to as waves, “although none of these is totally distinct or isolated from other 
phases.”25 Just as it is difficult to tell where one wave in the ocean ends and another begins, it 
is also difficult to determine when one ‘wave’ of feminist theory begins and ends. Hemmings 
has argued that the telling of feminist history has served to present the emergence of 
feminism as a more linear process than that described by the wave metaphor, and we should 
focus upon stressing the links between differing frameworks.26 Those that present feminist 
history as linear argue simplistically that each phase replaced the one before it, rather than 
acknowledge the influence of each wave upon the next.27 Radical feminism evolved 
predominantly within the second wave, though in keeping with the wave metaphor, it 
embraces elements of first wave feminism, and influences third wave perspectives.   
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First wave (liberal) feminism was most prevalent in the mid Victorian age, but stretched 
through to the mid 1980s. These feminists worked within existing systems of law and 
society, in order to remove the inherent inequalities, without questioning the system’s 
functionality itself. Liberal feminists “accepted law as traditionally portrayed: the rational, 
objective, fair, gender-neutral arbiter in disputes over rights which applied to undifferentiated 
but individual and autonomous legal subjects.”28 First wave liberal feminists argued that both 
men and women are autonomous. Consequently, “rationality, individual choice, equal rights 
and equal opportunity are central concepts for liberal political theory. Liberal 
feminism…argues that women are just as rational as men and... should have equal 
opportunity with men to exercise their right to make rational, self-interested choices.”29 
These liberal feminists have faced criticism from radical feminists both for their view on law, 
and also for their adoption of “an assimilationist theory of equality that would benefit women 
only if they acted like men.”30  
 
Second wave feminism does not focus primarily on “the substantive (legal) inequalities under 
which women exist…but rather the legal and societal structure which perpetuates 
inequalities.”31 I utilise this view to highlight a legal inequality- the requirement of 
consummation- and also position this inequality within its legal and societal structure of 
heteronormativity and patriarchy. Law’s use of gender-neutral language pretends to deliver 
impartiality, objectivity and rationality, but in fact serves to mask “the extent to which law is 
permeated by male constructs, male standards. The ‘reasonable man’ so beloved by the 
common law, does not include women. If women are to be ‘reasonable’, within the legal 
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meaning of the term, they must adopt the male standard of reasonableness.”32 Consummation 
legislation utilises ‘gender-neutral’ language, presenting the need to consummate as 
applicable equally to both the husband and wife. However, upon reading the case law and 
analysis, it becomes clear that in practical terms, consummation is a male construct with male 
standards.  
 
Radical feminists assert that to argue that women are similar to men “merely assimilates 
women into an unchanged male sphere. In a sense, the result is to make women into men.”33 
For this reason, radical feminists build their arguments upon the differences between men 
and women, which have been used by men to subordinate women. Daly states that all text is 
male constructed, and that ‘moronized’ women “believe that male-written texts (biblical, 
literary, medical, legal, scientific) are “true”.”34 This rings true of consummation. The fact 
that there is very little published material about consummation suggests that there is no 
alternative worth discussing. Failure to examine and criticise the consummation requirement 
deems the legal existence of consummation ‘true’ and necessary.  
 
In viewing law as male, second wave feminists have developed alternative theories about 
power, gender and sexuality, and how these relate to specific issues such as abortion, 
reproductive autonomy and the sex industry. “Radical feminism’s revolutionary intent is 
expressed first and foremost in its woman-centredness: women’s experiences and interests 
are at the centre of our theory and practice. It is the only theory by and for women.”35 Whilst 
liberal feminists were still focusing on individual rights and equal opportunities, radical 
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feminists were attempting “to find new ways of theorizing women’s relationship to men.”36 
Atkinson writes, “the analysis begins with the feminist raison d’être that women are a class, 
that this class is political in nature, and that this political class is oppressed. From this point 
on, Radical Feminism separates from traditional feminism.”37 Radical feminists provided 
new insight into the ways in which patriarchy expressed power, not only overtly but also 
covertly through accepted social norms such as the idea of ‘gender’, creating a “new political 
and social theory of women’s oppression, and strategies for the end of that oppression, which 
comes from women’s lived experiences.”38  
 
Extending the feminist theory of male domination, radical feminists have argued that the 
development of alternative feminist frameworks is not an argument between ‘equally 
matched contenders’ but rather an attack on radical feminism “powered by allegiances to 
varieties of malestream thought.”39 The notion of labelling types of feminism “serves the 
ideological purpose of opening a space within feminism for other ‘feminisms’, thus 
providing a platform for attacking it from within.”40 It will be found throughout this thesis 
that many authors who are referenced will not self-identify as ‘radical’ but will for example, 
argue against the institution of marriage, which is why they have been referenced in this 
work, as I make the same argument, on the basis of the consummation requirement.  
 
Whilst radical feminism may be more revolutionary in its actions and aims, it serves to 
analyse not only the effect of law upon women, but the root of the law, and the underlying 
assumptions leading to its enactment. This focus does not discount the contribution made by 
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academics and activists from other frameworks. The word ‘radical’ means “‘pertaining to the 
root’: Radical Feminism looks at the roots of women’s oppression.”41 For radical feminists, 
feminism is not about a revival of a political movement for social equality. Rather, “it is the 
second wave of the most important revolution in history. Its aim: overthrow of the oldest, 
most rigid class/caste system in existence, the class system based on sex- a system 
consolidated over thousands of years, lending the archetypal male and female roles an 
underserved legitimacy and seeming permanence.”42  
 
Theories emerging from within third wave feminism could be considered more relevant to the 
purposes of this research. The third wave emerged in response to perceived failures of the 
feminist waves before it, in particular, challenging the essentialist and universalising claims 
of radical feminism, which it felt rendered “invisible the actual experiences of diversity.”43 
Butler has strongly argued that gender is something that a woman performs, rather than 
something she is born with or destined to.44 This third wave/queer theory is often seen as 
challenging the naturalization of identity.45 It functions in the gaps of identity politics- 
challenging existing binaries. I believe radical feminism does the same thing, in a better way. 
Queer theory was born out of the principles of radical feminism, but in denying universality, 
its cause is betrayed. It cannot achieve anything if it tries to account for every possible 
situation. Asch argues that “society will balk at making modifications that include everyone 
unless dominant members of that society can be perceived to benefit as a by-product of these 
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changes.”46 Butler’s ‘gender performatives’  are born out of the insights of de Beauvoir’s 
conception of gender- in which a person is not born a woman, but rather becomes one.47 
Rejection of identity within Queer theory leads to a denial of difference. Seidman argues that, 
“this very refusal to anchor experience in identifications ends up, ironically, denying 
differences by either submerging them in an undifferentiated oppositional mass or by 
blocking the development of individual and social differences through the disciplining 
compulsory imperative to remain undifferentiated.”48 
 
Third wave feminism has become increasingly appealing because it is seen to allow feminist 
theory to move beyond “liberal feminists’ attention to individual women’s rights, radical 
feminism’s collective action for social justice, and the end of patriarchy,”49 and onto a type 
of feminism which is more reflective of its participants.50 In comparison to the perceived 
ignorance/exclusion of racial diversity by radical feminists, the third wave emerges “as 
champion of multiplicity and difference.”51 However, in patriarchy “other disparities of 
power such as race and ethnicity can be... sexualized,”52 and the power dynamic in this 
sexualisation is best explained by radical feminism and theories of patriarchy. Whilst I do 
incorporate some third wave feminist’s work, I do not feel that this thesis should be 
constructed solely from this perspective. I subscribe to the view put forward by second wave 
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feminists that “law and legal systems operate in an invariably sexist manner,”53 and the most 
effective way to combat this is to unite as women. Conversely third wave feminists argue 
“law is too complicated a phenomenon to be portrayed in this holistic manner. What needs to 
be understood from this perspective, is the manner in which law responds to differing 
problems, and in its operation reveals its well concealed gender bias.”54 
 
I further argue against the third wave’s view that ‘grand theories’ are dead.55 The second 
wave is seen as espousing monocausal explanations- for radical feminists this is patriarchy, 
for Marxist feminists for example, this is class structure.56 In my opinion, the ‘grand theories’ 
of second wave feminism are not complete, especially where issues of gender and sexuality 
are concerned. We have not obtained all the possible advantages given by second wave 
theories. We have not exhausted the theories espoused to their full capacity, and although 
each wave overlaps with the next, perhaps second wave feminism has been too quickly 
moved away from. Radical feminism has been attacked and marginalized, and feminism has 
moved more readily into “a comfortable and easy libertarianism, stressing individualism 
rather than collective responsibility; or into socialism with its ready made structures to attack, 
withdrawing the heat from the main actors of patriarchy: men themselves.”57 Radical 
feminism in comparison seems naively dependent upon collective action, and is perhaps 
overly ‘radical’ in its expectations. Some feminists argue that radical feminism focuses too 
strongly on woman’s biology, and in unifying women as ‘women’, creates an essential 
woman. But we have not achieved the political aims of the second wave movement, 
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described by Firestone as “not just elimination of male privilege but of the sex distinction 
itself.”58    
 
Third wave feminism does not appear to be addressing this aim successfully. In reference to 
consummation, I argue second wave theories are still the most relevant and that universal 
(monocausal) explanations can be provided. When grand theories are critiqued, and the local 
and particular are prioritised, at the expense of all-encompassing theories, this serves to 
endanger the effort to create wide-reaching social change.59 Race, age, faith and disability are 
irrelevant at the moment of consummation. For women who experience consummation, the 
experience is of course unique to them, but the concept of consummation is universally 
understood.60 The law universalises the experience, as it does not provide different constructs 
of consummation on the basis of faith, race or age. Following chapters show that the only 
matter of importance for the law is that the wife is a woman, and must be penetrated 
vaginally by her husband’s penis. Therefore, to speak of women as one for the purposes of 
this research is to promote radical feminist thinking, but also to work within law’s own 
definition.  
 
Richardson argues that no form of feminist theory has adequately dealt with issues of class 
and ethnicity. She disagrees with “the suggestion that radical feminism is inherently more 
likely than other forms of feminism to result in a denial of the different interests between, 
especially, Black and white women.”61 Stacey explains that universalising the oppression of 
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women and theorising differences between women are two different issues and “plenty of 
feminist theory which is not claiming the universality of women’s oppression can be 
challenged for its racist assumptions, and likewise generalised theories of oppression are by 
no means the prerogative of white feminists.”62 However, it has to be acknowledged that 
there are inconsistencies in adopting a universalist approach. When biology is incorporated 
into the law, it becomes essentialised for women. For example, it is assumed that all women 
will inevitably become pregnant, and this “constitutes a problematic difference with respect 
to legal treatment. This construction of womanhood is obviously problematic in that it 
excludes women who are not and who will not ever become pregnant.”63 MacKinnon states 
that radical feminism “sees all women in each one... In radicalism, women is a collective 
whole, a singular noun, its diverse elements part of its commonality.”64 The Redstockings 
argue that as radical feminists engaging with consciousness-raising they “identify with all 
women... [and] repudiate all economic, racial, educational or status privileges that divide us 
from other women... [and as such are] determined to recognize and eliminate any prejudices 
we may hold against other women.”65  
 
I believe that when it comes to examining the legal construction and socio-legal 
understanding of consummation in marriage, second wave feminism has not been used to its 
full advantage. When trying to effect legal reform, policy makers will be more concerned 
with a law that affects as many people as possible. Making law reform suggestions from an 
individualistic (third wave) position means that these proposals will never be taken seriously. 
This is perhaps the best example of the political rather than academic stance of radical 
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feminism. In order to enact any kind of change, in the law regulating consummation for 
example, there needs to be strength in numbers to gain power, and hopefully, change.  
 
Whilst radical feminist theory has been heavily criticised, feminists owe much to it. Rights 
movements need radicals and “what feminists owe to radical feminism is the conviction that 
what women share is their sexuality and that even if this sexuality has been a source of 
danger for women in the past, it can become a locus of pleasure and power for each and 
every woman in the future.”66 This thesis argues the same. Consummation is constructed 
though patriarchal understandings and is something required of women, by men. Once sexual 
relations are removed from these constraints, there is nothing to say a woman cannot enjoy 
her sexual experiences with men. To reduce radical feminism “to a simplistic biological 
determinist argument,”67 is to dramatically under appreciate the potential for social change it 
could still yield.  
 
1.3: Radical feminism: patriarchy, domination and power 
 
In one sense, all feminism is by definition ‘radical’, challenging the central 
tenets of legal and political thought and demanding full citizenship for 
women in society.68 
 
Patriarchy, domination and power relations are important feminist concepts most prevalent in 
second wave feminist writing. The ‘personal is political’ shows that our, “so-called ‘private’ 
life cannot be isolated from society’s attention: the refusal of society and law to recognise the 
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realities of patriarchy have for too long rendered women vulnerable to abuse, manipulation 
and violence.”69 Feminists have traced the origins of patriarchy to demonstrate its emergence, 
existence and continued influence. French argues that patriarchy is a hierarchical system 
which values ‘power-over’. “Originally developed to ensure the human community’s 
survival, power-over rapidly became, under patriarchy, a value cultivated simply for the 
experience of being the person in charge, the lawgiver, the “boss,” number one in the 
“pecking order.””70 
 
Bell argues that power is not directly given to men, but that “feminist analysis demonstrates 
the differential and hierarchical positions of men and women in relations which repeatedly 
accord men the greater access to the exercise of power.”71 The research presented here 
demonstrates the differential positions allocated to men and women within the consummation 
act, and the law. The patriarchal conception of heterosexuality is one of domination, in the 
“service of male-gratifying sex and, even more worrisome, as male-defined sex in the service 
of violence and domination.”72 Rifkin too argues that the definition of patriarchy is found in 
the relationship of power struggles between men and women “in which males hold dominant 
power and determine what part females shall and shall not play, and in which capabilities 
assigned to women are relegated generally to the mystical and aesthetic and excluded from 
the practical and political realms, these realms being regarded as separate and mutually 
exclusive.”73 
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Radical feminism “names all women as part of an oppressed group, stressing that no woman 
can walk down the street or even live in her home safely without fear of violation by men.”74 
In unifying women against men, women become ‘Other’. Patriarchal gender relations are all 
pervasive, and the root of all other oppression; “patriarchy is the paradigm par excellence for 
all modes of oppression; [and]... sexism is prior to all other “isms,” including classism and 
racism.”75 Patriarchy stems through all areas of life, from medicine, where medical services 
are male-controlled, through to the economy which is structured to disadvantage women and 
in which money equals power. “Women without economic independence cannot sustain 
themselves without a breadwinner. They cannot leave a brutal husband, they cannot 
withdraw sexual, emotional, and physical servicing from men, they cannot have an equal say 
in decisions affecting their own lives, such as where they might live.”76 
 
As the values of the legal system are male, radical feminists are “inclined to be suspicious of 
government intervention, perceiving the state itself as being intrinsically patriarchal, and also 
tends to focus on the politics of the ‘private’ sphere, in particular sexuality, motherhood and 
bodies.”77 Rifkin says law is a paradigm of maleness, and that “law and legal ideology under 
capitalism preserved, transformed and updated pre-existing patriarchal forms to serve the 
interests of the emerging bourgeoisie.”78 Thompson further expands upon the hierarchy and 
exploitation that exists in the public domain. She claims that “women’s entry into statuses 
and positions structured by the requirements of male prestige and power, does no more than 
set up among women the same hierarchies existing among men.”79 This is not to say that 
withdrawing from men is the way to provide societal change. I engage with the stream of 
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radical feminism that acknowledges the problems in society, is suspicious of the law, but 
challenges the system, without withdrawing from men. Commentators such as MacKinnon80 
argue that men dominate women, controlling not only the law, and through that, our bodies, 
but also the discourse used to explain these occurrences. Men have institutionalised sexual 
violence, and have allowed for the intimate violation of women by men, perhaps quite 
explicitly expressed in the consummation requirement for valid marriages. When considering 
patriarchy in marriage, radical feminists reach two conclusions: firstly, the 
reproductive/biological capabilities of women are used to oppress them, and secondly 
(hetero)sex manifests inequality between men and women.  
 
This thesis’ concentration upon the consummation requirement challenges the patriarchal 
ordering of sexual understanding. It does not argue that the removal of consummation from 
law will create equality in sexual relations between men and women. Rather, I use 
consummation to demonstrate patriarchal culture in sex, and propose the removal of at least 
one instance from legal significance. The consummation requirement is a specific example of 
legal inequality for women that needs to be abolished. This thesis critically analyses society’s 
heterosexual structure and demonstrates the symbolic and practical weight the consummation 
requirement adds to this structure.  
 
Most radical feminists argue that patriarchy and male domination pervade so deeply that men 
believe they have no choice “other than to respond to [their]... sexual urges, [which]... creates 
a self-validating tautology of belief predicated on the notion that his aggressive behaviours 
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are linked to his inherited traits.”81 Feminists try to break this acceptance of domination as 
the norm through highlighting “the source of men’s sexuality as deriving in part from... 
culture and not exclusively from biology.”82 Millett83 argues that patriarchy equates to male 
control of both the private and public world. This control needs to be done away with if 
“women are to be liberated... To eliminate male control, men and women have to eliminate 
gender- specifically, sexual status, role, and temperament- as it has been constructed under 
patriarchy”84 which renders men powerful and dominant, and women subordinate. 
 
No matter the choice of definition, “the scene... [has been] set in which 
body/women/emotion/nature coalesced into that which was rightfully governed by 
mind/men/reason/culture as the basis for the development of civilised society.”85 It is within 
this framework that women have had their role in society determined for them. Rowland and 
Klein state that “men have managed to create an ideology which defines men as the ‘natural’ 
owners of intellect, rationality, and the power to rule. Women ‘by nature’ are submissive, 
passive and willing to be led.”86 
 
Smart uses the term ‘phallocentric’, rather than patriarchal. She holds that within 
phallocentric culture, the sexual norm is considered to be heterosexuality, in which a man 
dominates a woman’s body, “and thus heterosexuality achieves a spurious universality 
against which ‘deviations’ (which are called by special names) are judged. In turn, this 
(hetero)sexuality is overdetermined by the prioritized activity of intercourse and its 
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satisfactions become synonymous with the pleasures of the phallus.”87 This prioritization of 
pleasure is evident in consummation case-law presented in Chapter 2.  
 
Patriarchy culminates in the idea of ‘one flesh’ and the ownership of women by men; “in 
marriage, two become one, and that one is the husband.”88 Though not explicit in the 
legislation, this is still the underlying notion behind consummation law. In that first instance 
of sex in marriage, the husband “makes of that body unequivocally a passive object, he 
affirms his capture of it.”89 Under this explicitly religious doctrine90 of ‘one flesh’, women 
have “found themselves tied to their husbands whose every whim- violent or sexual- could be 
forced upon her, with no legal rights over her children whatsoever, thus tying her more 
firmly into a state of dependency in the condition of slavery.”91 Daly declares that patriarchy 
in western society is found overtly and subliminally in Christian symbolism, and the all-male 
trinity, the significance of which is the “image of the procession of a divine son from a divine 
father (no mother or daughter involved)…This naming of “the three Divine Persons” is the 
paradigmatic model for the pseudogeneric term person, excluding all female mythic 
presence, denying female reality in the cosmos.”92 Consummation was originally a religious 
requirement, and its patriarchy stems from here.  
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To understand power is to understand “the means by which people struggle as well as the 
form and character of state authority and control.”93 Yet how does one reconcile that with the 
concept of woman as ‘Other’ in which it is argued that women are ‘Other’ to men, in other 
words that they are the opposite, and not as good as men- with becoming ‘one’ with their 
husbands? Beauvoir argues that the wife in fact “lets herself be taken without ceasing to be 
the Other.”94 So entrenched is female subordination and male power that he can absorb his 
wife’s being upon marriage, but still be her master.  
 
 
1.4: Radical feminism: private/public sphere  
The private sphere provides a “backdrop for the public sphere: relations within the private 
sphere, and particularly the division of labour within the family, often if not invariably 
dictate the capacity of individuals to participate fully in the public world of government and 
employment.”95 Women often do the larger share of the labour within the (private) family- 
from housework to childrearing- in order to allow men to participate in the public (economic) 
sphere. Women who have been able to participate in the public sphere have generally had to 
balance both spheres, rather than designate the private sphere to their male partner.96 
Feminist theory argues that confining women to the private (domestic) sphere, unregulated 
by law, renders women invisible.97  
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O’Donovan argues that legal policy has always distinguished between these falsely 
constructed spheres, creating a division between public law- for example criminal and 
constitutional law- and private transactions like property law and torts, and therefore a 
division between men and women. For her, “the division of labour whereby one spouse 
works for earnings and the other for love encapsulates the public/private split.”98 Taub and 
Schneider elaborate, “contract law... is not available during the marriage to enforce either the 
underlying support obligation or other agreements by the parties to a marriage to matters not 
involving property.”99 As a result of this socially accepted split, there has been a shift in 
people’s expectations regarding state responsibility for assisting families. “As more and more 
types of relationships become subsumed within the private sphere of the family, the state’s 
responsibility for supporting individuals correspondingly lessens.”100  
 
Given the tendency to separate between the public and the private within the law, it is no 
surprise that developments in private law are still relatively new, including legislation 
regarding domestic violence,101 child rights, and same-sex relationships.102 This new trend in 
effecting change within the family may be the realisation that, like the family, the ‘private 
sphere’ is an ideological, patriarchal, male construct, which will be interfered as and when it 
suits men. Designating certain areas  
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as personal, private and subjective makes them appear to be outside the 
scope of law as a fact of nature, whereas in fact non-intervention is a 
socially constructed, historically variable, and inevitably political decision. 
The state defines as ‘private’ those aspects of life into which it will not 
intervene, then, paradoxically, uses this privacy as the justification for its 
non-intervention... the idea that the family can be private in the sense of 
outside public regulation is a myth. The state cannot avoid intervening in 
the shaping of familial relations through decisions as to which type of 
relations to sanction and codify and which types of dispute to regulate or 
not regulate.103 
 
‘Non-intervention’ is evident in consummation. Marriage is the key institution of the private 
sphere. But the state intervenes in the most intimate aspect of this relationship- 
consummation- under the guise of determining whether or not the marriage is valid. Family 
law needs to change fundamentally, with the focus shifting away from defining public and 
private spaces. The use of this public/private divide in law has meant that the law “has 
operated directly and explicitly to prevent women from attaining self-support and influence 
in the public sphere, thereby reinforcing their dependence on men.”104 The delineation of the 
nuclear family (which is assumed to be (hetero)sexual), to the private sphere should mean, in 
theory at least, that the law has little or no regulation upon the family. It is instead clear that 
the family straddles the public/private divide. When the state has not wished to involve itself 
in family matters, it refers to the family as private, but has undertaken extensive examination 
of intimate and ‘private’ sexual relationships.  
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The definition of the nuclear ((hetero)sexual) relationship as the norm for the private sphere 
effectively renders others outside the protection of the law, whilst ignoring the fact that 
‘nuclear’ does not always mean ‘conjugal’ (see further Chapter 6). This tendency to declare 
the nuclear family the ‘norm’ stems from an ideal of the ‘natural’105 family, and when 
making this claim, provides the claimant a “rhetorical advantage. He or she does not have to 
admit the moral or political aspects of the claim while at the same time... dismiss[ing] all 
opposition as ‘unnatural’.”106 It is within the realms of family, gender, sexuality, and 
marriage that as a society we are most “seduced by appeals to the natural. In this realm, the 
shifting mores of practice are solidified, some to be sanctified and others condemned. The 
prevailing form of family is seen as inevitable, as naturally given and biologically 
determined.”107 The law uses the public/private divide to prioritise the conjugal family, 
relying heavily upon this ‘naturalism’ as a justification including reliance on medical 
evidence to argue that (hetero)sex is natural, biological and even necessary.  
 
Whilst legal developments in family law seemingly move away from viewing marriage as the 
only form of legally sanctioned relationship, the test for other relationship forms “is the 
degree to which they are marriage-like’… Law’s normative vision of ‘the family,’ with 
marriage as the benchmark, is reproduced each time a court is called upon to decide whether 
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a particular living arrangement is ‘familial’ or not,”108  clearly demonstrated in the debates 
surrounding the enactment of the CPA and M(SSC)A (Chapter 5).   
 
 
1.5: Radical feminism: gender and sexuality  
Whilst law and other social institutions can be accused of patriarchy that is not to say that all 
relationships are inherently oppressive. The creation of a hierarchy of relationship forms 
(heterosexual, cohabiting, homosexual, polygamous etc) is more detrimental to people’s 
rights than being in a heterosexual relationship, for further privilege is assigned on the basis 
of membership to a particular relationship form. Men have also controlled women’s bodies 
through the use of a socially constructed understanding of gender and femininity. Radical 
feminists have therefore taken the lead in articulating the nature of the sex and gender 
system, whilst also proposing ways to free women from ‘femininity’, ranging from 
suggesting a female culture, instead of a male one, to “transforming the institution of 
heterosexuality so that neither men nor women play a dominant role to rejecting 
heterosexuality in favour of celibacy, autoeroticism, or lesbianism... radical feminists should 
be credited with detailing the ways in which men, rather than “society” or “conditions,” have 
forced women into oppressive gender roles and sexual behaviour.”109 
 
This thesis works to transform heterosexuality by uncovering the inherent domination 
required in consummation law, and seeks to alter the socio-legal understanding of the 
consummation act. Feminists and radical feminists in particular have produced an extensive 
amount of literature analysing the control men exert over women’s bodies through 
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oppression, sexual control, and the control of medicine. Family, reproductive rights and 
motherhood also remain subjects of contention for feminists. “The institution of the family is 
a primary institution of patriarchy. Chained to the theory and practice of…compulsory 
heterosexuality, the father-dominated family, with its dependent motherhood for women, has 
enslaved women into sexual and emotional service.”110 Heterosexuality does not always 
produce inequality, but it oppresses and affects all women in some way or another, and 
motherhood oppresses most women who have children, as men control the workplace, and 
childcare provisions for working mothers. 
 
Through the 1970s and 1980s, feminists argued about whether or not to focus on the analysis 
of women’s “‘sameness’ or ‘difference’ (to/from men), concentrating on the issue of whether 
and how men and women are ‘different’ or ‘equal’ or ‘the same’.”111 Radical feminists were 
split as to whether they should focus on the ‘enemy position’– ie: to focus on men as 
oppressors- or to focus on the ‘women position’- ie: to focus on women’s oppression, its 
roots, effects and possible solutions. They felt that “where difference means dominance as it 
does with gender, for women to affirm differences is to affirm the qualities and 
characteristics of powerlessness.”112 To argue for sameness would be to still hold men as the 
comparator. Women’s rights should not be an issue of demonstrating the sameness or 
difference of women to men. Rather, the key is to uncover and address the dominance and 
power that men exert over women “because men have defined women as different, [and 
therefore]... equality arguments cannot succeed.”113 Radical feminism shifts to a focus upon 
the ‘sameness’ of women to each other; creating the ‘universal’ and ‘essential’ woman. The 
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differing types of feminist theory adopt differing approaches to the issue of gender, sameness 
and difference, but as Barnett explains, “radical feminism…conceptualises the question of 
gender in the light of power relationships, and the disparity of power between men and 
women, supported by law and society. From this perception, women’s role is determined by 
her socially constructed gender, which ensures her inequality and subordination in relation to 
law and society which is characterised by male dominance,”114 rather than a focus on class or 
difference.  
 
MacKinnon summarises that “…gender is socially constructed as difference 
epistemologically; sex discrimination law bounds gender equality by difference doctrinally. 
A built-in tension exists between this concept of equality, which presupposes sameness, and 
this concept of sex, which presupposes difference.”115 Viewed in this way, concepts such as 
sex equality become an oxymoron. She further argues that gender is constructed because 
heterosexuality demands it. Issues of the demands of heterosexuality are further explored in 
later chapters, but the need for female sexual subordination and male dominance has created 
gender, and sexuality.116 Thompson conveys her understanding of ‘male dominance’ as a 
‘phallic mandate’:117 the belief that women service the penis. This is particularly evident in 
the research presented in Chapters 2 and 3 in which the law is skewed to service male sexual 
expectations. Women are complicit in this ideology as they “accept a second-rate ‘human’ 
status for themselves and eroticize their own subordination.”118 Thompson feels this is most 
exemplified within conventional heterosexual relations, which promote the idea that women 
cannot live without a man. For women who are not in relationships, life is portrayed as empty 
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and unfulfilled, and their lives structured around the need to find a man. In the case law in 
which women are seen to want a ‘full’ sex life, this is justified as a desire to bare children, 
thereby avoiding any protracted judicial discussions of women’s sexual desires. As Chapter 2 
will show, in the case of women who are over child baring age, discussions turn to the want 
for a ‘normal’ marriage, again silencing female sexuality. Instead discourse surrounding the 
desire to appear ‘normal’ is prioritised.  
 
Tong explains that this will not change “so long as women’s sexuality is interpreted in terms 
of men’s sexuality- as if Eve had indeed been made only to service Adam’s every want and 
need.”119 Thompson argues that the term ‘gender’ is meaningless, as a consequence both of; 
 
the euphemistic role it plays within academic feminism (and the media, and 
wherever the word ‘sex’ would do instead), and of the incoherence of its 
origins. ‘Gender’ softens the harsh, uncompromising ring of ‘male 
domination’. It provides the appearance of a subject-matter while at the 
same time enabling the real problems to be avoided. Originally it was set up 
in opposition to ‘sex’, to stress the point that the differences between the 
sexes are socially constructed, not natural. But the ‘sex/gender’ distinction 
does not challenge the ‘society/nature’ opposition- it remains wholly within 
it. If ‘the social’ is ‘gender’, and ‘sex’ is something other than ‘gender’, 
then sex is something other than social. If it is not social, then all that is left 
is the residual category of ‘the natural’, and ‘sex’ remains as ‘natural’ as it 
ever was. As a consequence the ‘sex/gender’ distinction does not disrupt 
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and unsettle the society/nature’ opposition, but reinforces it because it is the 
same kind of distinction.120  
 
Sexuality is a political issue as a result of the analysis “of the oppression of women through 
male-defined sexuality and power, and because of the demand to take back our bodies.”121 It 
is important to note that the basis of radical feminist opinion is the “belief in the political 
necessity of women-identified feminism. It means that a woman’s primary relationships are 
with other women. It is to women that we give our economic, emotional, political, and social 
support.”122 Bunch argued that this means women should give their sexual energy to other 
women rather than engaging in heterosexual relationships.123 I do not agree with the 
extension of the theory in this direction. I would rather extend Raymond’s work on female 
friendships. She traced the history of women’s friendships; the history of women as friends, 
women as lovers, women as economic and emotional supports and companions. She attacks 
“the dismembering of female friendships…[and] emphasises the intimacy in women’s 
relationships, stressing that passionate friendships need not be of a genital-sexual nature.”124 
 
It could be argued that gender itself needs to be eliminated as a distinguishing category, 
creating androgynous people. Yet radical lesbian feminist separatists125 have argued that in 
rejecting claims for androgyny, women should actualize their full potential by engaging with 
the image of the ‘wild female’; “to become a whole person, to make contact with her true, 
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natural self, a woman need only strip away the false identity- femininity- that patriarchy has 
constructed for her.”126 Radical feminism accepts, and embraces women’s difference from 
men, and determines that this difference is not a basis upon which to treat women as a 
secondary class. Littleton argues for an assimilationist view, and points out that often courts 
hold that women could be just like men, if they were given the chance.127 To argue for 
androgyny is to argue for trying to find some kind of ‘golden mean’ between men and 
women requiring a “very substantial restructuring of many public and private institutions. In 
order to be truly androgynous within a symmetrical framework, social institutions must find a 
single norm that works equally well for all gendered characteristics.”128 
 
Littleton argues that she does not believe any court could value women enough to find a 
middle ground. “Moreover, the problems involved in determining such a norm for even one 
institution are staggering.”129 Radical feminism would baulk at an attempt to classify the 
female body as androgynous. Daly for example would rather that we embrace our whole 
personhood. If we argue that women are just like men, then little would need to be changed 
“in our economic or political institutions except to get rid of lingering traces of irrational 
prejudice… In contrast, if society adopted the androgyny model, which views both women 
and men as bent out of shape by current sex roles and requires both to conform to an 
androgynous model,”130 then we would need to radically alter our methods of resource 
distribution.  
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In promoting male attributes as the norm, men have been able to create and maintain power, 
and render women inferior. The use of the term ‘Other’ is representative of “linguistic 
analysis which is premised on binary opposites. Each concept in language contains within 
itself a primary and subordinate characteristic. The meaning of a word cannot correctly be 
understood unless both the primary meanings and its (silent) opposite is considered.”131 
Woman becomes the opposite of man, and feminine the opposite of masculine. The absence 
of a penis, and the promotion of male attributes as something to aspire to, have rendered 
women ‘other’.132 Daly argues that this form of language is imposed upon women by male 
society and means that women need to “find our way back to reality by destroying the false 
perceptions of it inflicted upon us…We must learn to dis-spell the language of phallocracy, 
which keeps us under the spell of brokenness.”133 This refers to a feminist understanding of 
male patriarchy being all-consuming- to the extent that it structures the language we use. 
Thompson argues that when people engage with binaries, they need to recognize the 
hierarchy that exists in language, with male terms valued, and female terms devalued,134 
effectively silencing women. Daly states that “during the middle ages, he had come to be 
both the female and the male pronoun. After she was introduced, it referred only to females, 
while he became “generic,” allegedly including women.”135  She argues that as women, we 
should embrace radical ‘Otherness’ so as not to become what patriarchy expects of us.136  
 
Beauvoir similarly claims that men never begin by presenting themselves as male, or 
individuals of a certain sex: “it goes without saying that he is a man…Representation of the 
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world, like the world itself, is the work of men; they describe it from their own point of view, 
which they confuse with absolute truth.”137 In this way, the pronoun I further disguises the 
sex of the speaker, and “makes the speaker/writer deceptively feel at home in a male-
controlled language.”138 However, Firestone argues that Beauvoir’s conception of woman as 
the ‘Other’ both in language and in life has perhaps overshot the mark. She asks instead why 
there has not been serious consideration of “the much simpler and more likely possibility that 
this fundamental dualism sprang from the sexual division itself?”139 Mackinnon similarly 
argues that Beauvoir’s work provides differing analysis when viewed as description or 
explanation.140  
 
Firestone believes that biology, and procreation are the basis on which ‘otherness’ has been 
constructed, as “the natural reproductive difference between the sexes led directly to the first 
division of labour,”141 and this trend has continued. Mackinnon questions why men are not 
‘other’ to women, and argues that the concept of ‘other’ does not sufficiently explain social 
power.142 Whichever of these radical theories one may subscribe to, the fact remains that 
both outline women’s otherness, be it a result of sexual characteristics, or some other criteria. 
It is this treatment of women and women’s bodies as something ‘other’ that I believe 
permeates the consummation requirement.  
 
Radical feminism is often confused with radical lesbian feminism. I do not subscribe radical 
lesbian feminism, and not all lesbians call themselves feminists, but it is important to 
demonstrate the breadth of opinions within the radical feminist perspective. Bunch argues 
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that men and women are so different, that heterosexuals cannot be true feminists.143 True 
feminists should be, or should choose to be lesbians as “lesbianism is best understood as a 
revolutionary rejection of all male-defined institutions,”144 and the decision to be 
heterosexual is viewed by lesbian feminists as choosing the easy option, and “going with the 
flow.”145 Bunch lived in a separatist community of women. She held that this time apart from 
men allowed for personal growth, and opportunities to develop political analysis. “Despite 
the fact that she ultimately rejected total separatism because of the isolation it involved, as a 
political strategy it still has its uses,”146 as a tool for reflexivity. Yet to extend this separatism 
to a call for lesbianism is to “fail... to appreciate the nature/nurture debate surrounding 
homosexuality.”147 Just as gender is socially constructed, to require women to be lesbians 
would also reduce sexuality to a social construct. Tong argues that “socially constructed 
sexual roles make it exceedingly difficult for a woman to identify and develop her own 
sexual desires and needs…”148 This thesis allows for the existence of heterosexual feminists. 
The legal requirement of an occurrence of a particular type of (hetero)sexual act, within a 
particular social relationship is what I am primarily questioning in this thesis, and it would be 
counter-intuitive to argue that it should be replaced by a different (homo)sexual act.   
 
Greer states that she wishes she was a lesbian, as “it’s difficult for heterosexual women 
because there are some aspects of the heterosexual negotiation that are immutable.”149 
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Lesbian feminism developed from radical feminism in an attempt to address this. Richardson 
explains that radical feminists have been accused of being narrow-minded and sex-negative, 
and make women “in particular, feel guilty and ashamed of their sexual feelings.”150 
Heterosexual women should not stop expressing their sexuality. Rather, the focus of this 
research is the legal codification and entrenchment of a form of sexual expression which is 
articulated as something which is ‘done’ to women.  
 
Lesbianism infused “excitement and reality into separatism”.151 The separatist movement- an 
extension of the difference movement- used lesbianism as its core focus, and drew on the 
power of sex to bring women together. Thompson argues that “the ease with which 
lesbianism was reincorporated in the malestream, at best as a neutrally valued sexual 
preference, at worst as just one more pornographic scenario, indicates that the struggle is far 
from over”152 in identifying the social relations of male supremacy. The place of lesbianism 
is an issue of contention within feminist theory. Delphy and Leonard demonstrate the 
importance of allowing for sexual difference within feminist analysis. Brook explains their 
argument as; “marriage…[is] a key problem in feminist theory, but [Delphy and Leonard] 
warn against blaming wives for their own situation because to do so would risk alienating 
women who love men from the women’s movement.”153 Women have not possessed the 
social power necessary to promote their own interests. Rather, “supporting and identifying 
with men is the only way women are permitted access to the ‘human’ under male 
supremacist conditions.”154 Instead, the focus should be upon women identifying with other 
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women. This ‘identity’ focus is seen as central to feminism to both challenge male 
supremacy, and the dominance of heteronormativity.155 
 
Radical feminists argue that a re-structuring of society alone is not enough to change the 
oppression entrenched in people’s thinking. Rather, “the attitudes of men must be changed 
and a state of equality made manifest in the power dynamic between men and women.”156 
MacKinnon has argued that heterosexuality is the ‘primary social sphere of male power’.157 
Others from within the lesbian feminist movement have argued further that “men are the 
enemy. Heterosexual women are collaborators with the enemy… every woman who lives 
with or fucks a man helps to maintain the oppression of her sisters and hinders our 
struggle.”158 I do not endorse this view. Women can be involved in heterosexual relationships 
whilst still fighting patriarchal society. Radical feminism has been credited with the 
emergence of lesbian feminist views, but they are not one and the same. “A commonly 
expressed view is that heterosexual feminists have been silenced as a result of radical 
feminists making them feel guilty about their sexuality and, more especially, sexual 
pleasure.”159 I do not agree; “it will not do to continue to blame radical feminism for the 
reluctance on the part of heterosexual feminists to discuss their…sexual relationships with 
men.”160 The responsibility for this is the heterosexual woman’s. However, as noted in the 
Introductory Chapter, there now exists a growing body of literature within the field of the 
sociology of heterosexuality.  
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As outlined above, in trying to unify ‘women’ radical feminists have fallen prey to 
accusations of essentialism. Essentialism claims are ‘aggravating’ because they “ignore the 
rich discussions about the relationships among gender, sexuality and race that took place 
in”161 the 1970s. Richardson argues that to claim essentialism is to misread radical feminism, 
and both Richardson and Hemmings argue this occurs through a narrow reading of a few 
‘key’ texts, rather than all of the literature available from the time.162 Hemmings states the 
false accusation of essentialism is so often repeated that “it can actually stand as justification 
for not reading texts from the feminist seventies at all any more. This in itself should make us 
suspicious, of course, given the political and intellectual vibrancy of this era.”163 The claim is 
so often bandied about, that it has become acceptable, unchallenged and naturalised.164  
 
Cain explains that radical feminists embrace the claim that women are socially constructed. 
However it is also felt that deconstruction will not lead to some kind of underlying true 
essence to being a woman. Instead, “they believe that by challenging the male construction of 
the category “woman,” we can begin to construct our own category. We may not be able to 
free ourselves from socially constructed categories, but a woman-defined “woman” is at least 
an improvement over the present state of affairs.”165 Brooks asks how those who wish to 
focus on race for example can avoid accusations of essentialism too. She asks if race can be 
deconstructed, or if these feminists talk of race in an essentialist way; “can I say, when 
someone sneers at me because I am African-American or Asian-American, or Hispanic- oh 
you are mistaken sir, what you see is merely a construct?”166 To argue that women are 
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reduced to a ‘constructed woman’ is no different from a constructed understanding of race. 
Thompson argues; 
 
Feminism cannot afford to give priority to the politics of race or class while 
ignoring male supremacy… to ignore male supremacy is to empty feminist 
politics of its central meaning... The categories of ‘race’ and ‘class’ also 
contain men, and any category which includes men tends to be dominated 
by the interests of men…Racism or class exploitation are more readily 
perceivable than the oppression of women because they involve the 
dehumanization of men.167 (emphasis added) 
 
In terms of the gender and sexuality focus of this thesis, I believe that discussions of sex and 
sexual practice from a feminist perspective should not be about reforming or improving 
sexual relations. Rather, any discussion about sex and sexual practices should focus on the 
impact that sexual change will have on wider society and wider understandings of power and 
sex for women. As Cooper suggests, “sexuality shapes, or impacts upon a range of social, 
cultural and economic practices and relations... sexuality impacts upon the state, becoming 
embedded within its technologies of power.”168 The very inclusion of sex in politics and the 
state has meant that particular forms/types of sex have been legally prioritised. Instead of 
arguing for acceptance of a sexualised society, we should be addressing the ways in which 
we have become so highly sexualised and why. In the area of consummation at least, if we 
could see the heteronormativity that the consummation requirement promotes, we could 
perhaps then argue (as this thesis does), for the removal from the law of a (hetero)sexual 
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requirement which has a historically symbolic, patriarchal and religious function. It would 
serve to begin to reduce the importance of marriage, and more importantly, the legal 
importance of a ‘sexual’ marriage. A thesis such as this could not undermine the religious 
significance of the sexual act, only the legal. No matter the preferred definition of patriarchy 
as men dominating women, to further their own interests, or men dominating access to 
power, in respect of a consummation requirement, the patriarchy involved could be seen 
from both aspects. Men use women’s bodies for their sexual pleasure, and they dominate 
access to consummation through possession of the penis.    
 
Feminists have noted the distinction between “sex as a biological and gender as a social or 
cultural category.”169 If sex is something we are born with, then we are born with a woman’s 
body, and we run the risk of creating sex as an essence. This essentialism is the greatest 
criticism directed at radical feminists, and is often a misguided criticism; “it will be a surprise 
to anyone who has read the writings of [Daly, Dworkin and Rich] that they believe in 
essential masculinity and femininity. In fact they constantly seek to understand the 
construction of gender and they desire the end of male supremacy. There would be little point 
in challenging male sexual violence if it was thought to be innate.”170 If one considers sex an 
essence, it “becomes immobile, stable, coherent, fixed, prediscursive, natural, and ahistorical: 
the mere surface on which the script of gender is written.”171 As radical feminist Firestone 
argues, sex class is so ingrained that it has become invisible.172  
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There are few that would now argue that the gender divisions we see in society are a result of 
the biological differences between men and women. Beauvoir claims that the body is a 
situation deeply related to our subjectivity173 and is our embodied relationship with the 
world. “For Beauvoir, a woman is someone with a female body from beginning to end, from 
the moment she is born until the moment she dies, but that body is her situation, not her 
destiny.”174 This ‘situation’ means that once women are distinguished from men on the basis 
of their biology, they are distinguished from being ‘human’. Firestone states that, 
 
nature produced the fundamental inequality- half the human race must bear 
and rear the children of all of them- which was later consolidated, 
institutionalized, in the interests of men... Women were the slave class that 
maintained the species in order to free the other half for the business of the 
world.175 
 
In this research I have utilised a translation of the ‘Second Sex’ by H.M. Parshley, whilst 
supplementing my understandings of Beauvoir’s work through other writings, and represent 
her theories here, to the best of my understanding. This version has been widely criticised,176 
but the newer 2009 edition177 has also been the subject of criticism,178 undoubtedly an 
inevitable result of any attempt to provide a comprehensive translation of a text. What is clear 
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from both versions, and of most relevance for this research, is the construction of women, and 
the understanding of woman as ‘Other’.  
 
Woman-identified theory has been shown to be extremely important, and the removal of a 
consummation requirement would result in a diminishing of the power of heterosexuality as a 
‘norm’. In removing sex from marriage, we remove the idea that sex in marriage is normal, 
natural, biological and necessary. As it stands, heterosexuality is “a form of coercion dictated 
by male ideology/propaganda, by force, by stigma, by the erasure of lesbian existence, and 
by the erasure of the coercion itself, so that what is imposed is made to look like the natural 
unfolding of our inclinations.”179 The removal of sex from marriage would allow for a move 
away from the institution of marriage. As a feminist I would welcome the removal of the 
consummation requirement180 to allow for a creation of ‘legal’ relations that are not based on 
sex. Alternative basis’ of legal relations are discussed further in Chapter 6, but could for 
example include relationships of caring or biological relations. Cooper suggests that 
investigation of theories of power reveal that not all men oppress, or oppress to the same 
extent. Some men are oppressed by other men. She argues that there are white men who do 
not oppress, and women who may feel oppressed, but not by an individual, but rather by an 
“anonymous social or cultural force;”181 patriarchy.  
 
Jaggar’s rejection of a biological determinist understanding of sex and gender means that she 
has “no reason to believe that by nature all men are one way and all women another, or even 
that most men are one way and most women another. The historical interplay of biology and 
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environment makes this man the way he is and this woman the way she is.”182 It is clear that 
some men are also oppressed, but radical feminists would not hesitate to claim that most men 
are one way, and most women another. Some women can attempt to evade this oppression, 
for “the fact that radical feminists themselves are able to escape their false consciousness, 
even under the system of patriarchy, is evidence of this. If patriarchy were, indeed, all 
pervasive and totalizing, radical feminism could never have obtained the space it needed to 
develop.”183  
 
A further consideration is the arguments that arise when radical feminism is labelled as ‘sex 
negative’. Pro-sex feminists have argued “that radical feminism’s representation of women 
as disempowered actors fails to see women as sexual subjects in their own right... while 
radical feminists see ‘female sexuality’ as repressed by ‘the patriarchy,’ the pro-sexuality 
movement sees repression as produced by heterosexism and ‘sex-negativity’- cultural 
operations often seen as institutionalized in feminism itself.”184 This leads one to ask if ‘sex’ 
as we know it is what women would have wanted it to be, or whether it is in fact the result of 
patriarchy. Whilst not in the scope of this research, it is important to note that it is not an 
either/or scenario. To declare sex as defined by patriarchy does not undermine women as 
sexual subjects. Instead, it is to declare that women are capable of and may enjoy sex, but 
that the type of sex required by the law, and the meaning behind it is worthy of 
consideration, and is not usually formatted for the benefit of the women involved.  
 
If biology is unchanging (removing here the obvious issues of transsexual and intersex 
people discussed further in Chapter 4), it should not impact how we view men and women. 
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Then perhaps the true issue is the gender that we ascribe to the two different recognised 
physiques. I believe it’s naïve to claim that we could overcome the tendency to label the 
differences we can see in the physiques of people. Perhaps if we were to start again, we 
would encompass more than two types (male and female), but we would no doubt still create 
labels. Radical feminism too holds this view, arguing for an acknowledgement that women 
are different, but equal, rather than the first wave contention that we are the same. It is the 
meanings that the labels ‘male’ and ‘female’ hold that is the true key to seeing women solely 
as women, in charge of their own destiny, and equal to men. In this way, “to speak of social 
treatment ‘as a woman’ is thus not to invoke any universal essence or homogenous generic or 
ideal type, but to refer to this diverse material reality of social meanings and practices such 
that to be a woman ‘is not yet the name of a way of being human’.”185 
 
 
1.6: Conclusion 
I believe that if you tell the truth of women’s  
lives, then women’s lives have to improve.186 
 
This chapter has summarised the nuances found in feminist theory, provided an overview of 
radical feminist theory in particular and shown that feminist theory is more than “simply that 
of placing women on the agenda.”187 It has been shown that radical feminist work “is 
developing a theory of male power, in which powerlessness is a problem but redistribution of 
power as currently defined is not its ultimate solution upon which to build a feminist theory 
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of justice.”188 Second wave feminism in particular is not about men and women competing, 
or comparing the detriments they suffer. It’s focus is the reproduction of patriarchy: 
practically, theoretically, conceptually and symbolically.189 The radical feminist task is to 
change “consciousness, rediscovering the past and creating the future through women’s 
radical ‘otherness’.”190 It is this task I bring to the examination of consummation. I hope to 
change the consciousness surrounding understandings of consummation. In order to do this, I 
try to rediscover the past; examining the ways in which this patriarchal religious 
phenomenon became entrenched in law, and finally creating a new understanding of sex in 
legal relationships, whilst acknowledging the differences between men and women.  
 
The following chapter outlines the legal history of consummation through statute and case 
law, demonstrating that the “state is male in the feminist sense: the law sees and treats 
women the way men see and treat women.”191 Chapter 3 then moves on to provide a socio-
legal radical feminist analysis of the case law, holding that in consummation (as in marriage) 
women are subordinate to men. The work of second wave feminists outlined above has 
argued for “power for women... in women’s own right.”192 By highlighting the legal and 
symbolic male power evident in consummation, I provide another example of an instance in 
which women are subordinate, as well as suggestions for the eradication of this power 
dynamic, without becoming distracted by sameness/difference arguments, both of which are 
still detrimental to women.193  
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At first glance, this thesis could be seen to work against the general tenure of feminist theory. 
Feminists have often called for there to be greater intervention in the private sphere, as it is 
felt that this sphere inflicts the most harm upon women as it is under-regulated. This is 
evidenced in the time it took for courts to recognise that marital rape could occur, that 
domestic violence was a reality and that domestic work should be recognised equally to 
public sphere work. In this respect, my thesis takes a dramatic turn away from traditional 
feminist requests, and rather asks for less intervention in private relationships, for this thesis 
argues that it is inappropriate to legislate what ‘needs’ to happen in the bedroom between 
people engaged in legal relationships.  
 
I uphold Rubin’s contention that “there is an urgent need to develop radical perspectives on 
sexuality.... A radical theory of sex must identify, describe, explain, and denounce erotic 
injustice and sexual oppression.”194 Consummation is a coerced and oppressive act, and the 
following chapters provide argument that identifies it as such, whilst continuing to enhance 
and advance radical feminist theory. I acknowledge that in writing from a feminist 
perspective I am ignoring many perspectives that focus upon men’s theories of sexuality 
(briefly discussed in Chapter 3), and so I fall prey to the general understanding that male 
sexuality is “less plastic than that of the female,”195 and the assumption that sex equates to 
pleasure for men. Men of course have their own experiences and theories of consummation, 
but here I aim to represent women’s views of marital sex which are constructed as natural, a 
wife’s duty, and a husband’s pleasure.  
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TWO 
THE LAW 
This chapter clarifies the doctrinal basis of consummation. Consummation originated in 
religious doctrine but its current form and content and “the establishment of an apparatus for 
the minute investigation of marital coitus, has been legal in form.”1 Below, I review the case-
law definition of consummation to better understand the legal concept of consummation and 
to establish how consummation has become a legal concept. This chapter looks at the way in 
which marriage, which houses the consummation requirement, has been defined in English 
law. I provide a general understanding of the term ‘consummation’, before moving on to 
outline the place of consummation in law. Finally, I establish a legal definition of the 
consummation requirement through an examination of case-law (in which the spouses are 
genetically male and female from birth), that ranges from the 1700’s through to the 1960’s.  
 
The case law outlined in this chapter has been selected for a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
majority of the case law is that which is most often cited in academic literature surrounding 
marriage and consummation. Secondly, using the most often cited cases, I have also gone on 
to find more obscure case law mentioned within the judgements, in order to present as much 
case law analysis as possible. Thirdly, I have not omitted cases that at first glance would 
appear to be at odds with my overall argument. It is important to include as many cases as 
possible for comprehensiveness, and I argue that cases which appear to contradict my 
argument only do so upon face value. Further analysis provided in Chapter 3 will 
demonstrate the overall legislative tenor of non-consummation cases, whilst highlighting the 
many issues in the case law, which have been approached differently by judges  
                                                 
1
 Collier, R., Masculinity, Law and the Family London, Routledge 1995 pg 146  
82 
 
 
There have been no reported cases of non-consummation in the UK since the late 1960’s, 
though most nullities are on the basis of non-consummation, indicating that nullity on the 
basis of non-consummation remains.2 Historically, the majority of the cases arose “as ways of 
trying to get round the restrictive divorce legislation of the time, whilst more recent cases on 
incapacity have arguably been more concerned with restricted rights to marry.”3 There have 
been no recently reported cases as a result of the increased ease of obtaining a divorce and 
because the interpretation of consummation law is no longer being challenged.  
 
 
2.1: How is marriage defined in law? 
Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee4 states that Judeo-Christian societies and marriages have 
“essential elements and invariable features,”5 which make marriage identifiable as “the 
voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others.”6 The case 
also stated that there are societies in which marriage is not a prevalent social structure, and 
inevitably these societies, unlike Christian societies, do not let the wife stand “upon the same 
level with the man under whose protection they live.”7 Feminist literature has revealed the 
fallacy of equality in marriage.8  
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The facts of Hyde are not relevant, but its definition of marriage is “deceptively simple... Yet, 
despite its Victorian heritage, it has not been overruled directly”9 and its main principles 
constitute the MCA 1973.10 Probert explains that “at a time when it is predicted that one in 
three marriages will end in divorce, [a union for life]... has the quality of an aspiration rather 
than an accurate description.”11 Further, marriage should be between ‘one man and one 
woman’ therefore historically excluding same-sex couples and transsexual people.   
 
In 1885 Durham v Durham12 attempted to expand the definition of marriage. The importance 
of this case lies in its assertion of the ‘natural’ meaning of the marriage contract. Sir J. 
Hannen declared that the marriage contract was simple, easy to comprehend by most. “It is an 
engagement between a man and woman to live together, and love one another as husband and 
wife, to the exclusion of all others... [with] protection on the part of the man, and submission 
on the part of the woman.”13 Loving one another seems to require sexual intercourse by the 
courts.   
 
In the absence of a sexual element, the courts have concluded that the essence of marriage is 
missing from the relationship. Historically, the court has enforced conjugal law to the 
exclusion of all other family forms, even providing decrees for restitution of conjugal rights, 
effectually requiring spouses to return to the marital home in the hope that consummation 
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may occur, though this would not happen in marriages where adultery had occurred.14 The 
primacy of conjugality is thus also of relevance in the ending of marriages- adultery can be 
used as a ground for divorce. The state is always a third party to all marriage contracts in 
England and Wales.15 One of the most intrusive and offensive pieces of legislation 
surrounding marriage is the ability to nullify the marriage on the basis of non-consummation, 
which in effect renders consummation as a ‘requirement’ of marriage. Card most succinctly 
summarises this outlook as; “although marriage rights would be sufficient to enable lovers to 
have sex legally, such rights should not be necessary for that purpose.”16  
 
2.2: What is consummation? 
The word ‘consummation’... originated around the fifteenth century from 
the Latin ‘consumare’, meaning to complete, and from ‘summus’, the 
highest, utmost. Sexual intercourse thus brings to completion or perfection, 
legally and spiritually, a solemnised marriage through the act of 
intercourse.17  
 
Consummation is the first instance of sexual intercourse between a man and a woman after 
their marriage ceremony. It finalizes a wedding, and occurs when the spouses “perform a 
single act of sexual intercourse, more specifically an act involving penile penetration per 
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vaginam.”18 English law governing marriage and consummation has its foundations within 
the Christian Church and in particular, the Anglican Church, which disapproves of pleasures 
of the flesh. They preach that intercourse should be for the purposes of procreation, “and one 
can only beget legitimate children....in lawful marriage. All sexual activity outside marriage 
has necessarily some purpose other than procreation and constitutes a sin. Hence, no such 
activity may be permitted.”19 
 
The Catholic Church also states “the marriage of two baptized persons... when followed by 
consummation, is not only a contract resulting in a status, but is also a sacrament, resulting in 
a relationship, terminable only by death.”20 Hence, marriage and sexual activity have been 
stringently regulated by the Church, which has influenced the development of the law. The 
law draws a distinction between an inability to consummate, and a refusal to consummate. 
Brook explains that in some jurisdictions, the requirement of consummation is “ostensibly 
obsolete, but its normative basis continues to shape and inform what marriage is and does. 
Consummation is very much like the handshake that seals a business agreement- it is a kind 
of corporeal communication.”21 The law requires the consummative act to be “ordinary and 
complete,”22 a concept developed within the case law, and addressed below. 
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In many non-consummation cases, claimants who brought suit for nullity also made claims in 
the alternative for cruelty as it was felt that an absence of sex in a relationship could be 
considered cruelty.23 Despite the increased ease of divorce there are still those that view 
nullity as the preferable form of terminating some relationships. Nullity is a much faster legal 
solution when compared to divorce and allows for a second religious marriage for those of 
religious persuasions which disapprove of divorce.24   
 
 
2.3: Where does the consummation requirement lie in the matrix of family law and how is it 
defined? 
With embarrassment, a sense of duty and an at times obsessive relish, the 
courts have proceeded to show scant reluctance in scrutinising the marriage 
bed, the bodies of husband and wife and, in particular, the transgressive 
nature of sexual dysfunction.25 
 
A New York court stated that the medical and testimonial investigations necessary in cases of 
non-consummation were so intrusive and distressing, that the parties would be better off if 
they could come to an agreement to separate between themselves, rather than go to court.26 
 
Of the marriages that do not end as a result of death, most are terminated through divorce.27 
However, some marriages are declared void or voidable. Unconsummated marriages fall 
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under the jurisdiction of ‘voidable’ marriages outlined in s12 of the MCA 1973. A voidable 
marriage “is one that will be regarded by every court as a valid subsisting marriage until a 
decree annulling it has been pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction.”28 In other 
words, a decree of nullity granted in respect of a voidable marriage, once made absolute, 
annuls the marriage whilst treating it as having existed until that time.29 For a marriage to be 
determined voidable, it is one which would have been considered void under Canon law, 
“because of the existence of a vitiation impediment at the time of celebration, but which 
ecclesiastical courts were not allowed to question after the death of either party.”30 The 
consummation requirement is of historical importance to English matrimonial law. Before 
the Council of Trent 1563, there was no religious ceremony involved in matrimony, only a 
declaration of intention, “either by a promise expressed in the present tense- ‘per verba de 
praesenti’- (eg ‘I take you as my wife [or husband]’), in which case the marriage was binding 
immediately, or by a promise for the future-‘per verba de futuro’- (eg ‘I shall take you as my 
wife [or husband]’), in which case it became binding as soon as it was consummated.”31 
However the twenty-fourth session of the Council found that the validity of a marriage would 
be dependent upon the ceremony being performed in front of a priest and two witnesses, and 
today, there does not have to be a religious element- a civil marriage will suffice. 
 
S12 MCA 1973 outlines the grounds for a voidable marriage. SS12(a)&(b) hold that a 
marriage is voidable on the basis of non-consummation owing to the incapacity of either 
party, or the wilful refusal of the respondent. Applications for nullity need to be bought by 
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the parties involved, they can only be annulled during the lifetime of the parties, and the 
decree can be barred in some circumstances.32 The main bars to a decree of nullity in non-
consummation cases are outlined in s13 MCA 1973 which holds that a decree won’t be 
granted if the petitioner had prior knowledge of the inability, and led the respondent to 
believe that a decree would not be sought, or that it would be unjust to grant the decree. A 
spouse can petition on the basis of their own incapacity to consummate the relationship, but 
not on the basis of their own wilful refusal.33 It is for the petitioner “to prove that the 
incapacity exists. The court has power to order a medical examination, and may draw adverse 
inferences against a party who refuses to be examined.”34 The use of these medical 
examinations is addressed below.     
 
Voidable marriages are a principle of Canon law. “Although marriage was formed simply by 
consent, it was an implied term of the contract that the parties had the capacity to 
consummate it. Physical capacity was thus as much a basic requirement of marriage as the 
intellectual capacity to consent.”35 Traditional Judeo-Christian marriage is stated to unite the 
couple as ‘one flesh’. The most obvious use of this belief is demonstrated in coverture, and 
the old consortium rules. Coverture declared that husband and wife become one at marriage, 
and the legally recognised ‘one’ was the husband. This law operated in England into the 
nineteenth century, placing women in a subordinate role once married, and declaring that 
property they brought into the marriage and their personhood become the property of the 
husband.36 Coverture allowed husbands to “beat their wives, [and]... forbid them from going 
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to certain places or associating with certain people…”37 Barnett adds that a husband had a 
‘right’ to sexual intercourse with his wife, concluding that this served to cement women’s 
legal subjection under ‘one flesh’. Upon marriage, “the wife impliedly consented to sexual 
intercourse ‘on demand’ (the converse position did not, of course, pertain). Until 1884, a wife 
refusing her husband’s sexual demands could find herself imprisoned for such refusal, and 
the husband could apply for an order of restitution of conjugal rights against his wife.”38 
 
A husband’s ‘right’ to his wife’s body is evident within the case law, with many judges 
referring to husband’s rights to access his wife’s body. Brook argues that whilst the passing 
of the Married Women’s Property Act39 overturned the worst aspects of coverture, the “logic 
of coverture has never been entirely extinguished.”40 Consortium is a common law doctrine 
that states that husband and wife are entitled to “the other’s society, assistance, comfort and 
protection. At one time the right to a spouse’s company was enforceable against a recalcitrant 
spouse (by means of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights) and against any third party 
who interfered with the relationships (by claiming damages of enticement, harbouring and 
adultery),”41 but these rights were abolished by 1970.  The loss of consortium allowed 
husbands to submit their wives to medical examination and for spouses to be ordered to 
return home. As with consummation, this is about men’s ownership of women and its 
diminished use in the courts should be celebrated.  
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A legal requirement for consummation had its most obvious purpose in medieval times. Ryan 
states “when equality came at a lesser premium, female virginity was highly prized. A new 
husband, in performing the act of consummation thus rendered her ‘worthless’ to other 
suitors, symbolically marking out his wife as his ‘property,’ a chattel to cater to his needs.”42 
Much all of the case law discussed below was decided before the enactment of the current 
MCA 1973, but well after its medieval purposes were established.     
 
 
2.4: How is consummation legally defined? 
How have judges decided whether or not consummation has occurred? Courts have held that 
the private sex life of a married couple is open to investigation where the issue of 
consummation is in doubt.43 Law in general favours certainty and universality, and the case 
law surrounding non-consummation over the years has attempted to adhere to these 
characteristics. The remainder of this Chapter demonstrates that although the courts speak of 
consummation as though it is clearly defined, in fact this is not the case. The following 
headings demonstrate the key factors judges need to assess in attempting to decide whether or 
not a marriage has been consummated.  
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2.4.1: ‘Ordinary and complete.... not... partial and imperfect’44 and for the prevention of 
‘licentiousness’ 
Though it is not the first non-consummation case, D-e v A-g45 provided the most in depth 
guidance for the criteria judges should prioritise. The case concerned the incapacity of a 
malformed wife, and a great amount of attention was paid to defining sex in marriage for the 
purposes of consummation.46 The couple were continuing to live as husband and wife, 
despite not consummating their relationship due to the wife’s malformation, which had been 
determined incurable by a doctor. Doctors found that sex could occur, but the wife’s vagina 
was not of normal depth, and she had no uterus. The husband admitted that he had had sex 
with his wife, but it was imperfect, and resulted in considerable pain on her part.47 This case 
led to a formulation of the legal understanding of consummative/marital sex, which has been 
referred to in all subsequent cases. Dr Lushington declared that, 
sexual intercourse, in the proper meaning of the term, is ordinary and 
complete intercourse; it does not mean partial and imperfect intercourse; 
yet, I cannot go to the length of saying that every degree of imperfection 
would deprive it of its essential character. There must be degrees difficult to 
deal with; but if so imperfect as scarcely to be natural, I should not hesitate 
to say that, legally speaking, it is no intercourse at all. I can never think that 
the true interest of society would be advanced by retaining within the 
marriage bonds parties driven to such disgusting practices. Certainly it 
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would not tend to the prevention of adulterous intercourse, one of the 
greatest evils to be avoided.48  
 
Not only was this ill-defined and unclear formulation adopted in subsequent case law, but 
further, it was held that consummation was religiously, morally, and socially necessary, for 
without the power to consummate, “neither of the two principle ends of the matrimony can be 
attained, namely, a lawful indulgence of the passions to prevent licentiousness, and the 
procreation of children, according to the evident design of Divine Providence.”49 The 
judgement stated that if a husband were to have a satisfying sexual relationship with his wife, 
there would be no need or desire to engage in adulterous relationships, and the marriage was 
nullified. Yet the ‘natural and ordinary’ sex Dr Lushington spoke of was not defined any 
further; a somewhat ambiguous conception for a social institution which favours certainty.  
 
B v B50 examined the capacity of ‘artificial’ genitals in achieving this ‘natural ordinary and 
complete’ intercourse.  The husband applied for a decree of nullity on the basis that his wife 
had undergone an operation to create an artificial vaginal passage of 4-6 inches, and was 
therefore incapable of consummating their marriage. The wife had physical defects at birth 
which meant that she had certain male organs which were removed when she was 17, leaving 
her with no vagina, no menstrual periods and barren. The court record noted that some of her 
physical appearance was not consistent with ‘a normal female’ but did not expand on what a 
‘normal’ woman is, or how the wife in this case differed.51   
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It was accepted that the husband was unaware of the full nature of the incapacity, or the 
necessity for an operation before their marriage ceremony. After the operation, there followed 
several attempts at consummation. “The husband said that he was unable to penetrate more 
than two inches, and it was proved that at some stage there was a considerable closure of the 
passage. The wife alleged that complete, or almost complete, penetration of the passage had 
been effected.”52  
 
The wife’s counsel referred to Dr Lushington’s opinion in D-e v. A-g53 in which he stated that 
he would not declare a marriage void if he believed that the vagina could undergo surgical 
intervention, to allow vera copula. Counsel submitted that consummation had occurred in this 
marriage, and if it had not, it could with surgical intervention, and should therefore not be 
nullified. Brown v Brown54 had held that the impediment to consummation had to exist at the 
time of marriage and be incurable. The husband’s counsel argued that even if the artificial 
passage could allow for penetration, it would not constitute ‘ordinary and complete’ 
intercourse. They believed that the facts of D-e v. A-g55 were not applicable to this case; “The 
vagina in that case... was a natural one, and the question was whether the natural formation 
might be lengthened; it was not a wholly artificial channel created by surgery.”56  
 
The judge concluded that the husband needed to prove that the marriage had not been 
consummated, and that the impediment was incurable; 
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The main matter to be considered in coming to a conclusion in this case is 
what amounts to consummation. It is said on behalf of the wife that it is 
sufficient if it is possible for a husband to have an erection and penetrate 
into the female body. On the other hand, it is submitted on behalf of the 
husband that it cannot be said that there is consummation of a marriage 
where the husband’s erection penetrates into an artificial passage which in 
effect has no relation to the organ which should be there in the wife.57 
 
The judge accepted the husband’s version of events, concluding that consummation had not 
occurred. The judge felt that the wife’s version was nothing more than “a mere connexion 
between the parties... and was nothing which could be said to be vera copula or proper coitus 
between husband and wife.”58 He continued that even if the consummation described by the 
wife had occurred, he could not hold it to be consummation as her organ was artificial. As her 
defect was incurable, she was physically incapable of consummation, thereby confirming the 
primary importance of ‘normal’ sexual intercourse.  
 
In the case of Snowman v Snowman,59 the wife petitioned for nullity on the ground of her 
husband’s incapacity to consummate the marriage, despite the fact that they had suffered two 
miscarriages. The judgement followed the ‘ordinary and complete’ principle of D-e v A-g.60  
The evidence of the wife was that “she was willing, that there was no complete penetration 
but that emission took place ab extra, as the result of which she had a miscarriage.”61 The 
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husband did not produce a defence to the petition, and the court doctors found that the wife 
was a virgin.  
 
This case is important in demonstrating that fertilisation can occur without full penetration, as 
“semen might have encountered the vagina of the woman and caused a possible pregnancy 
without penetration or ordinary intercourse as it is properly understood.”62 Following  D-e v 
A-g, the judge in Snowman held that the ‘intercourse’ in this case was unnatural- rendering it 
incapable of consummative intercourse. This notion of a complete and natural type of sexual 
intercourse sets a heteronormative requirement.  
 
The case of W v W63 also built on the precedent set by D-e v. A-g.64 The wife here petitioned 
for a decree of nullity on the ground of her husband’s incapacity. Brandon J. declared that 
consummation was a question of fact. He acknowledged that the emission of seed or the 
possibility of procreation are not necessary elements for consummation.65 The husband was 
able to penetrate his wife for a short time, but soon after his erection would collapse. The 
judge decided that “penetration maintained for so short a time, resulting in no emission either 
inside the wife or outside her, cannot without violation of language be described as ordinary 
and complete intercourse.”66 The marriage was held to be unconsummated and the decree of 
nullity was awarded on the basis of the husband’s incapacity. These cases demonstrate that 
consummation appears to often be a matter of inches, and duration, with abstract terms such 
as ‘nature’ ‘ordinary’ and ‘complete’ utilised, even though emission- which might be held to 
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be the ‘completion’ of the act- is rendered unnecessary! Counsels arguments are not 
contained in the reporting of this case, but I argue that (as in the case law below), it is 
unlikely that an in depth discussion of female sexuality was undertaken.  
 
2.4.2: Incurability of incapacity and the role of medical men 
Medical opinions have often been sought by the courts when there is a claim of incapacity, 
and failure to submit to medical examination has resulted in presumed impotence, and even 
contempt of court.67 Brown v Brown68 established that a decree of nullity for non-
consummation must be based on impotency or incapacity to consummate; the impediment 
needs to have existed during the marriage, and needs to be shown to be incurable. The wife in 
the case of D-e v A-g69 had already been assessed by a doctor upon her husband’s insistence, 
but the court also appointed doctors to assess,  
whether she is capable of performing the act of generation, and of being 
carnally known by man, and if she be incapable of performing that act, and 
of being carnally known by man, whether such her incapacity can be so 
remedied as to enable her to perform that act, and to be so known.70 
 
The absence of a uterus meant that an operation would not remedy the situation. The idea of 
‘perfect’ sexual intercourse was reinforced by the doctors in this case who claimed that the 
sexual intercourse between this couple would “be of a very imperfect character, from the 
peculiar and unnatural formation of the vagina; it being...an actual cul de sac, and admitting 
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only a very partial insertion of the penis, necessarily restricted to the very limited dimensions 
of the vagina.”71 The marriage was nullified on the basis of the wife’s natural and incurable 
malformation which rendered consummation impossible. The sex that had occurred was 
deemed “incipient, imperfect, and unnatural”72 thereby deeming the wife’s vagina- only 2 
inches smaller than would be considered normal- incapable of consummation.  Although the 
wife had been examined by two doctors, the judge requested a report from a third before 
making his decision. This overreliance on the medical profession is addressed further in 
Chapter 3. One can only guess whether the judge would have ordered a fourth opinion if the 
third had not agreed with his views.  
 
The type of sex that those who are ‘incapacitated’ are capable of is deemed so imperfect that 
women especially, should “be discreet enough to abstain from marriage entirely”73 suggesting 
that those incapable of sex are not capable of marriage. Some judgements have gone so far as 
to say that an unconsummated marriage constituted “a severe private injury”74 upon the 
capable party.  
 
In the past, the court would ask that the couple have at least a three year cohabitation, to truly 
assess the possibility of consummation.75 This demand was discriminately applied as 
demonstrated by the cases of Welde v Welde76 and N v M.77 Though separated by a hundred 
years, these cases have similar facts, both arising from a wife’s petition alleging non-
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consummation on the part of the husband, due to incapacity. In both cases, the courts turned 
to Canon law, which stated that a couple must cohabit for three years after marriage. If the 
relationship had not been consummated in that time, and the wife was capable of 
consummation, then the husband was presumed impotent in the eyes of the law.  
 
Neither of the couples had cohabited for three years. However, the court interpreted the 
Canon law differently in each case. The judge in Welde required the wife to return to her 
husband and fulfil the 3 years, to prove incapacity. “In N v M they concluded that in a similar 
situation cohabitation of less than three years satisfied the three year requirement.”78 In the 
case of Welde, the court decided that in order to grant the decree of nullity sought by the 
wife, they had to be satisfied that either “the husband was absolutely incapable of 
consummating the marriage or that the parties had cohabited for a period of three years, that 
the wife was capable of consummating the marriage during that period and that the marriage 
had not been consummated.”79 Yet in N v M the marriage was declared null because the court 
felt that the two and a half years that the couple had lived together was long enough to 
overcome any temporary impediment to consummation, had the husband been potent. The 
three year requirement is “not about the lapse of time alone... but continued facility for 
consummation.”80 The matrimonial home, the shared life and bed, and availability of the 
female body is the ‘continued facility’ for consummation to occur. In Welde the couple had 
spent much of their marriage apart. The three year requirement in this case was an attempt to 
extend the ‘facility’ to try and overcome any physical issues that may exist, and to be able to 
assess their permanence.  
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In the case of N v M, both spouses had to submit to medical examination. The husband had 
tried to counterclaim that there had been no consummation because the wife had a malformed 
hip joint, making consummation impossible. Doctors had to verify the wife’s virginity and 
hip mobility, before the husband accepted the allegation of impotence. The doctor’s 
examination of the husband found that externally he did not appear to have any defect that 
would render him impotent. On the part of the wife, the doctor’s decided that she was 
suffering from an “impaired state of health occasioned by distress of mind.”81 This 
occasioned from the inability to maintain a ‘normal’ marriage, thereby deeming this wife 
sensitive and emotional.   
 
The judge examined the medical evidence provided to the court, and felt that clarification 
was necessary regarding M’s impotence. Given that M had no external features indicating 
impotency, the judge concluded that the doctors’ prognosis could only be made based on the 
fact that the marriage had not been consummated, and therefore M’s impotence extended 
only to his wife.  As such, if after cohabitation “a wife is proved to be a virgin capable of 
consummation, the absence of consummation must necessarily be attributed to the apparent, 
or non-discoverable, impotence of her husband.”82 
 
Sexuality and sexual intercourse are legally constructed as ‘natural’ when two people live 
together. A move away from the three year rule is clear in the case of B v B.83 The couple in 
this case had only lived together for seven days. The wife then brought a case for nullity 
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based on the husband’s impotence. The court had to examine whether or not consummation 
had occurred, and whether or not seven days was a sufficient period to prove impotence. The 
husband defended the claim on the ground that the marriage had been consummated on the 
first night with penetration but no emission. The court’s medical evidence found that “the 
wife was not a virgin, and she admitted having had sexual intercourse with two men before 
the marriage; the husband was reported to be normally formed and apparently capable.”84  
 
The judge labelled the husband’s description of the marriage as “a little odd.”85 The husband 
claimed that he had been drinking on the wedding night, which is why he was able to 
penetrate his wife, but unable to have an emission. Throughout their first week of marriage, 
the husband and wife continued to celebrate. The husband continued to drink beer, and made 
no attempt at intercourse. He claimed that on their last night together (before her trip to 
Germany), he refrained from making an attempt at sexual intercourse because his wife would 
be embarking on a long journey the next day. Barnard J. stated that “it is a little odd that if 
this man, who was obviously in love with this woman, and had married her, realised that a 
few drinks of beer were likely to upset him in this way, did not abstain from beer in order to 
have normal sexual relations with his wife.”86 The wife’s assertions were held to be more 
believable, having stated that her husband was unable to have a normal sexual relationship 
with her. The judge said that the wife was a “woman with some experience, having had 
affairs with two other men....” and concluded that the husband’s behaviour did “not seem... to 
be the conduct of a normal man on his honeymoon.”87 The judge further considered a letter 
that the wife wrote to the husband describing her disappointment in their marriage, and 
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claiming that he had married her under false pretences, as she wanted children, and worried 
that he would be unable to produce them. Barnard J. claimed that this letter is what you 
would expect from a wife who had been treated in the way she described. The husband’s 
letter of response did not claim that the marriage had been consummated, as he later claimed 
in court, but rather told his wife that she must give him a chance, as a week was not long 
enough to judge impotence.  
 
As regards the duration of the marriage, the ecclesiastical ‘trial period’ of cohabitation was 
no longer in force, and the judge argued: “You cannot lay down any particular time. It is a 
fact, though, to be considered, but the time must depend on the facts of each case.”88 The 
judge felt the husband had lied, and tried to make “this beer-drinking an excuse for not 
having any further sexual intercourse because he realized that, although he might be able to 
penetrate his wife, he would not be able to have an emission; and I understand from the 
medical evidence that that is possible.”89  
 
The wife stated in evidence that whilst dating, they attempted sexual intercourse once, but the 
husband had again failed to penetrate her, and used the excuse of excessive beer drinking the 
previous day. The judge concluded that a pattern of behaviour existed with the husband, and 
that the wife was entitled to a decree on the basis of her husband’s incapacity and no amount 
of time would help the marriage to be consummated. 
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It would appear that this area of law is clear; there must be a defect that prevents 
consummation. Yet in the case of G v G90 a decree was granted despite the legal finding that 
the wife had no structural defect to prevent consummation. The husband’s capacity was not 
questioned as he was a widower with several children, though this fact alone does not prove 
that he has the capacity for consummation with this wife.  The wife had petitioned for 
separation on the ground of cruelty, whilst her husband counterclaimed, saying that he was 
provoked, especially by her refusal to have sexual intercourse with him. The wife submitted 
to physical examination by two doctors, and had adopted some of the remedies they 
recommended, but refused others on the ground that she thought they would be harmful to 
her health. One of the doctors stated he had “examined the petitioner at the request of her 
husband, and found no malformation or structural defect; but that she was suffering from an 
excessive sensibility. This condition was generally temporary...”91 The husband had actively 
made every effort to induce the wife to submit to the doctors recommendations. The wife’s 
refusal was determined to be incapacity because the doctors believed that without outside aid 
the couple would never consummate the marriage.  
 
In 1877, a case came to the courts which tested whether it would be acceptable to refuse 
sexual intercourse within marriage.92 The wife in the case refused to have intercourse with 
her husband. The courts at this time felt that refusal alone could not warrant a decree of 
nullity, and instead would infer incapacity in order to provide the order. An order was not 
given in this case, as the husband had not acted in good faith- marrying his wife only to 
obtain her money, in spite of her ‘deformity’. The judge also felt that the three year 
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cohabitation time recommended by law at that time was adequate to “ascertain whether it is a 
mere coyness on the part of the woman or whether there is any physical incapacity.”93  
 
The case of M v M94 also dealt with refusal to consummate. The husband brought a petition 
for nullity, because on his wedding day, his new wife informed him for the first time that she 
objected to consummating the marriage. The petitioner told her he was happy to wait a few 
days, and they went through with the ceremony. The marriage however remained 
unconsummated. The husband was perceived to be ready, willing and able (having undergone 
a medical examination) to consummate the marriage. The wife, having declined a medical 
examination, was held to be incapable, and a decree was subsequently granted, thereby 
demonstrating that refusal to consummate would now constitute grounds for nullity. S v S95 
further confirmed the use of implied incapacity, an early form of ‘wilful refusal’. Here, the 
wife refused to consummate the marriage. At the time of marriage, the husband agreed that 
the marriage could remain unconsummated for 6 months to allow the respondent to complete 
her studies. By the end of the first year of their marriage they had still not consummated the 
relationship, and it became clear to the wife that she was unable to be the wife he wanted.96 
He wanted to live a normal married life, with children. However she explained that she was 
cold by nature, and had no sexual interest. Soon after, the husband petitioned the court. The 
wife refused to submit to the medical examination, but the husband did, and was found to be 
capable. The court found that the husband, “had never actually attempted to consummate the 
marriage, but that was because the respondent had always declined to allow him to do so, and 
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the Court should in the circumstances infer that the respondent was aware of some physical 
incapacity on her part which would prevent her doing so.”97 
 
The judge issued a decree on the basis that the husband had treated the wife with “every 
consideration having regard to her conduct, as she evidently did not in the least appreciate her 
wifely duties... the frigidity on her part amounted to incompetence, and was a physical 
condition.”98 The terminology of ‘wifely duties’ signifies that the Court felt that a woman 
who consents to marriage, therefore consents to intercourse. C v C99 also provided a 
judgement with inferred incapacity, in which the wife told her husband “that she could not 
love any man as she was too fond of herself... she was averse to consummation of the 
marriage and absolutely declined to come and live with him, and that he must consider her 
answer as final.”100 She was persistent in her refusal, and given her rejection of a court 
ordered medical examination, the judge inferred incapacity on her part in order to grant the 
decree of nullity. In the case of F v P101 incapacity was again inferred, not just on the basis of 
the wilful refusal of the wife, but also from her persistent refusal to cohabit with her husband. 
These two cases demonstrate the expectation of sexual intercourse from a wife, whilst also 
highlighting the pervasive heteronormative structure of familial relations, requiring a wife to 
live with her husband.  
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In the case of G v G102 a medical examination revealed that there were no structural defects in 
the wife, and the action brought by the husband was deemed a result of “the unreasoning 
refusal of the wife to permit sexual intercourse.”103 No guidance was provided as to what 
would be considered a ‘reasoned’ refusal to consummate. On the wife’s instigation, the 
couple agreed to leave the marriage unconsummated for a year or so, (the exact duration 
being a point of contention between the spouses) as she felt that the spiritual union of a 
marriage needed to be developed before a physical one. The majority of the judges deemed 
this an ‘unusual’ view of marriage, and suggested that the husband should have employed 
some ‘gentle violence’ in his attempts to consummate his marriage! Had he done so, “it 
would either have resulted in success or would have precipitated a crisis so decided as to have 
made... [the judges] task a comparatively easy one.”104 The husband stated that he did not 
employ violence for his wife was often hysterical and tearful as it was, and he did not wish to 
aggravate these feelings further. One dissenting judge felt that the wife’s view of marriage 
was not unnatural, suggesting that the marriage had been rushed into, and the wife was right 
in wanting to wait before becoming physical with her husband. The arrangement between 
them indicated that she was willing to have sex with her husband some day, and the judge felt 
this indicated that this was not a wilful refusal for life. Ultimately, the judges felt sympathy 
for a husband who was just trying to obtain his rights, and who had shown ‘rare forebarance’ 
and as such, he was granted the decree.   
 
The case of S v S105 demonstrates the courts prioritisation of incurability. In this case 
consummation was prevented by a curable defect in the wife, and she remained a virgin 
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throughout her 4 year marriage. The husband brought a petition for nullity, based on 
incapacity and wilful refusal, and the wife counter-claimed, alleging adultery on his part. The 
wife did not consult a doctor until after the petition, despite her husband’s requests.  
 
The wife stated that she was willing to undergo the necessary operation to make herself 
capable of consummation. Though anxious, she had attempted sexual intercourse with her 
husband many times. It was determined that consummation had not occurred due to a 
structural defect in her. Before the petition was brought, the wife had left her husband. For 
his part, the husband admitted his adultery, and that he had had a child with the other woman. 
The case was adjourned and during that time the wife underwent a hymenectomy, removing 
any impediment to consummation, before further argument was heard. Counsel for the 
husband argued that the judge should look at the date of the petition, when the wife was still 
incapable, and contended that the operation was a tactical move on the part of the wife, not 
for the purpose of consummating her marriage. She could not be deemed curable at the date 
of the petition because she had up to that point refused to seek medical advice.  
 
The judge held the key date for incapacity was the date that the evidence is heard. In this 
case, the operation had rendered the wife capable of consummation, and it “could not be said 
that the consummation of marriage had been practically impossible at the date when the 
evidence was heard. It might in the circumstances have been improbable; but the impractical 
and the improbable should not be confused.”106 The court’s concern was not the structural 
defect, but the possibility of consummation. The judge argued that if the husband were to 
return to his wife, it was unlikely that she would refuse to consummate the relationship. 
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Rather, the fact that the husband had left the wife was the main preventative factor in 
consummation occurring, and so the petition failed on the incapacity claim.  
 
As concerns wilful refusal, the judge felt that although the wife had not been to see a doctor, 
the husband had failed to prove that this amounted to refusal. The court felt that “her conduct 
had been more consistent with a state of indecision.”107 Neglect in complying with her 
husband’s requests was not necessarily the same as refusal. The judge therefore found that 
the claim also failed on the claim of wilful refusal. Further the judge stated that a petition on 
both claims could not be brought; a single cause must be established. In spite of this, where 
discrepancies existed between the couple’s evidence, the husband “was considered to be a 
more reliable and convincing witness”108 and his testimony was preferred. The wife was 
eventually granted a divorce on the basis of her husband’s admitted adultery. 
 
S.Y v S.Y109 dealt with similar issues, attempting to assess the ‘impact’ of a cure to incapacity. 
The wife was incapable of consummation, but was willing to undergo the necessary 
corrective surgery. The husband argued that the surgery would create an ‘artificial vagina’ 
not capable of consummation. The Court of Appeal held that the wife had a natural, but 
abnormal vagina in its current form.110 If she were to undergo the recommended surgery, the 
doctors and court felt that she would be capable of consummative sex.  Despite medical 
evidence of a potential cure, the husband left his wife and initiated the petition. There was 
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some discussion in this case as to the degree to which the act would be ‘enjoyed’ by both 
spouses. It was suggested that the husbands satisfaction, 
would be limited by the fact that the woman was deriving little if any 
pleasure from it, but again the [medical] consultant took the view that, 
although probably the woman would not have quite the same satisfaction as 
she would do if she was normal and had an ordinary vagina, she would get 
pleasurable sensations which would in turn communicate themselves to the 
husband...  if the operation had been successful, [the husband would] have 
been able to obtain real sexual satisfaction from it.111  
 
Consummation is not judged by someone’s level of ‘enjoyment,’ rather the test for 
consummation is whether the husband “substantially penetrates the vagina provided by nature 
for that purpose.”112 Further, the wife’s potential enjoyment is discussed only in reference to 
enhancing her husband’s enjoyment, rather than in acknowledging her own right to sexual 
enjoyment, whether this ‘communicates’ itself to her husband or not. The judges also 
emphasised the geography of the body. The fact that the ‘artificial’ vagina was anatomically 
correct meant that the sex could be considered ‘normal’. The court also considered the fact 
that if the vagina was deemed incapable of consummation, it must also by extension, be 
deemed incapable for the purposes of adultery or rape, which would create a strange 
situation. Consequently, the judges held that an artificial vagina was capable of 
consummation, and the husbands claim failed.   
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In 1908, the courts discussed for the first time, whether someone could apply for a decree on 
the basis of their own incapacity. The wife’s claim in G v G113 was predicated on her 
husband’s incapacity. Medical evidence was presented to the court “to the effect that both 
parties were apparently competent, but that the generative organs of the husband were 
unusually large, whilst those of the wife were somewhat small.”114 It was found that the wife 
refused to undergo a small operation to ease the situation. The court at first instance found 
that the marriage had not been consummated, but stressed that there was not a general 
incompetence on the part of the husband, but rather incompetence specific to the wife.  
 
Prior to this case, an impotent person could not bring a suit on the basis of their own 
incompetence. The judges in this case felt that they should follow the direction of Irish courts 
in this matter, and allow a suit to be brought by the impotent spouse, but this discretion 
should be exercised carefully.115 The appeal court found the marriage to be unconsummated, 
but reiterated that “this implied no reflection on either party, as each could no doubt contract 
marriage with another person.”116 The court cannot order the wife to have the operation, and 
felt there would be no benefit in compelling this couple to continue living together. The Court 
of Appeal upheld the decree, in a modified form that would avoid any reflection upon the 
capacity of the husband. 
 
In the case of Harthan,117 a husband petitioned on the basis of his own incapacity after 22 
years of marriage. The husband was entitled to claim his own incapacity because he “did not 
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know of the defect until after the date of the marriage ceremony, he had not deceived the 
wife, the wife did not know of the defect until after that date, and there was no other reason 
why he should be debarred from suing.”118 If a party knows of his incapacity, or of his 
partner’s incapacity before the marriage, he cannot then rely on that fact to nullify the 
marriage.  
 
Medical examination established the husband’s psychological incapacity. It was stated that he 
could perhaps be cured if he persevered, but after such a long time, his wife was unwilling. 
Given this, the husband tried to bring a claim of wilful refusal on the part of his wife. This 
was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. Returning to the ability of a party to make a claim on 
the basis of their own incapacity, the judges held that ecclesiastical law allowed for this 
through a natural development from Roman Catholic views of marriage.119 As it turned out, 
the couple in this case were granted a divorce between the hearing of this case at first 
instance and at the Court of Appeal. The discussion at this point was as to whether or not a 
person could bring a claim based upon their own incapacity, and the court found that as long 
as there was no deception, a case could be brought. 
 
 
2.4.3: Persistent and unreasonable refusal 
Some of the cases discussed have shown the ways in which incapacity used to be inferred 
from wilful refusal. After wilful refusal became a ground upon which one could apply for a 
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declaration of nullity, judges had new factors to look for in non-consummation cases.120 This 
widening scope for legal interpretation of non-consummation is a daunting development. 
Instead of saying that a partner has the right to refuse sex in a marriage, the law has further 
instilled the requirement of sexual intercourse between married couples. This change could 
be seen as a shift from viewing an ‘incapable’ wife as unfortunate, to viewing one who 
refuses sex as ‘abnormal’ and not performing the duties of a wife, further reinforcing the 
notion of woman as wife, mother, and sexual recipient.  
 
Religious couples have featured in nullity cases. In the case of Jodla v Jodla121 a Roman 
Catholic couple did not intend to have ‘matrimonial relations’ until a religious marriage 
ceremony had been conducted after their marriage at the registry office. The husband had 
promised to arrange the religious ceremony, but failed to do so. Both parties brought 
proceedings for a decree of nullity on the ground of the other’s wilful refusal. The Court 
found that the husband’s wilful refusal to arrange the religious ceremony excused the wife’s 
refusal to have sexual intercourse with him. Her request for a religious ceremony equated to a 
request for sex in her marriage, and the husband’s refusal was without just cause, thereby 
entitling her to a decree.122 In his judgement, Hewson J. painted an interesting picture of 
sexual requirements in marriage, referring to consummation, and marital sex as the husband’s 
‘marital right’. Further, the judge claimed that had consummation taken place, then the 
couple could live together “as husband and wife in the fullest sense.”123 This suggests that a 
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‘full’ marriage must contain a sexual element. The judge held that the wife’s request for a 
religious ceremony showed that she wished to “live wholly as husband and wife”.124  
 
The Court of Appeal case Kaur v Singh125 also had similar facts, and involved a marriage 
between two Sikhs which required a religious ceremony after the civil ceremony. The Sikh 
religion requires the husband to organise the religious ceremony, necessary to commence 
marital cohabitation, but the husband in this case refused to fulfil this duty. Given this 
situation, the couple had not lived together, or even seen each other, since their civil 
ceremony. The wife made a petition for nullity on the basis of her husband’s wilful refusal, 
and at first instance, the wife’s petition was dismissed.  
 
The wife’s family implored the husband to arrange the ceremony, but he eventually revealed 
that he had no intention of arranging the religious ceremony. “The facts were that he never 
went near her again, and never tried to persuade her to live with him and have intercourse 
with him. It may very well be true that, if he had made any such approach, she, according to 
her religious beliefs, might have said that she was unwilling to allow it before the ceremony. 
But that never happened.”126 Davies L.J. believed this case was indistinguishable from 
Jodla,127 and therefore the wife was entitled to a decree based on her husband’s wilful refusal 
to consummate the relationship, through his failure to ensure the completion of the marriage 
ceremony according to Sikh traditions. 
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Dickinson v Dickinson128 was a case brought by the husband requesting a decree of nullity on 
the basis of his wife’s wilful and persistent refusal to consummate the marriage despite his 
repeated attempts. The wife refused sex because she did not want children, and felt 
intercourse was “unnecessary, vulgar, rude and disgusting: and that many of her married 
friends lived without such intercourse, and she wished to do the same.”129 After a month, the 
husband had a nervous breakdown, and drank excessively. The doctor who attended to him 
attributed this to the strain he was under as a result of his wife’s conduct. The wife did not 
submit to the court’s order for a physical examination. The husband did submit to 
examination, and the doctors declared him normal in every way.  
 
The husband’s counsel asked the judge to find that the wife had a physical incapacity making 
consummation impossible but the judge refused as he had no evidence for this. Sir Samuel 
Evans, President, argued that the law on the area of nullity had “been advanced on various 
points by the instrumentality of judicial decisions, so as to be brought into conformity with 
more modern ideas.”130 The change that the judge refers to is the move from the insistence on 
incapacity, to the provision of relief for cases “where there have scarcely been any 
circumstances beyond a mere wilful refusal.”131 Given this change, Sir Evans asked “is there 
any good reason why it should not now be held that a mere wilful refusal... to consummate 
the marriage is a sufficient ground for the Court to grant a decree of nullity?”132 
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He continued that claims need to be brought in good faith, and the refusal must not be based 
on a temporary unwillingness that may be cured, but instead needs to be a persistent and 
determined “refusal to perform the obligations and to carry out the duties which the 
matrimonial contract involves. It has always been held that the contract of marriage implies 
the ability to consummate it...it also implies the willingness to consummate it.”133  
 
The husband was granted the decree, for “unless by brute force the husband obliged the wife 
to submit, the intercourse is practically impossible where the wife acts as she has done in this 
case...”134 Sir Evans found it unpalatable to declare the marriage void on the basis of 
incapacity that has been unproved, as both the husband and wife could move on to other 
relationships which could be consummated and result in children. He refused to draw any 
inference of physical incapacity, and preferred to make the decree for nullity on the basis of 
the wife’s wilful refusal. This was effectively a refusal to procreate, and a declaration of 
disinterest in sexual intercourse. Whilst I argue that there is a consummation requirement, the 
inability to fulfil this requirement only comes to light if an action is brought. There are 
undoubtedly many couples who are not sexually active with each other. Though the marriage 
contract may imply a willingness and ability to consummate, it does not imply a willingness 
or ability to procreate.  
 
The case of Napier v Napier135 was heard in the Court of Appeal. The decision at first 
instance had overruled that of Dickinson,136 claiming that it was not “justified in principle or 
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by...authorities”137 to nullify a marriage on the basis that wilful and persistent refusal to allow 
marital intercourse is of itself a sufficient ground. At first instance, the judge believed that the 
issue was not one of wilful and persistent refusal on the part of the wife, but rather that the 
husband had failed to make any reasonable or real attempts to consummate the relationship 
and therefore dismissed the husband’s claim.  
 
The husband produced extra information to the Court of Appeal to demonstrate that the 
refusal of his wife had been persistent and wilful. The husband’s counsel argued that “a 
decree for restitution of conjugal rights would do...[the husband] no good.”138 Lord Cozens-
Hardy M.R. felt it important in his judgement to point out that he was bound to give an 
opinion which conformed to that of the Ecclesiastical Courts, which “did not dissolve a 
marriage. They only declared that there had been no marriage at all.”139 Even with the 
additional evidence presented to the court, he felt that the decision of first instance should be 
upheld. There was discussion of inferring incapacity on the wife’s part, but the evidence did 
not support this.  
 
The husband wanted the judges to follow the precedent set in Dickinson140 where refusal was 
held to justify a decree. Pickford L.J held that “the Ecclesiastical Courts never accepted non-
consummation as a ground for nullity unless it could be referred to impotence or incapacity 
existing at the time of the marriage. The amount and nature of the evidence necessary to 
prove such incapacity have varied from time to time, but the necessity of establishing it has 
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never varied.”141 Pickford L.J continued that he believed Dickinson142 was incorrectly 
decided and that courts cannot extend the meanings outlined in statutes. As such, the claim 
was again dismissed in the Court of Appeal, because the judges felt they could not extend 
existing legislation to nullify marriages on the basis of wilful refusal.  
 
The House of Lords case Horton v Horton143 held that the husband had failed to prove wilful 
refusal on the part of his wife to consummate the marriage. After their marriage the couple 
lived with the wife’s parents, and decided not to have children until they had a home of their 
own. As they disagreed with contraceptives, they refrained from having intercourse. Only one 
attempt was made to consummate the marriage, and this failed as the husband was unable to 
penetrate his wife, and further discussion of consummating the relationship was met with 
unhappiness on the part of the wife. The court examined a letter written by the wife to her 
husband, in which she stated she had to ask for sex, which she felt was unfair, as a married 
woman, she felt sexual intercourse was her right, and should be instigated by her husband.   
The tenor of this case appears to reinforce the view that sexual activity in a marriage is to be 
initiated by the husband, with the wife as the submissive party, whilst also raising the 
argument of women’s sexual desire.   
 
In effect, the couple had gone from a state where the husband was unable and unwilling to 
consummate, to a situation where he wished to consummate, but the wife was no longer 
agreeable. As far as he was concerned, non-consummation was now the result of his wife’s 
refusal. His counsel argued that “whatever may have been the earlier history of the marriage 
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and whichever of the spouses may have been responsible for the non-consummation during 
that time, it was indisputable that at the later stage it was the wife who was unwilling to 
consummate.”144  
 
The House of Lords felt that ‘wilful refusal’ connoted “a settled and definite decision come to 
without just excuse, and, in determining whether there has been such a refusal, the judge 
should have regard to the whole history of the marriage.”145 After a failed attempt at 
consummation, it was unsurprising that the couple would be anxious about trying again. Yet 
the wife consulted with her parents and her church to try and remedy the situation. The court 
held that it was unreasonable for the husband to refuse consummation, when his wife was 
willing to, and then turn around and demand consummation of his wife. Her resistance would 
be an effect of her husband’s previous rejection.   
 
2.4.4: Use of contraceptives/ability to reproduce 
The use of contraceptives has been discussed in many cases and charts the path from 
contraception preventing consummation, to contraception now no longer being a bar to 
consummation. In Cowen v Cowen146 the couple lived abroad, and had agreed that until local 
medical conditions improved, they would use contraception to prevent pregnancy. Upon 
improvement, the wife asked her husband to cease using protection so that they could have a 
child. He constantly refused to do this, and where there was no contraception, practised coitus 
interruptus. Upon leaving her husband, the wife claimed that the marriage had never been 
consummated.  
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At first instance the case was dismissed and it was held the marriage had been consummated. 
At the Court of Appeal, Church doctrine holding procreation as fundamental in marriage was 
discussed. The judge found that the husband’s wilful refusal to consummate the marriage 
rendered it void. The judge at first instance held that the only question at hand was whether or 
not penetration had taken place, and the use of contraceptive was not a barrier to 
consummation. However, the Court of Appeal were of the opinion that; 
sexual intercourse cannot be said to be complete when a husband 
deliberately discontinues the act of intercourse before it has reached its 
natural termination, or when he artificially prevents that natural termination, 
which is the passage of the male seed into the body of the woman. To hold 
otherwise would be to affirm that a marriage is consummated by an act so 
performed that one of the principle ends, if not the principal end, of 
marriage is intentionally frustrated.147 
 
Yet there are those who are sterile, and would also be incapable of fulfilling this requirement. 
The Court circumvented this complication by stating that there are “obvious reasons of a 
religious and social character why sterility should not of itself be a sufficient reason for a 
decree of nullity,”148 but provided no indication as to what the ‘obvious reasons’ were.  
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In Baxter v Baxter149, following a ten year marriage, the husband left his wife, and wanted a 
decree of nullity on the basis of her wilful refusal to consummate. For the entirety of the 
marriage the wife would only have intercourse with her husband if he wore a condom. The 
husband expressed his objections and desire “to have intercourse in the natural way”150 but 
complied with his wife’s wishes, believing that he would otherwise be denied sex. The House 
of Lords held that consummation had occurred even though contraception was used, 
overruling the Cowen precedent.   
 
In Baxter, the husband complained that the absence of complete intercourse prevented 
procreation, and was therefore not acceptable to him, or any church.  
The Christian institution of marriage according to the Book of Common 
Prayer, exists (a) for the procreation of children; (b) for a remedy against 
sin, and (c) for mutual society, help and comfort. This draws a careful 
distinction between pleasure and procreation as ends of marriage. Marriage 
is not consummated by an act designed merely to satisfy carnal lust while 
avoiding the possible consequence of procreation.151  
 
It was argued that the husband’s acquiescence in the use of a condom was not a voluntary act. 
When given the option of no sex, or sex with a condom, acquiescence to ‘unnatural’ sex 
cannot be a voluntary decision on the part of a man. The husband’s counsel claimed that the 
husband adopted the only reasonable course open to him: “to woo her and use the 
contraceptive in the hope that she would be won over to his outlook on marital happiness 
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which comes with the possession of children.”152 However, the case was dismissed, “after all, 
the defining features of vera copula (erection, penetration, and ejaculation) were present and 
correct. Thus, there is no need for “consummative” sex to be procreative.”153 Whilst this case 
could be seen to be progressive, in that it does not require procreation, it took the House of 
Lords to make this declaration. The lower Courts had found the husband was an author of his 
own wrong (it being ‘wrong’ to have to have intercourse with contraception), by acquiescing 
to his wife’s insistence upon condoms. Further, although it was finally held that 
consummation could occur without the possibility of procreation, a marriage from which 
children will be born is still the norm. There was no discussion in the decision about the right 
of the wife to choose not to have children. Preference was given to the fact that the 
intercourse that had taken place was as close as possible to ‘ordinary and complete,’ with the 
use of contraceptives.  
 
Grimes v Grimes154 also dealt with the use of contraception and the husband’s insistence 
upon coitus interruptus. The wife’s counsel tried to distinguish this case from Baxter155 
(decided in the same year), on the basis that sexual intercourse cannot be complete or natural 
when coitus interruptus is practiced. They felt that Cowen156 still applied, and that sexual 
intercourse cannot be complete before it has reached its ‘natural termination.’ D-e v. A-g157 
suggested that any form of imperfect sexual intercourse would lead a husband to seek an 
adulterous relationship. It could therefore be inferred that coitus interruptus could lead the 
wife to search for an adulterous relationship.  
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The couple had always practised coitus interruptus, so that “when there was intercourse 
between these two people the husband always withdrew before emission.”158 The wife was 
unhappy with this arrangement as she wanted to have children, but her husband did not. The 
court tried to interpret the new ground of ‘wilful refusal’, holding that “under the new law, if 
the man, although he is able to perform those functions, wilfully refuses to perform them he 
is not performing the normal and full act of intercourse and therefore that he is not 
consummating the marriage.”159 
 
Reference was made to Dr Lushington’s statement that there are two different types of non-
consummation; non-consummation by those that are capable of sex, but not of procreation, 
and non-consummation by those who are incapable of consummation in its natural sense.160 
In the case of those who are unable to conceive, he would not declare these marriages void, 
but would declare the marriage with the ‘imperfect’ sexual intercourse void. “If...[these]... 
principles are applied to the facts of this case... it is right to say that there was never any 
natural or complete intercourse in the present case,”161 and the wife was entitled to a 
declaration of nullity.  
 
White v White162 also dealt with coitus interruptus. The wife petitioned for nullity on the basis 
that this practice prevented consummation because the sexual act had never been completed 
inside her body. In the alternative, she made a claim for divorce on the basis of cruelty. The 
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wife had explained to her husband that she was unhappy with the practice of coitus 
interruptus, and wanted to have children, but he did not share her views. In anticipation of her 
claim failing, the wife added the alternative petition of cruelty, claiming; “the respondent has 
treated the petitioner with great unkindness and cruelty in that... he deliberately insisted on 
the practice of coitus interruptus in his sexual relations with her despite her protests and with 
a full knowledge that his persistence in such practice would and in fact did cause injury to her 
health.”163 The husband denied the allegations made in his wife’s petition. He contended that 
he sometimes practiced coitus interruptus, but also sometimes engaged in full intercourse. 
Willmer J. did not believe the husband. The husband’s counsel argued that coitus interruptus 
should constitute consummation, because intercourse capable of being consummative does 
not need to result in procreation. Further, they argued that coitus interruptus “does not 
necessarily avoid the possibility of procreation where the spouses are normal, so that should 
coitus interruptus be held to be a ground for nullity, there might be children born of a 
marriage declared void for lack of consummation.”164 
 
The judge held that the husband’s denial of children was having an impact on the wife’s 
mental health, and the denial of this could cause injury. She had never had any satisfaction 
from the sexual side of her marriage, yet the judgement focused upon her inability to have 
children due to her husband’s refusal. The doctor’s had explained to the husband that his 
behaviour needed to change, and had led to the wife’s altered mental health. The doctor 
concluded that if the husband was unwilling/unable to change his behaviour, then the best 
option available to the wife would be to separate from him. After interviews with doctors, it 
became apparent that the husband was unwilling to co-operate with any changes.  
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The judge had two questions to answer. First, did the facts and the practice of coitus 
interruptus mean that the marriage had not been consummated? If he answered this question 
in the affirmative, then the marriage could be nullified. However if he found that the marriage 
had been consummated, did the facts presented constitute cruelty, thereby entitling the wife 
to a divorce? The decision in Grimes165 was delivered only two days before the judgement in 
this case. However Willmer J. felt unable to follow the decision set out in Grimes166 and felt 
compelled to follow the reasoning of Baxter.167 Willmer J. continued, “I regret very much 
that, within two days, there should be contrary decisions on what appears to be the same 
point, but it only goes to emphasize... that this is an extremely difficult point which will at 
some stage have to be decided by a higher tribunal.”168  
 
The judge in this case felt unable to give a decree for nullity. The possibility of conception, 
even whilst practicing coitus interruptus was high enough so that to declare the marriage void 
would result in a very curious situation whereby a child would exist from a marriage declared 
void due to non-consummation. Instead, the key element to examine was the extent and 
meaning of vera copula ie: the conjunction of bodies. In this case, erection and penetration 
had clearly been achieved. Yet the wife contended that if there had been no emission, vera 
copula was not complete. Willmer J. explained that “true conjunction” of the bodies had 
occurred, and that what followed “goes merely to the likelihood or otherwise of 
conception.”169 In quick succession, the cases of Baxter and White had declared that 
consummation had still occurred with the use of contraceptives, and the practice of coitus 
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interruptus. This could suggest a move to include as many definitions as possible within the 
meaning of consummation. This could be considered  detrimental to women. It narrows the 
scope of their own nullity claims, and could reinforce the requirement of sex from wives. 
Further, these two practices are not so far removed from the aims of consummation as they 
may first seem. The use of contraceptives may prevent conception, but still allows for 
‘ordinary’ sexual intercourse. The appearance of normalcy has been prioritised here. As 
regards coitus interruptus, the mere possibility of conception means that it is in fact similar to 
the previous understanding of consummation.   
 
Moving to the issue of cruelty, Willmer J. found this was the proper place to examine 
‘imperfect’ intercourse, be it the use of contraceptives or coitus interruptus, and consequently 
made a finding for dissolution on the ground of cruelty (as opposed to a finding of non-
consummation), as the husband’s conduct had obvious effects on the wife’s health. The judge 
stated that coitus interruptus would not always result in a dissolution based on cruelty. 
Rather, it was the particular nervous disposition of the wife in this case, and her desire to 
reproduce that had made coitus interruptus so damaging: 
I feel that a husband must take his wife as he finds her, and if she is a 
woman of a type who needs the full and natural completion of the act, then 
to persist in withholding it from her, in the face of her repeated complaints 
and objections, is in itself an act of cruelty, of cold calculated cruelty; and 
if, as in this case, it does result in serious injury to health, or does contribute 
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in marked degree to the breakdown of health of the other spouse, then in my 
judgement it is only right that this court should give relief.170 
 
In Cackett v Cackett171 the husband also insisted on coitus interruptus for the duration of his 
12 year marriage, and against the wishes of his wife. The husband was capable of emission, 
and was aware that the practice resulted in deterioration of his wife’s health, but continued as 
he did not want children. When asked if he would have normal intercourse with the aid of 
contraceptives, he responded that he did not trust them fully, and would not alter his 
behaviour. Finally, the wife left her husband after advice from her doctor following the 
deterioration in her health.  
 
The judge pointed out two issues to the wife’s counsel: first, what constitutes natural and 
complete intercourse? Counsel answered that the meaning of consummation is that which is 
understood in common usage, and for the male, requiring erection, penetration and emission. 
The judge found that “it is impossible to determine exactly where normal intercourse begins 
and ends; there could be no legal standard laid down which would define a matter of that 
kind.”172 Yet the case law highlighted thus far demonstrates the courts attempts to define 
normal, complete sexual intercourse since D-e v A-g.173 The second issue discussed, but left 
unanswered was the difficulty that arose if a court had to consider the precise point at which 
emission took place. Hodson J stated that it is impossible to define what amounts to normal 
intercourse. For “where a woman alleged that the man had failed to complete the sexual act, 
the court would have to inquire exactly at what stage emission took place, or to what degree 
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of satisfaction was reached by the woman...[There are]... difficulties in... trying to draw the 
line between a complete act and an incomplete act.”174   
 
This case was heard by the court after the two contradictory decisions of Grimes175 and 
White176 and the judge here expressed his inclination to follow the precedent set by White.177 
The above cases show that in Cowen178 coitus interruptus rendered sexual intercourse 
incomplete. However, that case also held that the use of contraceptives would also ensure 
non-consummation. This was overruled in Baxter179 in which contraceptives did not prevent 
consummation. The cases of Grimes180 and White181 had only served to further cloud the 
waters in this area. The judge however examined all the preceding judgements before coming 
to the conclusion that a decree of nullity could not be made but found that the wife was 
entitled to a decree of divorce based on her husband’s cruelty, following the precedents of 
Baxter182 and White.183 He found the husband’s insistence on continuing with a practice his 
wife had protested, and which injured her health, demonstrated her husband’s cruelty.  
 
Dr Lushington in D-e argued that a husband must “submit to the misfortune”184 of a barren 
wife. However, a husband should not have to endure a relationship where there is no “natural 
indulgence of natural desire.”185 This would indicate that women should preferably be 
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capable of procreation, but if not, there should at least be sex. There is talk of a husbands 
‘right’ to sexual intercourse, but there is no such use of language in cases in which the 
husband is unable or unwilling.  
 
The ability to reproduce was interestingly examined in the case of Clarke v Clarke.186 This 
case decided that the marriage was null on the basis of non-consummation, despite the couple 
having a biological child together. The case was originally brought by the wife who asked for 
a divorce based on her husband’s adultery. To avoid this charge, the husband made a counter-
petition claiming that the marriage had never been consummated owing to his wife’s 
incapacity.  
 
Four years after their marriage, the wife gave birth to their son who was aged twelve at the 
date of the hearing. The husband admitted to having sexual intercourse with another woman 
several times, but held that it could not be said to be adultery, as his marriage had never been 
consummated. The judge stated that the question of whether or not the marriage was 
consummated during the fourteen years of cohabitation was one of fact. In cases where there 
was a child, the presumption would be that consummation had occurred, and the “onus of 
satisfying the court that the marriage has not been consummated lies heavily upon the 
husband.”187 
 
Both spouses were medically examined. The court did not extensively examine the possibility 
of ‘fecundation ab extra’ (pregnancy that occurs in the absence of penile penetration) but 
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rather accepted it as a medical fact. Therefore, the birth of the child did not indicate 
consummation in and of itself. For the first three years of their marriage, the couple used a 
sheath when attempting intercourse, but penetration was never achieved. The husband 
claimed that “his wife appeared to regard the sexual act as a disagreeable necessity,”188 and 
she only fell pregnant when the sheath broke.  
 
After the birth of their son, their attempts at penetration continued to fail. The wife’s account 
differed, for she claimed she did not insist on the use of a sheath, had no objection to having 
children and believed that some penetration had been achieved. However, the judge found 
Mrs Clarke an unsatisfactory witness. He felt she was evasive about matters that “she cannot 
possibly have forgotten.”189 Most disturbingly, the judge said; 
Mrs Clarke was, in my view, a woman who was devoid of the ordinary 
sexual instinct: she did not want children, and regarded the sexual act with 
repugnance. At the same time, she recognised that her husband was entitled 
to exercise his marital rights and was prepared, at any rate during the first 
years of her married life, to submit, in so far as she was physically able to 
do so, to the exercise by her husband of such rights. Inasmuch as any 
attempt by her husband to have intercourse was repugnant to her, she did 
not, in my view, even during the first few years after marriage, permit her 
husband to attempt intercourse as frequently as would have been the case if 
she had a more normal outlook in such matters.190 
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It was held that there were no physical barriers to consummation on the wife’s part, though 
she suffered from involuntary contractions, thereby physically blocking consummation. 
There was some claim that prior to the birth of her son the vaginal orifice was small, but this 
was not a barrier to consummation after the birth of the child. Both the examining doctors 
held that the wife was frigid. One of the doctors called on, who had not physically examined 
Mrs Clarke, held that the characteristics of frigidity were aversion to sex, “accompanied by 
resistance to the male... in some cases, it was accompanied by a desire for personal 
adornment and material possessions.”191 The judge concluded that although Mrs Clarke had a 
repugnance to sex, “she was able to bring herself to permit attempts by her husband, but her 
muscular reactions were such that her husband was never able to achieve any real 
penetration.”192 As a result the marriage was never consummated. It was held to be a physical 
incapacity rather than a wilful refusal, as the contraction of the muscles was psychological, 
and not a choice.  
 
The court did not require ‘want of sincerity’ on the part of the husband. It would not have 
been unreasonable to require a valid reason on his part for declaring his 15year marriage null. 
He had declared that he would like to marry someone else. But he explained that he had 
persevered with his marriage, hoping that the couple’s sex life would change after the birth of 
their child.  
 
The Court of Appeal decision of J v J193 also specifically dealt with the possibility of 
reproduction. The wife applied for an annulment of her marriage on the basis of her 
                                                 
191
 Ibid at 544  
192
 Ibid at 545 
193
 J v J [1947] P. 158  
130 
 
husband’s incapacity or his wilful refusal to consummate the relationship. Just before the 
couple were married, the husband decided he wanted to undergo an operation to make him 
sterile. He was still capable of penetration and emission, but conception would be impossible. 
The doctor required signatures from both the man and his fiancé in order to carry out the 
operation. His fiancé refused to sign the form, and expressed a strong desire to have children. 
Eventually, she agreed to sign, on the condition that her husband did not undergo the 
operation until after their marriage, in the hope that she would be able to change his mind. 
Unbeknown to her, her partner underwent the operation anyway. This only came to light 
some six weeks before their wedding.  
 
The marriage went ahead and intercourse took place regularly for the first two or three years, 
but rarely after that. Before the wedding, when the operation had come to light, the husband 
told his fiancé that they could adopt. However when she later mentioned this, he would not 
discuss the matter. The judge at first instance held that the husband was guilty of wilful 
refusal to consummate, but he still dismissed the wife’s claim “on the ground that it would be 
contrary to public policy to grant it in view of the wife’s knowledge of the facts before 
marriage.”194 No mention was made of the fact that penetration had actually occurred. Rather 
it was found that the inability to conceive was enough to negate consummation. Following 
the precedent of the court in Cowen195 in which the court held that the use of contraception 
rendered the marriage unconsummated, the Court of Appeal found here that they could 
extend that scope to include the sterile husband. The wife’s counsel argued there is no 
difference between “the application of an external contraception as in Cowen... and the 
achieving of the same result by means of an operation as in this case. The only distinction in 
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fact is that in the one case the contraception is occasional whereas in the other it is 
permanent.”196 
 
The wife’s counsel argued that she should not be denied a remedy because she had prior 
knowledge, and that it is contrary to public policy to be deprived of the ability to procreate. 
Also, “it is equally contrary to public policy that a person capable of generation should be 
tied to a person permanently incapable of it.”197 The judgement found that there was no 
question of natural sterility. Rather, the husband “rendered himself incapable of effecting 
consummation by reason of a structural defect which he had himself brought about in his 
organs of generation.”198 The court further felt that the wife’s knowledge was not a bar to a 
remedy in law, and held that the amount of time that had passed was not a problem, as she 
had been unaware of legal remedies open to her. Once aware, she immediately applied to the 
court for a declaration. In terms of sincerity (a concept that is further addressed below), the 
court found that she had found out very late, and had protested the idea. The husband had 
“made her swear to say nothing about this operation to anyone. In any case it would not have 
been an easy reason for her to give for breaking off her engagement. The natural inference 
from her evidence... is that she felt that it was too late to draw back,”199 and so the petition 
could not fail for insincerity.  
 
Following this case was the case of R.E.L. v E.L.200 which followed the ratio of Clarke.201 
This defended petition was brought by the wife. She told the court that her husband had been 
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unable to consummate their marriage, and that she had become pregnant through artificial 
insemination. She asked for a decree of nullity based on his incapacity, or in the alternative, 
his wilful refusal. The husband denied the claim, but did not deny that his marriage had never 
been consummated.  
 
Both spouses underwent medical examinations for the court. The wife was shown to have no 
impediments “and the husband was capable of consummating the marriage. The trouble was 
psychological...”202 The husband and wife had also previously visited doctors, and the 
husband had agreed to undergo some psychological treatment, but the marriage remained 
unconsummated. The wife was anxious to start a family, and the couple discussed artificial 
insemination. When she left her husband, she was unaware that the insemination had been 
successful. She explained that she wanted to be a mother, but also that she hoped the 
pregnancy would ease their sexual tension, as her urgency would be diminished. The judge 
believed that her desire to have a child was to try and aid her marital relations, but also 
because “most women desire children.”203 
 
The court gave some consideration to the prospect of bastardising the child if a decree was 
given. The counsel for the wife explained that Clarke204 and Dredge205 (discussed further 
below) had shown that legitimacy of a child should not be a deciding factor. Rather, they 
argued that public policy should allow the petitioner and defendant to separate so that they 
would be free “to contract normal marriages and found families. There is no real possibility 
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of a normal marriage between the petitioner and respondent; the husband’s cure... is highly 
unlikely and the marriage between them has finally broken down.”206 As regards the child, 
Pearce J. felt that the scope of Clarke207 was of limited help in deciding this case. In 
Clarke,208 the child was conceived by an “accidental freak of fecundation ab extra during an 
attempt to consummate, while here the conception was a deliberate act by the husband and 
wife.”209 The husband’s counsel argued this should be taken as a sign that the wife had 
accepted the marriage. Yet she was unaware that she was pregnant when she left her husband. 
The judge made reference to a claim of want of sincerity on the part of the wife, and stated 
that “the question is whether one ought to draw inferences from her conduct and acts which 
would make it inequitable now to give her a decree.”210 He held that the wife made it clear 
throughout that she was unhappy with the marriage, but she persisted. The judge believed that 
the husband would not suffer detrimentally for having a child with a woman he still claimed 
to love. There was no lack of sincerity on her part.  
 
A decree of nullity was granted on the basis that the wife had never wished to marry an 
impotent man, that her pregnancy was not a factor to be considered in the decision as the 
judge said that the birth of the child was unlikely to overcome “the husband’s psychological 
trouble, or...[resign]...the wife to an unnatural marriage”211 and further, that she had 
constantly made it clear that she wished and intended to have a normal married life. Pearce J. 
stated: “In most nullity cases there comes a moment when the most forbearing wife becomes 
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sickened by the role, so unnatural to a sensitive woman, of trying to stimulate an impotent 
spouse sufficiently to enable him to achieve penetration.”212 
 
In the case of R v R,213 the husband was capable of erection and penetration, but was never 
able to emit semen into his wife’s body. The husband brought the petition himself based on 
his incapacity to consummate his marriage, and his wife defended the claim. The court was 
provided with evidence to demonstrate the husbands ‘strait-laced’ upbringing, and other than 
“the usual involuntary nocturnal emission of semen of an adolescent... he showed very little 
interest in matters of sex.”214 The couple sought medical advice and treatment over 8 years, in 
the hope of solving the problem and conceiving a child, but the condition persisted. In the end 
the husband told his wife he had fallen in love with another woman, and with this other 
woman he had been able to have intercourse and emission. 
 
The issue for the court was whether this physical intimacy had constituted consummation. It 
was held that no direct authority existed on this problem, as medical science had not yet 
caught up “in investigating and explaining the intimacies of the marriage bed, and in enabling 
parties to give evidence thereon in a comparatively scientific way.”215 The court held that 
consummation is about erection and penetration, and agreed with the judgement in White 
which concluded that ‘true conjunction’ occurs when entry and penetration is complete. 
Anything that follows is about the likelihood of conception, the possibility of which is not 
necessary for consummation.216 The judge did not think it important to analyse the new 
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sexual relationship the husband had entered, and found that the marriage had been 
consummated, and therefore a decree of nullity could not be given to the husband. 
 
2.4.5: Want of sincerity, and the impact of age and delay 
Many of the cases have given consideration to whether or not it would be fair to provide a 
decree of nullity. In the case of Guest v Shipley217 for example, it was felt that a decree would 
be unfair. In a case alleging impotence on the part of the wife, the court found that the suit 
failed on the basis of a previous suit brought by the wife claiming adultery on the part of her 
husband. This previous suit had required the husband to plead that the marriage was a lawful 
one, which he did, whilst not mentioning that the marriage was unconsummated. The case 
was dismissed. In the case of S v S218 there was discussion as to whether it would be fair to 
withhold a decree when it took the wife 16 years to cure her incapacity. At first instance, it 
was found that the wife had undergone an operation (a hymenectomy) six days before the 
hearing. The judge found that there had not been wilful refusal, as the wife had made it clear 
she was willing to consummate the relationship, if possible. The judge at first instance was 
unsure of the effect of the operation upon the probability of consummation occurring. He 
held that it offered something more “than the possibility of a cure but less than a 
probability.”219 The judge felt that the wife could not fulfil the onus upon her to demonstrate 
that the operation offered a high probability of cure. As such the husband was granted the 
decree he sought. However, after the hearing the wife was medically examined by three 
doctors, and the court gave leave for their evidence to be heard at the wife’s appeal.  
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Two doctors gave evidence concluding that the operation had cured the wife of her 
incapacity. The third doctor was unsure of whether the wife would psychologically be able to 
have sex, given her past experience. The appeal judges held that the burden of proof is always 
upon the petitioner to prove that incapacity existed at the date of a hearing, not the respondent 
wife, and as the operation had provided a possibility of consummation, the claim should fail. 
The petitioner needed to show that there was incapacity, and that it was incurable. Instead, at 
the date of hearing, there was a very high probability that consummation could occur.  
 
This case challenged some of the presumptions of non-consummation cases. After a 16 year 
marriage with no sexual intercourse, the courts would generally infer incapacity on the part of 
the wife concluding that there had been a sufficient amount of time for consummation to 
occur, and if it has not occurred, then it was impossible. Given that the length of this marriage 
was over five times the length of the old ‘three year trial cohabitation’, it would not have 
been unreasonable for the court to provide a declaration of nullity. However, at the time of 
the hearing the wife was capable of consummation. The husband’s counsel argued on public 
policy grounds that “a woman who has imposed a sexless life on her husband for 16 years 
and done nothing to remedy the situation should not be allowed to rely on last-minute 
cures.”220  
 
The appeal judges felt that the first instance judge had incorrectly put the onus of proof on the 
wife, and not factored in the medical evidence enough. Further, enough weight was not given 
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to S. v S.,221 placing the relevant date of incapacity as the date of the hearing. Accordingly, 
they set the judgement aside, and no decree was granted.  
 
Want of sincerity was also a factor in the House of Lords case G v M.222 The case alleged 
impotence on the part of the husband. After marriage, G. and M. slept in the same bed for 
nineteen months, but only attempted consummation for 2 and half months. The husband in 
this case also had a medical examination which revealed no external physical reasons for his 
impotence.  
 
The husband alleged that the marriage was not consummated due to his wife’s cold 
demeanour. He alleged that he had to speak to her ‘severely’ on many occasions due to her 
behaviour, and that “his wife went to a good many balls and made violent love to more than 
one person.”223 The allegations between the two varied between ‘nervousness’ on the part of 
the husband, and a growing coldness on the part of the wife towards the husband.  
 
On cross-examination, the husbands doctor found that if the husband was encouraged, “and if 
a little champagne were given him beforehand, he might succeed with any other woman; but 
after his failures it would be more difficult with his wife.”224 This concept of requiring 
alcohol to consummate a relationship is worrying, though is a concept of its time. The judges 
in this case assessed the wife’s ‘want of sincerity’, referring to the motives behind her claim 
for nullity. The court held that the wife’s conduct after the separation (keeping her married 
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name, keeping insurance policies) “proved that the action [for nullity] was prosecuted for a 
side motive, and not for the single purpose of getting rid of the disappointment resulting from 
the alleged imperfections.”225 The implication being that wives who are denied a sexual 
relationship will be vengeful in their pursuit of nullity. To prove sincerity, the petitioner 
needed to demonstrate that the claim was not vengeful, and was prompt. One cannot discover 
something about their partner which makes them want to leave, but still enjoy the benefits of 
marriage for a considerable amount of time, before bringing a claim to enable them to leave. 
A “delay in raising a suit of nullity on the ground of impotency is a material element in the 
investigation of a case which upon the facts is doubtful; but there is no definite or absolute 
bar arising from it.”226  
 
Earl of Selborne, L.C contended that ‘want of sincerity’ had overstated importance, and was 
difficult to prove. It is a matter of psychology rather than proof as it looks “into the motives 
of a person’s mind rather than... whether a cause of action exists or not.”227 The crux of this 
case was the wife’s desire to avoid the stigma of adultery. By appealing for a declaration of 
nullity, she would be declared incapable of committing adultery (having had a child by 
another man after separating from her husband), as her marriage never existed. The decision 
of the lower court was upheld, and the husband’s impotence was held to be found. 
 
Nash v Nash228 also examined sincerity. The wife in this case made a plea of impotence, or in 
the alternative, of wilful refusal on the part of her husband to consummate the marriage. The 
court gave particular consideration to the husband’s claim that the petition was insincere. The 
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couple had been married just under three months when the petition was presented, and the 
couple had a considerable age gap, the wife being 34 years old when they met, and the 
husband being 73. The husband admitted that he had not consummated the relationship, and 
that he had no intention of doing so, as he did not want to have children with his wife, yet 
denied that this was a matter of incapacity.  Doctors found that the husband was likely to be 
impotent. The focus turned to the “unusual question of want of sincerity on the part of the 
petitioner.”229 The issue was whether or not the petitioning partner had benefitted in some 
way from the marriage which would then render it unfair to treat the marriage as never 
having existed. The judge concluded that the court should only be concerned about the 
sincerity of the plea, and the focus should not be on “...the general character of the petitioner 
as a sincere or insincere person, or... with the conduct of the petitioner before her marriage or 
the motives which prompted her to enter into the marriage.”230 As such, if a petitioner was 
aware of impotency before marriage, and then brought a claim of impotency, then the decree 
would be refused, not on the basis of previous knowledge, but because of the insincerity of 
the claim.  
 
Given that the husband did not accept that he was impotent, it could not be held that the wife 
knew before marriage that the union would not be consummated. The judge examined the 
time between the wife becoming convinced of her husband’s impotence, and bringing the 
claim. The husband and wife had varying accounts of the attempts at consummation made 
during their honeymoon, and the judge felt that the younger and fresher memory of the 
petitioner was preferable to the “hazy and fuddled recollection”231 of the respondent. 
Sincerity has also been taken to refer to delays in bringing claims for nullity. In this case 
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however, there were only four days between the wife leaving her husband and petitioning the 
court, though aware of her husband’s impotence a month before. Her attempts to salvage her 
marriage in that month did not negatively affect her claim of sincerity. The petitioner must be 
shown as “not having wavered in her view as to the action she will take to assert her rights 
after she attained full knowledge of the facts and the law concerning those rights.”232 It seems 
unusual that such clarity is required of a spouse at a time that is no doubt upsetting and 
traumatic. The judge concluded that the wife had received no benefits, material or otherwise, 
from this marriage, that her petition was sincere, and that the decree would be granted.  
 
In the Court of Appeal case of Pettit v Pettit,233 brought by the husband, claiming his own 
incapacity the court dismissed the appeal on the basis that the court has to give consideration 
to all the circumstances of a marriage, “including the respondent’s attitude and reaction to the 
situation created by the impotence of the petitioner... [including] whether it would be just or 
unjust that the impotent spouse should obtain a decree.”234 It was felt that it would be unjust 
and inequitable to grant the husband the decree, the husband having left his wife of 20 years 
for another woman. It appeared the other woman was pushing for the separation, and given 
that the wife had paid for the matrimonial home and all the furnishings, it would be unfair to 
grant the husband the decree he wanted. The judges felt that there were three key factors to 
assess: firstly, had non-consummation been proved? Secondly, had the husband proved that 
the incapacity was his own? And lastly, the court had to give consideration to all 
circumstance in order to determine whether a decree was fair or not. The court did not focus 
too heavily upon the alleged incapacity, but rather felt that the order would be unfair to the 
wife. The judges felt that both partners ‘suffer’ when there is incapacity on the part of one of 
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them. Yet Willmer L.J stated that “the fact that [the husband]... was prepared to go on for 
upwards of 20 years before seeking advice seems to me to indicate a complete lack of any 
sense of injury or grievance...this must surely be a matter to take into consideration in 
determining whether he has approbated the marriage, and... in deciding whether it is fair and 
equitable to grant relief.”235 
 
The judges made explicit reference to the fact that the wife in this case was a ‘good’ wife, 
even providing a child within an unconsummated marriage. It was said that “she has given up 
her whole life to the husband, has served him faithfully as wife and as mother to his child, as 
well as being of considerable financial help to him.”236  
 
Consideration in cases has been given to the age of the parties- in particular the age of the 
wife. In Briggs v Morgan,237 once the advanced age of the wife was established, the court felt 
it unnecessary to further medically determine her sexual capability, as she was no longer of 
child-bearing age, and too old for a ‘sex-drive’. On this basis, Sir William Scott held that the 
marriage was not worthy of a decree of nullity. The husband was deemed to have approbated 
a union without sex by taking a wife of her age. Brown v Brown238 also held that the 
husband’s application for a decree failed as he had not shown that the impediment was 
incurable, or existed for the duration of the marriage. Rather the judge pointed out that 
although the main objective of marriage is child-bearing, when an old man takes an old 
woman as his wife, this cannot operate, and a husband must take his wife “tanquam soror”. 
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In Morgan v Morgan,239 a petition was brought by the husband on the basis of his own 
impotence. The couple in this case were married later in life, (the husband being aged 72 and 
the wife 59) and agreed to marry and live together on a basis of companionship only. During 
the couple’s courtship, kisses were exchanged and after the marriage he gave his new wife 
£2000.  
 
During questioning, the husband said that he had hoped that after living as husband and wife 
for some time, their relationship might change, and include a sexual element: “Well, naturally 
as time goes on and we live together I might possibly have thought possibly connection might 
be had... I had that in mind, sartorially, like any man would do.”240 After the ceremony, the 
wife left her husband and the court heard evidence that she had mental problems. The 
husband told the court that he had never had sexual relations with a woman, and at the date of 
marriage, was unaware of his incapacity. He was only advised of his impotence after a 
private medical examination. After leaving him, the wife wrote to the husband and asked him 
to visit her solicitor, where he was informed that she regretted marrying him and she would 
return his money. She did not return the money and the husband sought his own legal advice, 
before presenting the petition for nullity.  
 
Following the precedent of Harthan,241 the petitioner would be entitled to a decree of nullity 
on the ground of his own impotence, as long as the petitioner and the respondent were 
unaware of the impotence at the date of the marriage ceremony. Yet in this case, the 
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husband’s petition was denied. His incapacity was held not to be a relevant factor in the 
marriage, as neither party was aware of the incapacity and further it was deemed contrary to 
public policy for the husband to be able to plead his own impotence, having acknowledged 
that the marriage was undertaken on the basis of companionship only. It is important to note 
that this acknowledgement does not sit within the general trend of the cases I have outlined. 
The judge argued that the question which arose was; 
whether the husband was debarred from the relief he claimed by reason of 
his having entered into this marriage on the basis of mere companionship 
and without any intention of marital intercourse, and whether this court, 
which must... treat nullity cases as of national importance irrespective of the 
wishes of the parties, can accept the husband’s mental reservations as to the 
bare possibility of marital intercourse in the future.242 
 
He argued that the husband could perhaps have requested a decree on the basis of his wife’s 
wilful refusal. However, this was barred once he revealed to his lawyers that he was 
impotent. A person must have regard to the circumstances in which they have married, at the 
time they married, and taking into consideration the circumstances of this marriage the 
husband “could not make a grievance now of what did not occur to him a grievance then.”243 
Having approbated the marriage, the husband could not then claim he no longer wished to 
have a marriage for companionship. There was effectively “a valid agreement between the 
spouses not to consummate.”244 
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In the case of G v G245 the judge made time to discuss the merits of bringing the case in the 
first place. He was careful to say that he was satisfied that the case was “free from all 
suspicion of being a suit trumped up for the purpose of getting rid of a marriage to which 
both parties are averse.”246 The judge felt that the length of time of cohabitation provided 
ample opportunity for consummation to have occurred, and as it had not, he believed it never 
would. The failure of consummation, (and in this case the failure of the wife) meant that the 
“ends of marriage, the procreation of children, and the pleasures and enjoyments of 
matrimony cannot be attained.”247 He claimed the question of non-consummation was a 
practical one and felt the husband had exhausted all options open to him.   
 
As regards delay, in the case of B-n v B-n248 the court gave extensive consideration to the 
delay in applying for a decree- the couple having been married for 18 years- and felt that 
given this amount of time and evidence that there had been ‘partial connection’ between the 
couple, the husband was not entitled to a decree of nullity. The delay alone could not 
constitute a bar to the decree.249 In Dredge v Dredge250 also, the husband and wife were 
already expecting a child together before their marriage ceremony. After marriage, they did 
not consummate the union as a result of the wife’s wilful refusal. The wife offered no 
explanation for her refusal, and did not attend court to defend the suit. By the time the 
husband filed the petition, the couple’s child was 17 years old. The Court considered the 
implications on the child in declaring the marriage voidable, but decided it was not a factor in 
the decision. The judge examined the reasons for the delay in the application, but found the 
husband’s reasons to be sincere, as was his request for nullity; “he was giving his evidence 
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with complete candour and truthfulness, and I am prepared to accept it.”251 This case 
established that sex before marriage with your spouse does not affect a claim for non-
consummation after marriage.  
 
2.5: Conclusions 
This chapter has shown the development of consummation law and highlighted the 
presumptions made by the courts. I do not claim to have presented every case that has dealt 
with consummation, but rather have made reference to those most referenced in academic 
literature, and a selection of further cases from which to understand the current legal 
situation. Throughout the chapter, I have pointed out the issues I feel the case law has 
identified. Most evidently, the construction of law itself has come to light in this chapter; 
“when it is most ruthlessly neutral, it is most male; when it is most sex blind, it is most blind 
to the sex of the standard being applied. When it most clearly conforms to precedent, to 
“facts,” to legislative intent, it most closely enforces socially male norms and most 
thoroughly precludes questioning their content as having a point of view at all.”252 
Consummation is constricted by these principles, written in language that portrays gender-
neutrality, but which impacts most negatively upon women through a male construction and 
need for sex. It is claimed that this is necessary for the purposes of (male-defined) justice. 
Chapter 3 will show that most of the case law portrays the husband as the dominant partner, 
who needs sexual intercourse, and should initiate it. Where the wife has brought a claim of 
nullity, most have claimed it is a result of their desire to bare children. It is unclear if this is 
actually true for all, or if these women have been advised that this argument is most likely to 
succeed in court. Not a single case makes any extensive reference to female sexuality outside 
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of the desire to be a mother, or as a ‘wifely duty’, although the case of Harthan has 
acknowledged role of companionship in marriage.    
 
As regards physical examinations of spouses, Cloud states that although this would seem to 
violate modesty, in the name of justice, modesty must be put to one side.253 However, this is 
only the case for women who should still be in their sexual prime. Wives of a certain age 
have been deemed unable, and justifiably unwilling to consummate their relationships- a 
‘natural’ consequence of advanced age in women, which diminishes sexual drive.254  
 
The case law and statue show that a marriage can be declared voidable on the basis of non-
consummation due to incapacity, or wilful refusal on the part of one of the spouses. 
Effectively, this creates a positive ‘requirement’ of the spouses. The spouses have to bring the 
claim themselves within their lifetime. An incapacity will be deemed incurable if the cure 
would risk the health of the spouse in question, or if the spouse in question refuses to undergo 
the treatment necessary to cure it. Refusal to undergo medical examination to establish 
incapacity may result in an inference of incapacity. Further, the use of contraceptives does 
not invalidate consummation, and neither does the ability/inability of the wife to have 
children. A spouse can make a petition for nullity on the basis of their own incapacity, as 
long it was not known before the marriage. The consummative act must be ‘ordinary and 
complete’255 but coitus interruptus will not necessarily invalidate the consummative act. The 
emergence of wilful refusal is somewhat of an anomaly because “all other grounds for nullity 
                                                 
253
 Cloud op cit n14 pg 704  
254
 Ibid at pg 705-706 
255
 D-e v. A-g (falsely calling herself D-e) op cit n22 at 298 
147 
 
depend on circumstances existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage whereas the 
new ground depends on subsequent conduct.”256  
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THREE 
 
CRITIQUING CONSUMMATION  
 
…consummation is a lodestar in a constellation of practices aiming to 
maintain congruence and coherence in often ambiguous, sometimes fluid, 
and almost inevitably anxiety-ridden categories of sex, corporeality, and 
sexuality.1  
 
Chapter two outlined the way in which “the law has constructed ‘natural’ sexual intercourse 
in its institutionalised setting:...marriage.”2 Using radical feminist theory this chapter 
provides analysis of the legal developments, with particular emphasis on gender/sexuality 
issues, and incorporates my literature review on current (radical feminist and alternative) 
perspectives on consummation. I engage with alternative perspectives to demonstrate not 
only their existence, but also in some cases, the weaknesses of radical feminism, which have 
been more adequately addressed by others.   
 
3.1: Emerging themes from the case law 
To consummate a marriage, a couple must have sexual intercourse once after the marriage 
ceremony to avoid a claim for nullity on the basis of non-consummation.3 This chapter 
addresses the trends and issues that arise from the case law presented in Chapter 2: I expand 
upon the case law’s prioritisation of heterosexual relations, and the presentation of 
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penetrative sex as ‘normal’. I then develop this further to examine how and why the sexual 
marriage has been prioritised. I also use the case law to develop the understandings of sex 
and gender offered in Chapter 1. I highlight the way in which law has treated, or made 
invisible those who do not fit into the consummation requirement- for example, impotent 
men- and the way that male sexuality has been presented in court. I present alternative 
foundations for understanding relationships by asking ‘where is the love?’ in legally 
recognised sexual relationships. I conclude the chapter with a critique of the court’s 
overreliance upon medicalised understandings of sex and marriage.   
 
Honoré has argued that the requirements for consummation “are stricter than are needed to 
establish a case of rape.”4 The courts have prescribed a detailed form of penetration for 
consummation.5 The definition and requirements of rape are not as precisely defined. Whilst 
analysis of academic writing and doctrine about rape is not directly part of this thesis, I 
provide a brief analysis to try and understand how the law has differentiated its 
understandings of penetration.  
 
Arguably, definitions of rape and sexual offences remain wide so as to incorporate as many 
scenarios as possible, to provide legal remedy for as many as possible who suffer sexual 
offences. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 states that rape can only be committed by men, 
(women can commit rape as accessories but not as principles) because a man commits the 
offence of rape if “he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person... 
with his penis”6 without consent.7 The marital exemption to this was removed in 1991, 
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reversing “the outdated view that on marriage a wife gave irrevocable consent to sexual 
relations at any time during the marriage and therefore marital intercourse could not be 
unlawful.”8 This view had been the result of the belief that husband and wife become one 
flesh at marriage, and it was therefore impossible for a husband to rape himself.  
 
In contrast to overt discussion of penetrative consummation, definitions of rape have been 
vague. Rape requires penetration, but “what exactly will amount to penetration is an issue 
which is likely to be left to the jury, giving penetration its normal meaning.”9 No clarification 
is given as to what its ‘normal meaning’ may be, but rape does not require ejaculation. 
Radical feminist analysis of sex has often been misunderstood as asserting that all women 
should exert their sexual energies with other women.10 This view is not shared by all radical 
feminists. The more common belief is that these sexual relationships are a continuation of 
subordination: “the argument is that we cannot pretend there is a neat division between ‘bad 
rape’ and ‘good sexual intercourse’.”11 I would not take this so far as to say that no woman 
can ever give true consent, but the complexities of sex, and the continued subordination of 
women mean that there is no ‘neat division’ that can be used to differentiate sex and rape.12  
 
An alternative view of rape (applicable to consummation and intercourse), is constructed by 
Madden Dempsey and Herring who argue that sexual intercourse is a prima facie wrong, “in 
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other words it is an act which requires the penetrator to have a good reason for the act of 
penetration.”13 Viewed in this way, the consummation requirement could read something like 
this: penetration is a prima facie wrong, and the consummation requirement is a codification 
of this wrong demanded only of heterosexual married couples. Though the Madden 
Dempsey/Herring view appears beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worthy of extensive 
discussion as it is applicable to our understanding of sex, and consummation as the first legal 
requirement of sex within a marriage. The orthodox view of sexual penetration is that sexual 
penetration is not a wrong; “there is no general moral duty not to engage in sexual 
intercourse.”14 In fact, the very opposite is argued- sex is necessary because it is biologically 
required both to maintain the species, and for male gratification for example.15 These authors 
offer a new understanding of penetrative sex, and claim that sexual penetration needs 
justification.16 They offer a series of explanations and potential exceptions to their theory. 
The exceptions are cumulative: “in order to avoid prima face wrongdoing, a man engaging in 
sexual penetration must satisfy each and every potential exception... If any exception fails to 
be satisfied, then his conduct calls for justification.”17 Beauvoir similarly argued that the 
vagina is eroticized through the intervention of a man, and that this,  
 
always constitutes a kind of violation... We still speak of ‘taking’ a girls 
virginity, her flower, or ‘breaking’ her maidenhead. This defloration is not 
the gradually accomplished outcome of a continuous evolution, it is an 
                                                 
13
 Herring op cit n8 pg 472  
14
 Madden Dempsey, M. & Herring, J. ‘Why Sexual Penetration Requires Justification’ (2007) 27 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 467-491 pg 468 
15
 De Beauvoir, S., The Second Sex (1949) Parshley, H (ed and trans) London, Vintage, 1997 pg 35  
16
 Madden Dempsey & Herring op cit n14  
17
 Ibid pg 473  
152 
 
abrupt rupture with the past, the beginning of a new cycle. Sex pleasure 
thereafter is obtained through the contractions of the vaginal wall...18 
 
which is ‘activated’ through the intervention of a man. I argue the vagina is prioritised in 
consummation and sex definitions because it is linked to the male’s satisfaction, whereas 
clitoral stimulation is not viewed as dependent upon a man. Madden Dempsey and Herring 
contend that ‘use of force’ is necessary for sexual penetration, and that it is widely accepted 
that the “use of physical force on another person is a prima facie wrong.”19 Although there 
can be justifications to sometimes using force (for example to pull a child away from a busy 
road), the use of force is always a prima facie wrong, and its use should be regretted.20 The 
use of force in these cases does not serve to create a correct act; rather, it creates a justified 
prima facie wrong. Whilst the authors take no “position as to whether penetration into 
muscled cavities is best understood as invasion, possession or occupation,”21 they highlight 
the force necessary for the penis to achieve this, and that penile penetration of the vagina 
therefore requires justification. The only exception they suggest is a situation in which the 
man “employs no such force (e.g he is immobile during penetration)” and as such does not 
commit “a prima facie wrong grounded on the use of force.”22  
 
Penetrative sex carries psychological and physical risks and “posing a non-trivial risk of 
significant harm to another person is a prima facie wrong.”23 The use of force is indicative of 
physical risks that exist in penetrative sex. Other risks include a degree of abrasion, tearing or 
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more serious injury, the risk of contracting a sexually transmitted disease, the risk of 
unwanted pregnancy and the physical risks associated with continuing a pregnancy to term 
even when it is planned. Madden Dempsey and Herring identify three exceptions to these 
risks. The first, is in reference to the risk of pregnancy where it is held that “a man who 
penetrates the anus of a woman with his penis or a man who penetrates the vagina of a 
woman with his penis where either the man and/or woman are infertile does not commit a 
prima facie wrong grounded on posing a risk of pregnancy.”24  
 
The second exception is in reference to the risk of contracting a sexually transmitted disease 
(STD). A man who is infected with an STD, who sleeps with a woman who is not infected 
with the identical STD commits a prima facie wrong in placing that woman at risk. “But a 
disease-free man who penetrates the vagina or anus of a woman with his penis, or an STD-
carrying man who penetrates the vagina or anus of a woman with his penis when the woman 
is infected with an identical strain of the STD, does not commit a prima facie wrong 
grounded on posing the risk of STD.”25 The final exception is that a man will not commit a 
prima facie wrong in connection with the risks of abrasion, “in the case of penetration where 
the man’s penis is sufficiently small relative to the pliability of the woman’s sphincteric 
musculature, and where adequate lubrication is present so as to reduce the risk of injury 
below the relevant threshold.”26 Whilst discussing the impact of STD’s, it angers me that 
non-consummation legislation is held in the same regard as potentially infecting a spouse 
with a life-threatening disease such as HIV/AIDS.27 Domestic violence does not nullify a 
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marriage, but a lack of sexual intercourse will. This de-values any other aspect of marital life, 
for example love, money, and children.   
 
The psychological risks associated with penetrative sex also constitute a prima facie wrong. 
There are social meanings attached to sexual penetration, which also impact the psychology 
of those involved in the act.28 Current social conditions mean that there has been an increase 
in “the frequency with which women and girls are subjected to actual and threatened sexual 
abuse.”29 The psychological risk of penetrative sex is found in situations where the woman 
has previously suffered rape or sexual assault by penetration. For women who have not 
suffered sexual assaults or rape, the authors hold that sexual penetration still holds a 
psychological threat because of the culture we live in. The exception to this is “where the risk 
of psychological harm falls below the relevant threshold.”30 These risks may seem extreme, 
and it could be argued that “if an act endangers another but the feared injury does not 
materialize then there is no harm. However, that would be to adopt too narrow an 
understanding of harm. It is a set-back to an individual’s interest to be exposed to a risk, even 
if that risk does not materialize.”31 If one accepts that penetrative sex is a prima facie harm, 
then consummation is the legally required embodiment of this.  
 
Feinberg writes about the ways in which society and law makers define harm, in comparison 
to a ‘wrong’, concluding that there is harm in rape (he does not address consummation), 
when one undergoes a “sexual act under compulsion or coercion quite against one’s will. 
Take away the compulsion and coercion and add willing collaboration, and you have 
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eliminated the harm altogether. Genuinely voluntary consent does just that...”32 Although 
consummation often entails willing collaboration, the fact that the marriage could be nullified 
on the basis of non-consummation, renders it a coercive act- the coercion and compulsion 
being on the part of the state as well as the husband. Radical feminism argues that the harm 
of consummation and rape stems from the universal wrong perpetrated against women- 
patriarchy.  The law is harmful to women per se, in its construction as gender-neutral. The 
consummation requirement is part of law, and is harmful to all women in that it places a 
requirement upon their bodies to perform a particular sexual function. Whether a woman may 
wish to do so or not is beside the point, as there is a requirement upon her to do so. The law is 
further harmful to women in that the type of sexual intercourse that must occur is stringently 
defined, therefore again leaving some marriages open to claims of nullity, even though one of 
the parties believes the marriage to have been consummated as far as they are concerned. In 
non-consummation cases where the wife has asked for relief, even when a finding has been 
made in her favour, it is so as to free that woman from her current husband, to allow her to 
find another, with whom she can fulfil her duty to have children, and to avoid a barrage of 
women with ‘nervous dispositions’ as a result of their inability to have children with their 
husbands. As such, not only is the law harmful in and of itself, but it causes women further 
harm in the way in which it constructs ‘normal’ marriage and femininity. In terms of 
heterosexual marriage, all marriages should be consummated, and those that are not are open 
to nullification, as this is deemed so contrary to the norm. In patriarchal society, rape is a 
property crime “of man against man. Woman, of course, was viewed as the property.”33 Rape 
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needs to be examined for its violation of bodily integrity; for battle lines between refusal and 
consent; public safety and state concern.34  
 
What are the current social meanings of penetrative sex and consummation? The case law 
reflects social understandings of penetrative sex and the benefits attached to marriage. 
Madden Dempsey and Herring hold that penetrative sex violates women because “it is an act 
through which... [the woman]... is rendered less powerful, less human, whilst the male is 
rendered more powerful and more human.”35 The woman becomes unequal to the man by 
virtue of having been fucked by him.36 The actual intentions of a particular couple are 
irrelevant. The woman will often have given her consent, but the social meaning of 
penetrative sex overrides a couples good intentions to not be part of patriarchy and afford 
their partner due respect. As Chapter One showed, radical feminism argues that women are 
not equal to men, and so any consent given by a woman is not worth as much as that given by 
a man. The woman is in an unequal position- and likely does not hold any bargaining power. 
The claim that penetrative sex is a prima facie wrong “on the basis of its negative social 
meaning is to claim both that it requires justification... and that even where justified, it leaves 
a moral residue of regret.”37 They conclude that the only way to overcome the negative 
implications of penetrative sex is to transform its meaning. In order to achieve this, we must 
enter a post-patriarchal society where our understandings of sex are fundamentally changed. 
We must fundamentally move away from relationships that are given special privilege 
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because of sex- ie marriage- and remove the legal requirement for penetrative sex in 
heterosexual relationships- consummation.38  
 
The authors acknowledge that their approach could be considered reductionist “insofar as it 
conceptualizes the act of sexual penetration as a mere physiological action type.”39 This is a 
fair assessment, but they justify this approach on two grounds: that the traditional 
understanding of penetrative sex has limited too narrowly “one’s ability to consider whether 
our traditional understandings of what counts as rape or sexual assault,”40 and that their 
methodology corresponds with “the laws characterization of sexual penetration as a 
physiological action type. Statutes prohibiting sexual offences are not defined in terms of 
their context; instead the law defines prohibited conduct in terms of physiological action 
types.”41  
  
Madden Dempsey and Herring’s view is that “there is always a reason against sexual 
intercourse, at least when it involves a man penetrating a woman’s vagina or anus.”42  This is 
a minority view. Yet its message is far-reaching. If one accepts that penetration is a prima 
facie wrong, this provides a new understanding of consummation, and of law. In a different 
text, Herring writes that “sexual penetration can be justified and so this negative meaning 
may be outweighed by many positive meanings attached to a particular act of sexual 
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penetration... For most commentators who have written on the issue there is no wrong in 
sexual penetration per se; it is only sexual penetration without consent which is wrongful.”43  
 
Consent issues highlight the differences between the two approaches. In the majority 
approach to sexual penetration, we are seeking to identify circumstances which render the act 
criminal. The Madden Dempsey/Herring view is instead looking for circumstances to justify 
a wrongful act. If penetration is viewed as a wrongful act, with some justifiable instances, we 
could argue that consummation is a prima facie wrong, with some justifiable instances.44 In 
this case, non-consummation would not be grounds to nullify marriage. It could then be 
argued that unconsummated marriages should be celebrated and respected rather than 
declared void. There should be no implied legal requirement to commit a prima facie wrong, 
even if it could be argued as justifiable in some instances. In utilising this view, 
consummation can be seen in a new light, and further, radical feminism is rehabilitated for 
those who may previously have dismissed the theory. To view sex as a wrong, and to declare 
that men and women do not have the right to commit this prima facie wrong against each 
other can only sit within a radical feminist outlook. First and third wave feminism do not 
emphasise the differences between men and women in the way that radical feminism does. In 
highlighting this difference, radical feminists are able to explain that the patriarchy that sits 
behind consummation law renders women unequal in sexual relationships.  
 
Why is consummation deemed necessary by law? Masson et al claim that marital sex ensures 
fidelity, and in requiring sex from the very beginning of a marriage, will somehow ensure 
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monogamy.45 As demonstrated throughout, monogamy is important in order to sustain a legal 
situation in which each woman is under the control of a man. However, the consummation 
requirement does not necessitate ‘satisfaction’. It only requires one act of sexual intercourse 
after a marriage ceremony. Further, “given that the vast majority of modern spouses will 
have tested their sexual compatibility prior to the marriage, the significance of this ground 
has diminished further still.”46  
 
The consummation requirement might be desirable for those who hold religious beliefs 
forbidding them from experiencing sex outside of marriage and for whom divorce is less, or 
not acceptable. In my opinion, Brook effectively explains the consummation requirement by 
declaring it a sexual performative, through which,  
 
governmental and legal inscriptions of heterosexual and masculine privilege 
are traced onto the body of the population. The sexual performatives of 
conjugality continue to produce sexed subjects- some of whom accrue 
privileges through their actions while others are penalized or 
disadvantaged.47     
 
Her view of sexual performatives makes use of the same theories espoused by Butler that 
gender itself is a performative, where the performance or the ‘doing’ of gender creates 
gender.48 If one accepts Butler’s argument that gender is performative, given its close ties to 
sex, it is not a stretch to claim that sexual activity is also performative, with consummation as 
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the first example of this. David Fraser argues that “the dichotomies of self/other, 
subject/object are defeated in the act of becoming lovers. The ultimate act, making love... is 
itself acting.”49 Consummation serves to be a real, and symbolic representation of all sexual 
performatives within marriage, confirming and finalising the marriage contract. In Brook’s 
words, “the sex act does not merely describe or communicate consummation, but produces it. 
In this way, consummation can be understood as performative sex. Consummation is not the 
only sexual performative associated with marriage, it is merely the first and most obvious 
one.”50 O’Donovan argues that in law, consummation becomes “the final performative act of 
consecration of the marriage. The primal act of heterosexual intercourse… to be repeated as a 
generative act ad infinitum.”51  
 
 
3.2: Prioritisation of heterosexual relations and penetrative sex as ‘normal’ 
 
The law is not just concerned to ensure that marriage is a heterosexual 
institution; it is also concerned with the form that sexual behaviour takes 
and, specifically, the nature of the genital interaction therein.52 
 
This obsession with heterosexuality and form is a result of law’s patriarchal construction. 
Whilst the term ‘sex’ can refer to a wide range of actions and behaviours, the sex that is 
required for consummation “refers to a particular type of sex invested with legal meaning 
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such that it, rather than other sexual acts, comes to stand as “sex” as such, or as all sex.”53 It 
is this genital interaction that the law has concerned itself with. Dr. Lushington’s judgement 
in D-e v. A-g54 shows this through his assertion that there is a “proper...ordinary...natural”55 
form of sexual intercourse, and any ‘unnatural’ intercourse would be a ‘great evil’ against the 
‘true interest of society’ which serves to maintain ‘normal’ and monogamous marriage, and 
could lead to adultery- one of the ‘greatest evils’. This judgement is over 160 years old, and 
one has to remember the social conditions of the time. However, the combination of 
patriarchy and sexuality remain “monolithic and immutable [even today]... the very 
naturalness of heterosexuality becomes the abiding truth of sexuality per se.”56   
 
O’Donovan contends that the missionary position has been and continues to be privileged in 
sex and law. Although the case law has clearly privileged/demanded vaginally penetrative 
sex, it has not gone so far as to demand a particular sexual position. O’Donovan argues that 
consummation as the ‘final performative act’ serves to marginalise other sexual 
acts/practices. “The missionary position, in which the woman lies under the man and facing 
him in readiness for coition, has been privileged in this discourse... Although marriage law 
does not demand that the missionary position is adopted for consummation, it is clear that 
non-penetrative sexual activity is insufficient.”57 This submissive position is symbolic of 
women’s position in marriage, sex and law.  
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The Courts have shown meticulous and detailed examination of non-consummation 
concluding that “heterosexual sex is natural and sexuality expressed in marriage is a natural 
phenomenon. Naturalism denies any alternative organisation of the body, for what is natural 
is inevitable and cannot be questioned.”58 As such, an investigation into consummation such 
as the one undertaken by this thesis has to construct arguments that question something 
deemed by many to be accepted and innate. Fishbayn argues that the case of D-e v. A-g59 
reflects “both a quaint prudiushness regarding the diversity of sexual practices and, perhaps, a 
benevolent impulse to find a basis for ending an unhappy marriage that could not otherwise 
be terminated.”60 
 
In the 1970s Honoré described the duties of marriage as: 
 
(a) To consummate the marriage by having sexual intercourse at least once. 
(b) To develop and maintain a mutually tolerable sexual relationship. 
(c) To be faithful to one another in matters of sex.61 
  
Divorce law also implies sexual faithfulness as one can claim a marriage has irretrievably 
broken down on the basis of adultery.62 I take issue with Honoré’s second criteria. He admits 
the duty to maintain a sexual relationship is not set out anywhere in so many words, but 
emerges as a result of the marriage ceremony. The law here is “concerned with minimum 
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standards of conduct, not with the conduct of the ideal husband or wife. For that reason it is 
put as a duty to try to ensure a tolerable relationship, not to satisfy the other partner.”63 Of the 
case law discussed in Chapter 2, not one case explicitly required an on-going sexual 
relationship. Weatherley v. Weatherley64 stated that, even if contraception is used in all sexual 
contact, were one spouse then to refuse intercourse, this could not constitute desertion, 
though under today’s law, one could petition for a divorce on the basis of unreasonable 
behaviour.65 This seems somewhat of a legal anomaly. Why does the law care about 
consummation, but not about what happens afterwards? Arguably, consummation is regarded 
as not only the final act of consecration in marriage, but as an indicator of the sexual life to 
come. It is assumed that a consummated marriage indicates the partner’s sexual capability 
and the possibility of intercourse continuing during the course of the marriage. 
Consummation is legally privileged (no matter the later sexual relationship) because it 
provides at least one opportunity for conception. The case of Synge v Synge66 held that a wife 
must provide good cause to refuse her husband marital intercourse, whilst Hutchinson v 
Hutchinson67 held that a husband’s refusal to continue marital intercourse was tantamount to 
desertion, and a wife’s refusal of marital intercourse in Slon v Slon68 was held to constitute 
constructive desertion, demonstrating that intercourse in marriage is of significant 
importance.  
 
Failure to maintain a ‘sex life’ will not result in a decree of nullity (issues of cruelty aside). 
Rather than solidifying the role of consummation in law, the distinction between the first 
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instance of sex, and all subsequent sexual contact serves to undermine the arguments given 
for the continuation of the consummation requirement. If the aim of consummation is to 
compound the notion of ‘one flesh’; if the aim is to promote heteronormativity; if the aim is 
to promote procreation, can it be said that these aims are achieved through just one instance 
of this act? One instance of heterosexual intercourse does not prevent a person from later 
engaging in homosexual acts, and although it of course does give the opportunity of 
procreation, it does not guarantee it, especially as contraception does not invalidate 
consummation.  
 
If a couple consummates their relationship, then under the law they have succumbed to these 
understandings of sex and have played a role in patriarchal understandings of consummation. 
One occurrence of sex does not guarantee mutual satisfaction. Nor does it guarantee the 
avoidance of licentiousness so abhorred by Dr Lushington.69 So why has the law not dictated 
the sexual liaisons required for the entirety of a marriage? There is no clear reason for this 
omission. If courts are unwilling to discuss the sexual relations required of a marriage after 
the wedding night, what reason can they have to involve themselves in the wedding night? 
The government should not require a specific act from its citizens in the bedroom.  
 
Incumbent in understandings of penetrative sex is the notion that the woman is a vessel for 
the man’s sexual pleasure- she must submit to him sexually as his wife. N-r, falsely called M-
e v M-e70 demonstrates this historical basis for discussing sex as something which is ‘done 
by’ a man to a woman. The husband’s doctor in this case spoke of the wife in the following 
terms; “to be properly made and formed as to her parts of generation, and apt and fit for man, 
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and that no impediment exists, or existed, to her being carnally known by man...”71 In this 
formulation, the wife becomes the ‘Other’ to her husband. Not a man, not human, but a vessel 
for his sexual requirements. The husband’s doctor continued, “a woman must be capable of 
being carnally known, unless there is some visible or palpable incapacity, or unless she resists 
the act of intercourse.”72 
 
The judge in this case concluded that impotence in a husband can only be determined when, 
after trial cohabitation, “and the wife proved to be a perfect woman and a virgin, the non-
consummation is by law attributed to the impotence of the husband.”73 The judgement is no 
doubt a product of its time however it sets the historical and social tone for non-
consummation cases today. The wife should be ‘perfect’ (a virgin), and if she is not perfect, 
this needs to be attributable to outwardly visible physical defects, or psychological resistance. 
If she is perfect, only then can the blame for non-consummation move to the husband in cases 
where impotence has no external indicators. So, “the important player in the drama of 
consummation- the ‘speaking’ part, if you like-is the penis.”74 Yet consummation, requires 
two people, one of whom needs to be a woman. The penetration of woman is the key to the 
successful completion of consummation.75  
 
Masculinity and sexual enjoyment are given prime importance; the consummation act is 
about the penis. Women are necessary, but the two sexes are supposed to have different roles 
and draw different pleasures from the experience.“Women’s sexual pleasure, though 
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recognised, has frequently been constructed in relation to an awareness of the possibilities of 
conception taking place…it is thus a ‘woman’s desire for motherhood’ which is central to her 
desire for ‘normal’ marriage, not her desire for sexual satisfaction per se.”76  
 
In this way, all other expressions of affection are de-valued. The female orgasms’ 
construction as mysterious and perhaps even non-existent, and maternity as the height of 
female pleasure have served to create a sexual understanding that promotes a male centred 
view. As a result, “sexual pleasure received from physical closeness, from bodily contact, but 
not from penetration, does not exist or denotes female frigidity.”77 But this has been viewed 
as a ‘condition’ in women, whereby as a general rule a wife should “submit... to her 
husband’s embraces, but principally to gratify him.”78  
 
Collier states that discussions of sexuality are changing. A re-thinking of penetrative 
heterosexual sex, as required for consummation, “has become a matter of concern not simply 
in assessing the quality of an individual’s sexual life. It has also, through the advocacy of 
‘safe’, protected sex and a stressing of the dangers of unprotected sexual intercourse, become 
a matter of the protection of life itself.”79 Gardner and Shute, whilst writing about rape ask 
“why is penetration so special?”80 They argue that although the penetration requirement, with 
its crude phallocentrism is a “hang over from an era of obsession with female virginity and 
overbearing preoccupation with the sin of bearing illegitimate children, an era in which 
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women were officially regarded as objects... rather than subjects”81 its solution is not as 
simple as to do-away with that condition. They argue that penetrative sex has been given a 
particular moral symbolism that has been over-romanticised, and the desire to create ‘one 
flesh,’ is a desire to create an “impossible perfect union of two selves through two bodies.”82 
It is described as the “most complete and literal intertwining of selves”83 and once this 
possession of another is complete (through marriage, sex or both), the husband is open to 
objectifying his wife’s body as seen in the courts deference to the (male dominated) medical 
profession, and in the earlier case law, the principle that a husband ‘submits’ his wife for 
physical examination.   
 
In the prioritisation of penetrative heterosexual intercourse, Jackson suggests “there is no 
reason why the conjunction of a penis and a vagina has to be thought of as penetration, or as 
a process in which only one organ is active…[it is actually] the product of the social relations 
under which those bodies meet.”84 This refers to a point discussed earlier about the value of 
consummation, not just as an act in a certain moment, but the social value and meaning it 
provides. However, if the law is ever “out of step with the sexual dictates of nature then the 
ensuing disorder threatens not only the institution of marriage but ultimately social order per 
se.”85 Adultery, non-heterosexual sex and sex outside of marriage become issues of interest 
as sites of political deviance, and social breakdown. But, social conditions and trends are 
ever changing.  
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Glennon claims that the best way to rid English law of the consummation requirement would 
be to advocate gay-rights. She claims that it is within these discussions that the true nature of 
the use of sexual relationships is seen. However, she is keen to point out that in the struggle 
for rights, she feels it would be better for gay men and lesbians to ask for express legal 
recognition, rather than “the possible absorption of lesbian and gay relationships within de-
sexualized legal categories, which can amount to little more than homophobic responses to 
the demands for legal development.”86 Unfortunately, the recent enactment of the M(SSC)A 
does little to help, and is further discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
It appears difficult to produce a conclusive legal reasoning in non-consummation cases, 
demonstrated through a comparison of Corbett and S.Y. In Corbett an ‘artificial’ vagina was 
deemed incapable of consummation. But in S.Y., a vagina that was extended was deemed 
capable of consummation because it was anatomically correct. “On another level, however, 
there is a consistency to be found here; for what marks out the naturalness, or otherwise, of 
the genitals is not so much their relation to transformative surgery as something much more 
subjective and difficult to quantify: male sexual pleasure.”87  
 
The case laws’ discussion of male sexual pleasure demonstrates the tense relationship 
between for example the Protestant Church’s two views of marital sex; firstly that sex should 
be for procreation, and secondly that sex is about a man’s pleasure, to prevent adultery.88 
Collier argues that at the end of the sixteenth century a shift in the Church’s view of marital 
intercourse “thus entailed a separation of pleasure and procreation as distinct concepts- at the 
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same time, paradoxically, as advocating their inseparability in marital coitus,”89 which was 
reflected in the non-consummation case law. Female sexual pleasure is not discussed in the 
case law as an end in itself. Marriage is constructed and presented as the primary institution 
in which women should procreate and fulfil their wifely duties. Where a woman complains of 
non-consummation, it is often inferred that she is actually complaining of the inability to 
enter into motherhood. Women enable sexual pleasure, and the continuation of the human 
race for men. The words ‘woman’ and ‘mother’ have become synonymous but these roles are 
not divinely intertwined. Men are capable of Mothering.90 Yet the dominant image of 
‘mother’, “is first and foremost that of a married woman….the term “married mother” is 
almost never used- rather, it is simply assumed that a mother will be married, carrying the 
further tacit assumption that a mother is heterosexual.”91  
 
It is somewhat surprising that procreation is not necessary for consummation “given that one 
of the most frequently heard rationales for marriage is its suitability as an environment for 
offspring…”92 It can further be inferred from Chapter 2 that “a husband’s lack of sexual 
appetite is beyond his control and not subject to discipline, but wives are expected to “adjust” 
their will for sex.”93 The case of Dickinson v Dickinson94 shows the earliest use of the ‘wilful 
refusal’ clause. The woman’s refusal to have sex, because she did not want children is 
deemed capable of causing a nervous breakdown in the husband. Yet the case law makes it 
clear that procreation (or the possibility of procreation) is not a prerequisite of legal 
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consummation, and actually what is being inferred is that a man ‘needs’ sex.95 “Pleasure is 
thus given priority over procreation but it is a sexual pleasure which is to be derived from 
sexual intercourse,”96 and a pleasure that needs to be experienced by a male. This move to 
pleasure over procreation was a gradual process. Cases such as Cowen97 and J v J98 show the 
courts initial instinct to nullify cases in which the couple were incapable of conception during 
the sexual act, be that due to contraception or an operation. In both of these cases there was 
wilful refusal on the part of the husband to fulfil a role that Gower claims is “what most 
people would regard as his matrimonial duties,”99 i.e: the role to allow the possibility of 
impregnating his wife.  
 
Why have courts increased their discussions of pleasure, rather than focusing solely on 
procreation? Is it recognition of changing social conceptions of the role of marital sex? No. 
Rather, it is recognition that upholding such a requirement is practically difficult. For 
example, if a marriage is declared voidable due to use of contraception, would the court then 
have to assess the effectiveness of each respective form of contraceptive? Further, if the 
condom used is found to have ripped, a voidable act, intended not to consummate the 
relationship would suddenly be deemed capable of consummating the marriage. This would 
move the law from examining the intimacies of the marriage bed, to examining whether or 
not the “contraceptives used on every occasion effectively prevented the male seed from 
entering the body of the woman.”100 From the point of view of say the Catholic Church, at 
first instance one would assume that they would not condone contraceptive use, as it would 
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go against teachings about procreation. Alternatively, if the use of contraception could nullify 
a marriage, the church would also disagree with this because it could lead to a situation of 
‘trial marriages’ which also go against teachings of marriage for life.101  
 
Clarke v Clarke102 is the clearest example in which pleasure is prioritised over procreation. 
12 years after the birth of their child, and after 16 years of marriage the court still held that 
the marriage had never been consummated. Sexual pleasure is primarily the male pleasure, 
and must adhere to the “proper...ordinary...natural”103 meaning of the word; “The husband 
sets the sexual agenda and is not expected to endure anything he might find distasteful or 
alien to his own needs. Conjugal rights, it seems, are men’s rights.”104 Whilst the case law 
and surrounding literature portray (hetero)sex as normal, both in G. v M.105 and in Dr 
Chesser’s106 guide to marital sex, worryingly, the use of a little alcohol is also advocated to 
help ‘loosen’ up nervous women, and ensure the male right is served, though this suggestion 
of intoxication was refuted and described as doctor’s being ill-equipped to understand issues 
of non-consummation.107 
 
Definitions of ‘normal’ penetrative sex have been specially honed within the courts. Case law 
has shown the development of those groups which lie outside ‘normal’ marriage law- those 
unable to, and later, those unwilling to consummate. Hinds claims that the acceptance of 
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‘wilful refusal’ for non-consummation is an extension of the reflection of the judicial 
tendency to nullify marriages that are deemed to be intolerable and/or unjust from their 
inception.108 Analysis of cases that involve ‘mere’ wilful refusal, such as Dickinson109 and 
Napier,110 use terms such as ‘obstinate refusal’ to explain the behaviour of these wives, 
compounding the assessment of women as sensitive, emotional, weak, hormonal and 
irrational, thereby justifying treating women as second class.111 Women incapable of sex for 
psychological reasons have been labelled ‘frigid’ which “was the diagnosis offered by men to 
the women they’d failed to ‘satisfy’- or rather women who’d failed to be satisfied.”112 Why 
have women’s choices to avoid sex not been seen as a demonstration of their decisiveness, 
assertiveness and freedom of sexual expression?  
 
3.3: Prioritisation of (sexual) marriage 
 
Marriage is a... social institution that has for centuries inspired moral beliefs 
which encourage and protect it.113 
 
Consummation is a “corporeal yoke linking law and marriage,”114  and is the only physical 
intimacy required by the marriage contract. This physical requirement was not replicated in 
civil partnership or in same-sex marriage (Chapter 5). Prioritising marriage produces 
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“meaningfully sexed bodies and supplies the conditions for which certain kinds of sex are 
performative- and therefore “special” (privileged).”115 In some of the case law presented 
there had been fragments of sexual intimacy between the couple, or occasions outside of the 
marriage where the person had achieved sexual intercourse (with their spouse or another). 
These occurrences are legally dismissed as irrelevant, and not reflective of the nature of 
sexual activity within marriage, due to the state’s institutionalised privileging of the 
“formalized sexual tie between a man and woman, reinforced by the later biological event of 
parenthood,”116 and anything else is rendered ‘not good enough’.   
 
A point easily forgotten in the discussions of consummation, is the assumption that when the 
law was made, that (for the wife at least), it would be the first sexual experience. If the couple 
have had no previous sexual experience, then the wedding night, traditionally thought of as 
the consummation moment, presents a new frontier in the couple’s relationship. Chesser, 
writing in the 1960’s explains that the wedding night is more significant for the wife for two 
reasons, “first, the significance of the occasion from the physical standpoint; second, the 
tremendous emotional significance of the occasion for the woman... The great majority of 
wives look upon the honeymoon, and particularly the wedding-night, as the greatest occasion 
of their lives. Whatever impressions are made then, stay right through life.”117  
 
Chesser’s view reinforces the historic view of women as emotional. He goes on to explain 
that because the moment is so important for the wife, the husband should not regard the 
wedding-night “solely, or even primarily, as an occasion for his own sexual gratification. If 
                                                 
115
 Ibid pg 68  
116
 Fineman, M.A., The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies London, 
Routledge 1995 pg 151 
117
 Chesser op cit n106 pg 67 
174 
 
he regards it thus, not only will his own pleasure be marred but he will wound his wife 
emotionally and so their married life may be adversely affected.”118 Sperry warns that men 
find consummation “one of the most delicate and important events in their own lives... Now 
is the time for the husband to show himself a man, instead of a selfish sensualist or a careless 
and ungovernable brute,”119 demonstrating that in that moment masculinity moves from 
brutishness to sexual prowess.  
 
Radical feminism in particular has argued that despite legal developments, English law is still 
reliant upon the idea of a monogamous sexual relationship between a man and a woman 
when looking for definitions of the family.120 The pervasive image of ‘sexual-family-as-
natural’ creates a metanarrative and discourse that transcends disciplines and crosses social 
divisions, designating the husband-wife relationship as the core intimate relationship for law 
to legislate, key to both religion and social policy.121 Law does this whilst claiming to 
remove itself from the private sphere of life. Brook argues that a lot of energy is used in 
maintaining an interest in marriage, from the “media frenzy of royal weddings... [to] the very 
big business of bridal industries. On a more mundane level, there is the inevitable boost in 
soap opera ratings when a wedding looms into the storyline. Marriage is anything but 
ignored- we are alerted to it at every turn, bombarded daily with images and messages laden 
with its social significance,”122 within the media for example.  
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Ideas of family and marriage are being challenged with reforms based upon concepts of 
equality and freedom.123 This invasion into the private sphere has been welcomed by radical 
feminists in relation to some elements of married life but not in others. For example, radical 
feminists have drawn a lot of attention to domestic violence, made invisible by the state’s 
refusal to involve itself in marital affairs, and has served useful for the purposes of 
highlighting the existence of domestic violence, the extent to which it pervades society, and 
the forms it can take. Marital rape would also still exist were it not for the state’s intervention 
in the nuclear family. In these respects, state intervention has been advantageous. However, I 
argue that the requirement of sexual intercourse within a marriage, and the intervention of the 
state to allow for a spouse to nullify any relationship that does not measure up to this standard 
is not a welcome intrusion into the private sphere. The courts should remain out of the 
bedroom when it amounts to demanding sexual intercourse both in respect of non-
consummation, and in claims of lack of sexual intercourse resulting in unreasonable 
behaviour in divorce. Fineman argues that the law has ‘partly pulled aside’ the veil of privacy 
reserved for the family, “revealing the hierarchical nature of the family and its conceptual 
core of common-law inequality. In response to feminist agitation... the law regulating the 
domestic has changed,”124 but has not yet changed enough to nullify the consummation 
requirement.  
 
Marriage is still privileged materially, socially and personally.125 Married couples have 
historically been medically privileged and approved “for infertility treatment, adoption, 
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parental rights on the break-up of relationships.”126 Marriage also has its own symbols and 
iconography. Symbols of marriage include the “engagement ring, church announcements, 
public notices, invitations, special clothes, wedding dress, veil... Marriage is a rite de passage 
to be celebrated with food, wine, speech; to be recorded on film.”127 
 
The marriage institution has promoted the importance of the consummation requirement on 
“the theological ground that the act of sexual intercourse united the two spouses in a spiritual 
union and was therefore necessary to complete the sacrament of marriage.”128 In line with 
radical feminist understandings of sex and gender, one would argue that consummation 
within the MCA 1973 is the legalisation of men’s sexual dominance over women, and 
reinforces the view that procreation is the central purpose of marriage, despite the explicit 
expression in the courts that this is not the case, and the fact that sexual intercourse between a 
sterile couple still constitutes intercourse. Collier argues that sexual intercourse serves to 
differentiate marriage from any other legal contract, establishing marriage as a;  
 
relationship of a different order from, for example, the sex-blind contract 
relationship…It is the essence of the marriage relationship that there occurs, 
or at least may potentially occur, heterosexual intercourse... Intercourse and 
marriage are said to be inseparable but this is not backed with any evidence 
that marriages actually are contracted with the intention of having ‘legal’ 
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sexual intercourse… The parameters of human sexuality transcend the 
genital connections of the traditional marital sexual dichotomy.129 
 
To remove consummation as a requirement would be to directly threaten the institution of 
marriage. This is why the Court looks at whether or not consummation can occur with the 
spouse only. Intercourse with another is irrelevant. It is necessary to know that within the 
confines of the marriage in question both parties are capable of satisfying the sexual elements 
necessary.   
 
In the twenty-first century, the nuclear family model- based on a husband, wife, and children- 
is not the societal norm in the U.K., and so Hibbs, Barton and Beswick ask why some people 
still get married?130 There are legal benefits, and those of a religious persuasion regard the 
ceremony as a key part of their lives. The governmental research undertaken by Hibbs, 
Barton and Beswick found that the Government’s stated support “for families is somewhat 
equivocal in its support for marriage. It says that it neither has a wish to interfere in family 
life nor to pressure people into one type of relationship. It does not wish to try to make people 
marry, or criticise or penalise those who choose not to.”131 Despite this, the government does 
provide greater financial benefits to people who are married. The authors tried to assess the 
importance of law as a factor in the decision making process of couples when contemplating 
whether to marry or not. They argued that in fact, many people are unaware of the legal 
benefits or requirements of marriage, and the main factors considered are economic, social, 
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and emotional.132 Marriage provides both legal and social advantages: being in a heterosexual 
couple is the norm, and marriage is the final, and ‘everlasting’ union used to demonstrate this. 
It is a status symbol, a sign of desirability, eligibility and fertility.  
 
The legal rights spouses acquire133 are beneficial to the state, which involves itself in the 
breakdown of relationships, trying to provide equitable division of property and adequate 
care of children, for example. Herring argues that even if marriage were abolished, a 
replacement institution would be necessary, “to... legally... regulate family.”134 However, no 
adequate reason is provided for the need to regulate family relations. The requirement of 
consummation serves to make these ‘legally special’ relationships easily identifiable, for it 
could be argued that “it is the act of sexual intercourse that most clearly distinguishes 
marriage from a close relationship between two platonic friends.”135 
 
 
3.4: Sex and gender 
The rules surrounding marriage and the necessary criteria for formalising the ceremony serve 
to maintain a perceived ‘natural order’, for men and women. “Sexed categories are, however, 
fictions. The familiar binaries of “male/female” and “man/woman” are neither exhaustive nor 
exclusive. Rather the patriarchal legal construction of marriage is one of a number of 
mechanisms that makes them seem to be so. Marriage acts as an axle not just for 
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heterosexism, but also for corporeal and sexed categories.”136 The cultural naturalisation of 
gender and attempts to “fix the dualisms of male/female, heterosexual/homosexual in place 
do not ‘float free’ of the law… They are beliefs which have a history, a context and a legally 
based legitimacy.”137 Fineman argues that legal rules become prizes for competing factions. 
Further, the sexual family represents “the most gendered of an organized women’s 
movement. While other, nonfamily transformations have fostered male-female 
competitiveness, the family is the one area where tensions generated by perceived changes in 
the status and position of women are registered most clearly.”138  
 
Consummation serves to reinforce a certain enactment of the sexual act as normal. Man as 
strong and woman as vulnerable is an accident of biology, and “had it not been for this 
accident of biology, an accommodation requiring the locking together of two separate parts, 
penis and vagina, there would be neither copulation nor rape as we know it.”139 
 
Collier conceptualises consummation as a ‘heterosexual trinity;’ “that is, erection, penetration 
and orgasm as the ‘perfect’, ‘complete’ sex act.”140 Yet case law has reflected that neither 
male nor female orgasm is necessary to complete the sexual act. Chesser reinforces the view 
of women as vulnerable, claiming that during the first intercourse women will instinctively 
want to resist. “This resistance is not entirely due to a fear of possible pain from the rupturing 
of the hymen, though that may play a part... Much deeper is an instinctive spiritual or mental 
recoil from full congress. This arises in part from the prospect of losing something which has 
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been carefully protected.”141 Women are inherently frigid and sensitive, especially virgins. 
He claims that for a virgin, there is nothing more terrifying than a display of ‘sexual 
athleticism’ as the husband rushes to display himself as quickly as possible, the shock of 
which “may yield from that moment a dislike of all sexuality, which will render intercourse 
difficult, if not impossible.”142 
 
None of the available case law discussed fear of hymen rupturing, or fear of penises. 
Chesser’s assertions place woman in a delicate and subversive role in the first intercourse. 
The women of the case law are sensitive, and their first impressions render them incapable of 
understanding that sex may change as partners understand each other’s bodies further, or as 
they feel more confident to experiment or express what they do and don’t like, or could be 
dramatically more enjoyable with a different partner. It should also be acknowledged that 
there has been a change in social trends in sexual attitudes, with many people being engaged 
in sexual relationships before marriage. This means that although there “may no longer be a 
sacrifice of female virginity to male sexual desire, there is a sacrifice of autonomy... on 
unequal terms.”143 In theory, a husband sacrifices some autonomy as he ‘becomes one’ with 
his wife. This sacrifice is however nothing more than symbolic. It is the wife’s autonomy that 
is in fact sacrificed.144 Her body becomes part of her husband’s property, but Stychin argues 
that we need to stop engaging with the construction of our bodies as an object of “(man’s) 
knowledge. A feminist inspired analysis of property in the body requires that we theorise 
beginning from the body and from specific experiences of embodiment; rather than from a 
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standpoint of ‘universal’ reason which historically has constructed woman as Other.”145 To be 
a man, is to be a person. Male sexing “has been so proximate to personification that male 
sexing has been all but invisible. Men have largely been defined by their individuation and 
their individuality as persons; women by their homogenisation as a sex and 
their...confinement to the domestic sphere of life”.146 This understanding of male sexuality as 
normal, and as such unquestioned, is addressed next.  
 
 
3.5: Male sexuality and the impotent man 
In consummation, just like the homosexual man, the impotent man signifies a threat both “to 
marriage and the social body. He is...not really a man at all... As victim of the ‘mythology of 
virility’ he is one whose sexuality speaks of the truth of his being and for whom entry to the 
married state is to be denied by reason of the Truth: he is incapable of sexual intercourse.”147 
The impotent man is not denied entry into the state of marriage, but his impotence provides 
accelerated exit from the relationship, if it is discovered after the marriage ceremony, should 
either party wish to make this argument. Given the clear sexual requirements necessary for 
‘full and complete’ consummation, impotence in the case law was taken to be a male 
affliction. Women were rather termed frigid, which implies a choice, while impotence 
implies no choice in the matter. The case law examining male impotence provides a clear 
understanding of what the judiciary (and to some extent, society) “have taken to be the nature 
of the male pleasure which is to be derived from sexual intercourse.”148 Extensive 
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consideration is not given in the case law to the psychological elements of impotence. The 
impotent man is most clearly understood when compared to its binary opposite; the potent 
man. In law and society, the potent man has become a representation of masculinity. Collier 
explains, “the idea of the ‘family man’ constitutes a model of masculinity which surfaces 
regularly in legal discourse; he is the embodiment of a virile, responsible masculinity.”149  
 
The ‘family man’ has been established as married and employed, and “these contingencies, 
alongside sexual orientation and physical ability, constitute key elements of hegemonic 
masculinity in law.”150 The ideal of masculinity has been lent the force of naturalism, as 
masculinity, and therefore a man’s worth is most evident in its ‘true’ physical form- 
penetrative sexual intercourse. Only a true man can be the head of a family- he must be 
heterosexual and virile. The law will protect this family man above all others as the norm. 
Women can never achieve this norm, therefore “the absence of the penis... signifies 
femininity and the absence of intercourse... signifies impotence and the unconsummated 
marriage.”151 Hall argues the creation of the male ‘norm’ implies that sexual discourse 
operates “exclusively for his benefit and that there...[is] no ambiguity or ambivalence in his 
position, no possible constrain upon him. He and his sexuality have not been accorded the 
attention given to attitudes to female sexuality and the construction of deviant identities.”152 
 
Male sexuality is afforded a primacy in the case law that is not extended to female sexuality. 
Judges go to some length to avoid labelling men as impotent. In N v M153 the judge declared 
that the doctors had made their declaration of impotence based purely on the fact that the 
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marriage had not been consummated. There were no external factors to indicate that the 
husband was impotent. The judge found this troubling, and went to great lengths to suggest 
that the husband was probably not impotent, but had been impotent with his wife only. Whilst 
no blame was apportioned to the wife, the very suggestion that the impotence was a result of 
this marriage only, is a slight on her sexual ability, and reassured the husband’s sexual 
virility. Thomson argues the need for consummation is the need for a moment in which 
“heterosexual masculinity is defined primarily through performance... The construction of the 
consummative act is around male activity, response and pleasure.”154 
 
Hall collated the available literature regarding male sexuality in the first half of the twentieth 
century, and found that for wedding night advice, men were constructed as “the rampant, 
impetuous male who needed to curb his insurgent desires if the marriage were not to be 
wrecked from the outset.”155 He stated that few writers mentioned the possibility of a 
temporary inability to obtain erection, ignoring the possibility of ‘failure’. Perhaps less 
disruptive but equally threatening to marital bliss is the husband who suffers premature 
ejaculation. This has however not been explicitly addressed in any of the case law. Some 
research has implied that this was a problem found in the upper classes, because only the 
educated upper classes could understand the condition.156 “The more intelligent, cultivated 
man, because of his higher ideals and aspirations in the sexual sphere, was more likely to 
suffer from dysfunction, and to worry about his sexual adequacy.”157 One should note Hall’s 
caution that perhaps the research was a bit skewed; “Much of the published writing on 
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working-class marriage came from middle-class observers who found it easier to study and 
comment upon working-class habits and practices than those of their own class.”158 
 
Consummative intercourse has served to silence women, and increase sexual pressure on men 
who are expected to have sexual prowess and ability. They are construed as naturally 
polygamous and aggressive. Women are there to serve their sexual needs within the confines 
of marriage; “in assigning responsibility for a woman and her children to one man, 
[channelling]...his socially acceptable sexual expression and free[ing] the energy he might 
otherwise expend in sexual activity for socially productive work.”159 It is assumed that all 
men have these universally understood sexual needs. Women (as long as they have 
‘adequate’ vaginas) are passive objects in sex for the use of men, whilst the men are the 
active element of the sexual act.160 If the woman is unhealthy, it does not matter as much as if 
the man is, for only her enjoyment is diminished, “whereas the husband may still continue to 
obtain full satisfaction.”161 Men rather than women need to initiate intercourse, and sexual 
penetration is penis led, evidenced by the case law where husbands are encouraged to cajole, 
persuade, encourage or even intoxicate their wives. The use of radical feminism in this 
research highlights that not much has changed in the respect of treatment of women from the 
radical feminist heyday.   
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3.6: Where is the love?  
English marriage law sweeps away all the tenderness, all the grace, 
the generosity of love, and transforms conjugal affection into a 
hard and brutal legal right.162 
 
Today’s society has arguably moved to relationships primarily predicated on friendship, 
mutual caring and love,163 an ideology that “glorifies men and both glamorizes and enforces 
heterosexuality- all at the expense of women.”164 Duncan and Phillips explain that although 
couples now search for love and intimacy, they still have the need to give and receive care, 
leading to ‘families of choice’. As such, “caring and loving relationships are consciously 
developed and built up on the basis of what they do, rather than depending on a pre-given 
biological or kinship status... At the same time, the significance of romantic coupling is 
lessened and friendships become more important,”165 shifting family life from married 
couples, to different family forms.  
 
Ariès argues that in the past, conjugal love was secret- something that occurred between 
husband and wife, privately. Although he is writing about France, the societal changes to 
which he refers are mirrored in the UK. Ariès says that in terms of love, things changed after 
the eighteenth century. Religions strong-hold was beginning to diminish. The church had 
gone through a process of change where marital sex had gone from procreation only, to 
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pleasure between husband and wife (yet still with the possibility of procreation ie: no 
contraceptives).166 In the west, there was a gradual adoption of the “ideal of marriage 
requiring husband and wife to love each other (or appear to), like real lovers. Extra-conjugal 
erotics found their way into the marriage bed, expelling traditional prudishness in favour of 
real feeling.”167 
 
The Hyde168 definition of marriage is biologically determined. The criteria for a union 
encapsulated in the MCA 1973 also speaks of marriage in terms of biology and gender, 
requiring a [hetero]sexual union. Why is this so? What privileges sex over finances or 
emotions for providing a legally special relationship? Diduck and Kaganas explain, “…there 
is no requirement…in the statute [for]… commitment, respect, economic interdependence or 
emotional fulfilment.”169 Collier elaborates,   
 
Compassion, consideration, empathy and the ability to love and understand 
are all subordinated within an economy of masculinity which privileges 
intercourse above all else in the constitution of the marriage relationship. 
Other forms of human contact and pleasure are deigned legal validity within 
a position which takes it for granted that there is a fundamental difference 
between men and women, and that heterosexuality is normal.170  
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Fraser agrees with the (radical) feminist claim that gender, sexuality, sexual relations and 
love are important to society and ideologically important because they have been defined and 
constructed as such by men. Further, he argues that in practice, the characteristics of love and 
law are incompatible, for love is an experience between people, while law “is the construct of 
reason: it is about distance, mistrust and the regulation of relations among isolated 
individuals. Law is about a world in which human interaction only occurs at the level of 
commodity exchange, where women are objects to be used for men’s pleasure.”171 Therefore, 
in a world where woman is a commodity, primarily for male pleasure, “the primary signifier, 
the ultimate sign giving meaning to all its constituted subjects is the phallus, the penis. All 
else- love, passion, hate, desire- refers back to and is given meaning by this primary 
signifier...”172 To allow for love, women must keep away from men because they first need to 
discover, “capture and define that which his-story has denied her: contact with her own 
experience, an experience not entirely mediated through the phallic economy.”173 
 
Loving relationships have been referred to as ‘pure relationships’; relationships that people 
enter freely, for its own sake, and only stay in for as long as is mutually beneficial.174 This 
‘pure relationship’ like the “ideal-typical dyad, has no overarching structure to sustain it. 
Rather, its key sustaining dynamics are mutual self-disclosure and appreciation of each 
other’s unique qualities.”175 Giddens suggests that ‘pure relationships’ are born of changing 
attitudes to sexuality, and that if notions of gender and sexuality are changing, from absolute 
to fluid and not essentialist, then sex within relationships is also changing. The intimacy 
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required of a relationship is also changing, as both parties contribute equally to the 
relationship in terms of a shared sense of self-disclosure and “when the new connections 
between sexuality and intimacy were formed... sexuality became much more completely 
separated from procreation than before. Sexuality became doubly constituted as a medium of 
self-realisation and as a prime means, as well as an expression, of intimacy.”176 
 
Giddens believes that the changing notion of intimacy will create equality within 
relationships and ‘plastic sexuality’ frees people from the needs of reproduction, and claims 
that gay men and lesbians forge the way with these new relationships. Whilst couples may 
class themselves as equals, feminist literature shows there is very little equality in division of 
labour within relationships for example.177 Whilst Giddens draws on particular feminist 
works, he devotes little time to the existing scholarship on themes of the ‘private’ and 
‘public’ dichotomy, for example. The fragility of heterosexual couples exists because people 
know “the relationship is only ‘good until further notice’,”178 and there is “tension between 
strengthening cultural emphasis on intimacy, equality and mutuality in relationships and the 
structural supports of gender inequalities, which make these ideals difficult to attain.”179  
 
If love is the new social norm for marriage formation, rather than arranged marriages or 
marriages of convenience for example, then why does the law not legislate ‘special legal 
relationships’ based on this changed formation? The Book of Common Prayer marriage vows 
require a couple to express their love for each other through the words “to love and to 
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cherish”.180 Yet this requirement of love is not reflected within any matrimonial law. I do not 
believe that love should be legislated, for it is too difficult a phenomenon to prove. How can 
a partner demonstrate love? If it can’t be proved how can the other partner claim an end to the 
marriage based on a loveless marriage? One could claim that the consummation requirement 
could be used or altered to reflect love. If sex is viewed as the ultimate form of love, then 
why has the consummation requirement removed the love element, and instead been 
associated with procreation, pleasure, understandings of male sexuality, and the power of the 
medical profession? Perhaps this links back to law’s desire to be certain, predictable and 
universal, and love’s inability to be judged under these criteria.  
 
Fineman suggests an alternative relationship for the law to protect caring relationships. She 
explains that the existing structure of intimacy is horizontal; founded upon the romantic and 
sexual affiliation of one man and one woman as necessary for marriage and consummation. 
Intergenerational lines of affinity and intimacy are sometimes uncomfortably accommodated 
for, for example “when children are “underage,” or... such as when an ill, elderly parent has 
to be fitted into the sexual family. The dominant paradigm, however, privileges the couple as 
foundational and fundamental.”181 The natural sexual family is maintained when children 
leave home and develop sexual families of their own, and elderly parents move on to care 
homes etc. There remains a chronic failure to address the more difficult and less attractive 
elements of family and domestic life- for example who will care for the elderly in the family, 
the ill or the disabled? The family was built upon the prioritisation of heterosexual pairings. 
This foundation was essential to the structure of any kind of reform.  
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Fineman claims that the family fails to adequately “handle both the demands for equality and 
the contemporary manifestations of inevitable and derivative dependency.”182 It is not the 
family that needs to be reconceptualised but rather we need to abolish legal support for the 
sexual family.183 Fineman wishes to construct protection “for the nurturing unit of caretaker 
and dependent exemplified by the Mother/Child dyad.”184 Fineman’s conception would allow 
for a deviation from heterosexuality, but instead replaces it with a format in which 
responsibility for care is privatised, rather than expanded and absorbed by the state and 
society in general.  
 
Fineman, like myself argues only to abolish the legal importance of marriage, not marriage 
itself. Sexual interactions would be governed by the same rules we use for our other social 
interactions e.g: contract, property, tort, crime etc. People would be free to engage in 
symbolic marriage ceremonies, but would then undertake a separate negotiation and contract 
to impose any terms they would like. This is because the marriage contract as it currently 
stands does not even adhere to legal understandings of contract, as “its terms are not 
negotiated by the parties, but prescribed by law.”185 In addition, Courts will not enforce the 
marriage ‘contract’ or award damages, in the way they would a business contract, and the 
parties cannot end the contract through mutual consent, but are instead required to more often 
than not engage with divorce or nullity legislation.186  
 
Supporters of women’s liberation “see in marriage the model for all other forms of 
discrimination against women. The marriage contract is the only important contract in which 
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the terms are not listed, or are expressed so vaguely that there is no clear limit to what a wife 
must do in order to fulfil them.”187 The marriage contract implies equality on the part of 
parties to the contract, but women are actually not equal contractors, but rather are “self-
sacrificing in direct proportion to their incapacity to offer anything but this sacrifice. They 
sacrifice what they never had: a self.”188 The result is that the marriage contract exploits the 
woman. Pateman therefore asks, “how can beings who lack the capacities to make contracts 
nevertheless be supposed always to enter into this contract? Why, moreover, do all the classic 
theorists... insist that, in civil society, women not only can but must enter into the marriage 
contract?”189 
 
Fineman hopes that her new concept will still recognise the need for family, and some of the 
roles that are necessary within that, but allows people to determine what and who their 
‘family’ is, and remove the reading of ‘family’ and ‘marriage’ as synonymous.190 Jamieson 
argues that these vertical relationships serve to detract from Giddens’s ‘pure relationships’: 
“The processes of having children and making a joint project of their upbringing create 
structure over and above a relationship and therefore necessarily detract from the purity of the 
‘pure relationship’.”191 I find the mother-child relationship problematic. Although Fineman 
explains that men can also mother,192 I find the gendered terminology troubling. Further, 
what does this mean for those who do not have, or cannot have children? I applaud the move 
away from sexually prioritised relationships. The prioritisation of the ‘caring’ relationship is 
interesting, but my argument is that sex should be removed from law’s regulation of 
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relationships. People should be trusted to nominate those they wish to have legal relationships 
with. Inevitably, these choices will probably be based on some sort of affiliation- romantic, 
parental, or caring. As such, Fineman’s belief in prioritising the caring, mother-child 
relationship, is not too far-fetched from the legal reality I would envisage. Yet this could 
result in a move from sexually privileged relationships to care-giving relationships being 
privileged: “the caregiving family would be a protected space, entitled to special, preferred 
treatment by the state.”193 
 
Roseneil, Budgeon and others have expressed that “an individual’s ‘significant other’ may 
not be someone with whom she or he has a sexual relationship.”194 Their research found 
increasingly different structures of ‘family’ life, with the focus on ‘caring’ moving from the 
family to friends. From the sexual to the individual.195 They argue that if we are to truly 
understand the current and future culture of intimacy and care in society, “sociologists should 
decentre the ‘family’ and the heterosexual couple in our intellectual imaginaries.”196 The 
‘family’ as an institution “retains an almost unparalleled ability to move people, both 
emotionally and politically. However, much that matters to people in terms of intimacy and 
care increasingly takes place beyond the ‘family’, between partners who are not living 
together ‘as family’, and within networks of friends.”197 They conclude that although 
investigations of the family have moved on to incorporate lesbian and gay families, they are 
still insufficient to understand the notion of care and intimacy, because “they leave 
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unchanged the heteronormativity of the sociological imaginary; and... they are grounded in an 
inadequate analysis of contemporary social change.”198 
 
If it is felt that love should be legislated for in some way, Fraser’s argument would mean that 
we must rewrite the law’s relationship to, and understanding of women. Further, “the phallus 
must be extracted, cut out from its position as signifier. The law of authority...  must yield to 
the law of experience, and experience must give way to a new law of sexuality.”199 The 
understanding of intimacy can be challenged by practices within non-normative relationships 
such as friends or ex-lovers, which serve to “decentre the primary significance that is 
commonly granted to sexual partnerships and mount a challenge to the privileging of 
conjugal relationships in research on intimacy.”200 
 
For Ariès, love now is a fleeting emotion, and one that cannot possibly last the duration of a 
marriage. A real, successful, loving marriage is one that, “stands up to wear and tear- is not 
created by a ceremony...in church...but by the fact of its duration. The true marriage is a 
union that endures, with a living, fertile lastingness that defies death.”201 It would be naive to 
assume that everyone who falls in love and marries will stay together forever. Changing 
divorce rates and family structures cannot be ignored. I argue, we should keep the 
government out of the bedroom and not use sex as a way to determine legally ‘special’ 
relationships.   
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I do not believe that a sexual relationship- the primary occasion, and symbolic gesture of 
which is consummation- should be used to define a legally special relationship. Law needs to 
interact with the reality of family situations. “The focus should...be on the many grey areas 
or, better, the many different shades in the niches inside and outside the traditional family 
network.”202 However Vascovics is critical of those that claim that family structures are 
changing. He claims the conjugal family “has kept its dominance up to the present day... The 
‘normal chaos of love’, as it has been called, continues to display quite clear and dominant 
patterns of the partnerships which... in most cases lead to a quite normal family.”203 Yet the 
introduction of civil partnerships, easier divorce, several generations living together, and the 
increased number of step- or blended- families demonstrate the changing nature of the 
family: “This does not mean that the traditional family is simply disappearing. But it is losing 
the monopoly it had for so long...”204  
 
 
3.7: Reliance upon the medical profession  
The case law demonstrated the court’s inclination to defer to medical ‘expertise’ in cases of 
consummation.205 However, there is an inherent paternalism in the medical profession, and 
the court’s deference serves only to create doctor-led law.206 No other profession is afforded 
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such a luxury within the law. Sheldon states “it is not so much that the medical voice is 
prioritised over other accounts. Rather, it is permitted to silence any other completely.”207 
Doctor’s ability to examine and diagnose is an extension of paternalism, which is “the view 
that the health professional is best placed to decide for the patient.”208 Naffine has explained 
that the most fundamental right extended to humans is “the right to physical integrity. Human 
dignity is said to reside in what is thought to be our natural inviolability, our separation and 
freedom from intrusion by others.”209 However, where consummation is in doubt, courts have 
superseded this fundamental right, and demanded physical examination- often of both 
partners, but more intrusively of the female partner. This medical intrusion is a result of the 
biological basis of consummation- requiring a man, and a woman- and is extended by the law 
positively demanding a sexual act.  
 
Paternalism does not allow for the consideration of a ‘patients’ personal experiences. They 
are not asked about past experiences, religious views, family obligations etc. Paternalism 
“rests largely on the presumption that the sole aim of the patient is to be cured and that he is 
willing to entrust his well-being completely to the doctor’s care.”210 In the case of those who 
have not consummated their relationship and wish to take action in court, the assumption is 
that the medical profession are best placed to understand why this has not occurred, and that 
the couple will want to be informed of why this has not occurred and how to fix it; no matter 
how intrusive the medical examination. Glover argues autonomy should not be given 
absolute priority. For example “if someone wants to start taking heroin, I will think it right to 
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stop him if I can. This results from giving less weight to his autonomy in this matter than to 
sparing him the appalling suffering involved in the slow death of a heroin addict.”211  
 
Are heroin addiction and unconsummated marriage comparable? Is a non-sexual marriage 
such a threat to society that we will allow a get-out clause for people in non-sexual marriages, 
and reduce those who can’t/won’t consummate their marriage to the humiliation of medical 
examination? I argue that an insistence upon a sexual marriage is not enough to impose these 
conditions upon people, and in particular, upon women, and Chisholm argues  “apart from 
the medico-legal context, doctors were for a long time hesitant in their approach to non-
consummation”212 which led to late referrals, with uncertain and piecemeal treatment aims. 
Writing in the 1970s, Chisholm argued that doctors at that time were better able to deal with 
non-consummation cases than in the past. Perhaps this explains why there is a distinct lack of 
case law regarding non-consummation after the late 1960s.  
 
Sheldon explains that the paternalism evidenced in Glover’s example serves to subvert 
autonomy, and is biased towards women because women in general are more likely to “suffer 
the worst excesses of medical paternalism both in terms of the quotidian medical encounter 
and the more spectacular intervention. There is also clear evidence to suggest that doctors 
show least respect for patient autonomy when their patients are women.”213 In the book 
Virgin Wives, 10 female doctors were asked to feed back information from the physical and 
psychological conditions of wives in unconsummated marriages to a male doctor, and the 
final version of the book was written by a male doctor. They concluded that there are three 
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types of women who ‘suffer’ from non-consummation: women who don’t know about sex; 
aggressive women who view love and fighting as the same thing; and women who want 
babies but not sex, so their priority is the mothering role, not the wifely role.214 
 
Lord Woolf would disagree with my assessment of the court’s continuing deference to the 
medical profession. He contends that “until recently the courts treated the medical profession 
with excessive deference, but recently the position has changed… for the better.”215 Lord 
Woolf continues, “we have moved from a society which was primarily concerned with the 
duty individuals owed to society to one which is concerned primarily with the rights of the 
individual... The move to a rights-based society has fundamentally changed the behaviour of 
the courts.”216  
 
In more recent case law, the courts have not demanded medical intervention. Could this be 
demonstrative of Lord Woolf’s argument that we are starting to respect the rights of the 
individual? No. I believe it is a reflection of the effective entrenchment of medical knowledge 
into courts, and wider society. Gower has claimed that “sexual relations are a most important 
attribute of marriage, and the experience of most lawyers confirms the opinion of 
psychiatrists that sexual maladjustments are perhaps the commonest root cause of unhappy 
marriages.... excessive delicacy is as out of place in the Divorce Court as in the consulting 
room.”217 This mode of thinking is clearly demonstrated in the case law. No stone or bed 
sheet has been left unturned. Both the medical and legal profession feel that the bedroom is 
their domain to legislate, and will ensure that people are correctly carrying out their duties 
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with no sense of embarrassment at the intrusion upon people’s personal, private lives. The 
courts (through the medical experts) conclude that there could be a negative impact upon a 
person’s health if they are not engaged in a sexual relationship.218 The law has effectively 
rendered sexual intercourse normal and natural, and anyone who is not engaged with it will 
suffer.219 This leads one to ask whether marriage should be a private affair, “its form to be 
determined by the parties themselves, or a public affair, which the state may legitimately 
require to be conducted with certain formalities? In ascertaining the existence of a marriage, 
should the law focus on its external appearance or the intentions of the parties?”220 The 
presumption is that families have a right to be free from intervention by the state, and that 
they “have a right to make demands upon the larger society for certain kinds of 
accommodation and support. Threats to this family are taken seriously.”221 Yet the 
public/private divide is not taken seriously, it is pliable for the purposes of subordinating 
women. The state always intervenes in the ‘private’ family- it legislates single-parent 
households, marital rape, domestic violence- as these threaten the husband-wife dichotomy.  
 
The government should not interfere in the bedroom when it comes to consummation, as 
there should not be a positive obligation on couples to perform a certain type of sexual act. 
The state’s inaction on this point continues the patriarchal belief of the heterosexual, nuclear, 
sexual family as the norm. Of course the removal of consummation from legislation could 
still leave room for couples to divorce on the basis of unreasonable behaviour if they feel 
their sex life is unsatisfactory. The end result of both actions being the same- exit from the 
marriage. Yet consummation requires a positive act; it tells couples it is expected. The 
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divorce criteria allow the couple to argue that they find a lack of sex unacceptable, without 
setting a requirement for all married couples.  
 
 
3.8: Conclusions 
Consummation: “The primal act of heterosexual intercourse... 
 to be repeated as a generative act ad infinitum.”222 
 
If we accept that intimacy and relationship structures are changing, then how can it be 
justifiable to provide legal privilege to consummated marriages which do not prioritise a 
healthy sex life, compatibility or happiness, but rather focus on one sexual experience “which 
may be performed satisfactorily, if joylessly, in under a minute”?223 Relationships have 
changed so much that now, “care and support flow between individuals with no biological, 
legal or social recognized ties to each other.”224 The continuing insistence upon 
consummation within marriage is a throwback to a relationship structure that no longer 
dominates.  
 
As explained by Fineman, “tearing the veil of privacy from the traditional family has 
revealed that, even if not abusive, the family often fails to perform the social and 
psychological functions that were the justifications for its privileged position.”225 Change to 
consummation law has to come from women. Women must acknowledge “the fact that men 
are totally irrelevant now as far as change is concerned. So we can take our eyes off them and 
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look at ourselves to make a shining new reality right here, right now in the midst of the old 
putrescent, collapsing world of the fathers.”226 
 
Changing theories of intimacy- which is defined as sex for the purposes of marriage, and 
therefore consummation- will not rewrite male privilege. Transforming the legal significance 
of this one act will not transform the intimacy of sex in marriage or male privilege. “It is not 
clear, for example, that change in the quality of heterosexual relationships would shatter the 
interconnection of gendered labour markets, gendered distributions of income and wealth, 
and gendered divisions of domestic labour.”227 Rather, it would serve to reduce the medical 
profession’s influence in law, reinforce individual rights to respect and privacy, and remove a 
sexual requirement.  
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FOUR 
 
TRANSSEXUALISM AND CONSUMMATION 
 
This chapter addresses transsexual people’s impact on the consummation requirement. The 
GRA is silent on the matter of consummation, but this very silence is of importance “as it 
would seem that transgender people are vulnerable as a class”1 to annulment on the basis of 
non-consummation, unless they have been ‘honest’ about their condition prior to marriage. 
Their marriages could also be void under s11(c) MCA 1973 which requires parties to a 
marriage to be “respectively male and female”. The term ‘transsexual’ has been, and will be 
used here as an “umbrella term that includes transgender, transsexual, bigendered and 
intersex people.”2 Through this chapter, the commentary shows that transsexual issues have 
been discussed by those who claim it is a sexual deviation, not far removed from 
homosexuality, to those who hold that the ‘cure’ for transsexual people lies in ‘wholly’ 
becoming the other (legally recognised) gender, both for their own mental health, and also to 
maintain the gender binary.   
 
                                                 
1
 Sharpe, A.N., ‘Endless Sex: The Gender Recognition Act 2004 and the Persistence of a Legal Category’ 
(2007) 15 Feminist Legal Studies pgs 57-84 pg 77  
2
 Hines, S., ‘A pathway to diversity?: human rights, citizenship and the politics of transgender’ (2009) 15 
Contemporary Politics 1 pgs 87-102, pg 87. These terms have been assigned many different meanings, but the 
term ‘transsexual’ is used throughout this chapter to denote a person who feels their birth gender does not match 
their true gender identity, and may choose to undergo gender reassignment surgery. This suggests that gender 
and sex are easily identifiable and transsexuals move from one to the other. Past definitions of transsexualism 
(as shown in this chapter) relied heavily upon the need for reassignment surgery, but contemporary usage of this 
term “reflects the reality that many individuals undergo a permanent gender transition without having such 
surgery.”-Tobin, H.J. ‘Against the Surgical Requirement for Change of Legal Sex’ (2006/7) 38 Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law 2 pgs 393-435 pg 400  
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Following pressure from the European Court of Human Rights, the U.K. enacted the GRA 
enabling a person to legally change and live in their new gender.3 This legislation allows the 
person to amend every part of their legal life- and most importantly, their birth certificate. 
Moreover, the law does not require the person to undergo any surgery or hormone treatment 
to have the physical attributes of the new gender.4 A result of this statutory procedure is a 
shift from biological factors to “psychological factors- largely ignored by the common law- 
becom[ing] paramount.”5 This has meant that a woman, who still possesses a penis, could 
legally marry a man, but would not be able to consummate her marriage in the way outlined 
in previous chapters, and could fall prey to an accusation of incapacity to consummate. This 
will be the focus of the second half of this chapter. If sex is essential from birth, then it 
cannot change, as shown in chromosomes. The only institution to which this seems to be of 
significance is marriage, and therefore, the ability to consummate that marriage. It is for this 
reason that I include such an extensive analysis of transsexual jurisprudence.  
 
The first part of this chapter outlines the definitions of transsexual as presented by law and 
the medical profession. I then explain the way in which I utilise radical feminism to shape my 
understandings of transsexual issues. Nearly every text addressing transsexual issues points 
out the inherent problems in writing about this area when the writer is not transsexual 
themselves. Sandland expresses the main issue as “‘we’ tend to think in terms of how this or 
that legal development is seen by ‘them’.”6 On this point, I endeavour to stay true to the 
                                                 
3
 Sandberg, R. ‘The right to discriminate’ (2011) 13 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 2 pgs 157-181 pg 163  
4
 Sharpe op cit n1 argues that in reality the vast majority of transsexuals will have undertaken gender 
reassignment surgery.  
5
 Masson, J., Bailey-Harris, R., & Probert, R., Cretney’s Principles of Family Law (8th ed) London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2008 pg 57  
6
 Sandland, R., ‘Feminism and the Gender Recognition Act 2004’ (2005) 13 Feminist Legal Studies pgs 43-66 
pg 44. Johnson explains that feminism’s engagement with transgender issues has predominantly been to try and 
understand ‘gender’ better, rather than to theorise gender from an understanding of the experience of being 
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guidelines outlined by Hale,7 and present this chapter without wishing to cause distress or 
offence, but merely to assess the way in which our understandings of consummation are 
furthered or inhibited by transsexual jurisprudence.   
 
4.1: What is gender dysphoria?8  
Definitions of gender dysphoria or gender identity disorder and the legal developments 
building upon these definitions have predominantly come from the medical profession and its 
“construction of transsexualism as a mental illness.”9 Those with gender dysphoria usually 
lack harmony between the body and mind, or harmony between gender identity and gender 
role. English law has been posited upon scientific medical explanations, rather than “on the 
normative justifications for linking legal entitlements, such as marriage to sex and gender.”10 
The GRA could be seen as positing recognition as a ‘cure’: creating legal protection for both 
those who have, or have had (those still suffering, and those who have been cured) from 
gender dysphoria.11 Transsexual people have been defined as having a powerful urge to 
transition into their acquired sex to the fullest extent, an urge which often dates back to 
childhood, until “they come to think of themselves as females imprisoned in male bodies, or 
                                                                                                                                                        
transgender. For the purposes of this research, I subscribe to this feminist engagement Johnson, K., ‘From 
Gender to Transgender: Thirty Years of Feminist Debates’ (2005) 24 Social Alternatives 2 pgs 36-39 at pg 36   
7
 www.sandystone.com/hale.rules.html (accessed 15/03/11) 
8
 ‘Gender dysphoria’ is the terminology adopted by the American Psychiatric Association in their ‘Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV’ (DSM-IV) to describe those who have a persistent aversion to 
their physical anatomy and believe it is not compatible with their true gender role.  
http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevision/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=482# (accessed 22/09/12): 
http://www.gidreform.org/gid30285.html (accessed 22/9/12) & The Home Office ‘Report of the 
Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual People’  
www.webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/transsexual/wgtrans.pdf 
(accessed 12/4/11)  
9
 Sandland op cit n6 pg 49; Sharpe op cit n1; Cowan, S., ‘Gender is no substitute for Sex: A Comparative 
Human Rights Analysis of the Legal Regulation of Sexual Identity’ (2005) 13 Feminist Legal Studies pgs 67-96  
10
 Fishbayn, L., ‘“Not quite one gender or the other”: Marriage law and the containment of gender trouble in the 
United Kingdom’ (2006-2007) 15 Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law 3 pgs 413-441 pg 414  
11
 Sandland op cit n6 pg 49. In Corbett v Corbett the court was presented with medical evidence stating that 
psychological treatment does not appear to work on transgender people, and the only ‘cure’ was surgery: 
Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) [1971] P.83 at 98  
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vice versa, and leads to intense resentment of, and dislike for, their own sexual organs which 
constantly remind them of their biological sex.”12 
 
Medical procedures are available “to address the dissonance between psychological sex and 
physiological structure, ranging from hormone treatment to surgical reconstruction,”13 and 
the undertaking of surgery is often talked of as the ‘end’ of the transsexual journey to bring 
the transsexual body into harmony with psychological sex.14 Medical understandings of 
transsexuals influence rights discourse and law.15 If one understands sex and gender as 
separate, this could hold “the potential for a greater diversity of masculinities and 
femininities.”16 With medicalised understandings at the forefront of the legal professions 
mind, how then has transsexual jurisprudence emerged and developed?  
 
4.2: The development of transsexual jurisprudence  
One has to acknowledge the increased legal activity regarding sex and gender issues in the 
early 2000’s. Between the year 2000 and 2006 alone, the UK passed five pieces of legislation 
addressing gender and sexuality issues, ranging from an equalized age of consent for sex, to 
enabling Civil Partnership and adoption rights for same sex couples.17 However, writing in 
2005, Conaghan and Millns sounded a note of caution in relying too heavily upon rights 
                                                 
12
 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) Idem  
13
 Masson, Bailey-Harris & Probert op cit n5 pg 56  
14
 The term ‘post-operative’ here refers to those that engage in genital surgery. The term can be problematic as it 
does not acknowledge that there are in fact many surgical procedures that can be undergone. There is also 
disagreement as to whether or not gender reassignment surgery is the ‘proper’ end of the transsexuals’ journey. 
For the purposes of this chapter, where the term is used in reference to case law, it is to denote that the 
transsexual person has undergone genital surgery. See further Taitz, J. ‘A Transsexual’s Nightmare: The 
determination of sexual identity in English law’ (1988) 2 International Journal of Law and the Family pgs 139-
154 at pg 141 
15
 Hines op cit n2 pg 96  
16
 Idem; Ingraham, C. ‘The Heterosexual Imaginary: Feminist Sociology and Theories of Gender’ in Seidman, 
S. (ed) Queer Theory/Sociology Oxford, Blackwell, 1996 pgs 168-193 
17
 Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000; Adoption and Children Act 2002; GRA 2004; CPA 2004, and the 
Equality Act 2006. See Hines op cit n2 pg 88  
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discourse. Building upon the work of Brown, they contended that existing rights language for 
gender and sexuality issues could “contribute to the further entrenchment of... disadvantage 
by reaffirming as universal the abstract norms which are made in man’s image and which 
reflect his particular concerns.”18 They asserted that human rights discourse has masked its 
universal nature and perpetuates women’s exclusion. This point is further developed below 
after discussion of the case law.  
 
Law’s aim of predictability to avoid and resolve arising disputes has led to a desire to 
“establish stable categories of social and sexual identity,”19 whether this be through reference 
to biology or anatomy. The tension created by the existence of transsexual people has (for 
some) been seen to demonstrate the “fluidity of gender... a fluidity which refuses traditional 
modes of categorisation,”20 and further demonstrates the weakness of “law’s projection of the 
legal subject as stable, unified and capable of categorisation.”21  
 
Historically at common law, a male-to-female (hereafter MtF) transsexual remained male.22 
Sex was fixed at birth with “reference to gonadal, genital and chromosomal factors.”23 This 
legal stance prior to the GRA was widely condemned for its failure to acknowledge the 
psychological factors involved in sex determination.24 Collier explains that the genital test of 
                                                 
18
 Conaghan, J. & Millns, S. ‘Special Issue: Gender, Sexuality and Human Rights’ (2005) 13 Feminist Legal 
Studies 1 pgs 1-14 pg 2; Brown, W. ‘Suffering Rights as Paradoxes’ (2000) 2 Constellations 7 pgs 230-241  
19
 Grenfell, L., ‘Making sex: law’s narratives of sex, gender and identity’ (2003) 23 Legal Studies pgs 66-102 pg 
67: Cownie, F., Bradney, A. & Burton, M., English Legal System in Context (5th ed) Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2010 chapter 5 
20
 Grenfell op cit n19 pg 67 
21
 Idem   
22
 And vice versa. Corbett v Corbett op cit n11  
23
 Probert, R., Cretney & Probert’s Family Law (7th ed) London, Thomson Reuters, 2009 pg 46  
24
 See criticism from other jurisdictions in  Attorney-General v. Otahuhu Family Court [1995] 1 NZLR 603; Re 
Kevin and Jennifer v. Attorney-General for the Commonwealth [2001] FamCA 1074  
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marriage25 means that “for there to constitute a legal marriage there must be the capacity for 
‘true’ heterosexual intercourse.”26 This view was encapsulated in law in the case of Corbett v 
Corbett27 outlined below. I do not provide an as in-depth analysis of the case law in this area 
as I have undertaken in Chapter 2. There are a few key cases, the facts and findings of which 
I outline below, with particular reference to consummation.  
 
The most often cited case is that of Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley),28 and it is from this 
judgement that biological factors had been prioritised prior to the GRA. The case focused on 
the validity of a marriage, as the wife had been born male, but had undergone gender 
reassignment surgery which her husband was aware of. After three months of marriage the 
husband filed a petition to have the marriage declared null and void on the basis that his wife 
was a man, or in the alternative, a decree of nullity on the basis of her incapacity or wilful 
refusal to consummate. Mrs Corbett asked for a declaration of nullity on the basis of her 
husband’s incapacity or wilful refusal to consummate, as she claimed her husband “achieved 
full penetration on several occasions but withdrew after a very short time without ejaculation, 
either because he was incapable of ejaculation, or because he was unwilling to do so, and 
then became hysterical.”29 As such, the judge, a medical doctor by training, had to assess the 
sex and gender of Mrs Corbett, the validity of the marriage, and the ability of Mrs Corbett to 
consummate her marriage.  
 
                                                 
25
 The requirement of male and female (penis/vagina) penetrative sex 
26
 Collier, R., Masculinity, Law and the Family London, Routledge, 1995 pg 149  
27
 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) op cit n11 
28
 Idem   
29
 Ibid at 88  
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The judgement held that marriage is a relationship between a man and woman,30 and the 
determination of sex for marriage is to be made at birth with particular reference to 
chromosomes, gonads and genitalia. With sex determined in this way, the judge held that Mrs 
Corbett was male from birth, and therefore the marriage ceremony undertaken was 
ineffectual. The judge felt that if Mrs Corbett was found to be a woman, her artificial vagina 
would never be capable of the ordinary and complete sexual intercourse required by the D-e v 
A-g31 conception of sexual intercourse in marriage. The judge felt that Mrs Corbett’s sex 
should be established before considering whether consummation had occurred, in other 
words, establishing whether there was a marriage to consummate. If penetrative sex had 
occurred between the two, the case would suggest that ‘artificial’ vaginas could be capable of 
penetrative sex. However, Ormrod J., like many radical feminists, found that sex (and the 
vagina), has an essence that cannot be created artificially.  
 
The court heard from 9 medical experts, discussing Mrs Corbett’s body and understandings 
of gender. Mrs Corbett’s first doctor concluded that as a man, April Ashley had a womanish 
appearance, and several homosexual experiences. Extensive reference was also made to Mr 
Corbett’s desire to dress in female clothes, and to socialise with ‘sexual deviants’, thereby 
trying to infer that his association with Mrs Corbett was a desire to further his own sexual 
deviance, rather than to appreciate her as a woman and create a ‘normal’ heterosexual 
relationship. Mr Corbett’s evidence stated that his original motives were transvestite to begin 
with, but that he then “developed for her the interest of a man for a woman. He said that she 
looked like a woman, dressed like a woman and acted like a woman. He disclosed his true 
                                                 
30
 In accordance with the Nullity of Marriage Act 1971 which legislated this area at the time. s1(c) of the Nullity 
of Marriage Act stated that a marriage would be void if “the parties are not respectively male and female.”  
31
 D-e v. A-g (falsely calling herself D-e) [1845] 1 Rob Ecc 280  
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identity to the respondent to show that his feelings had become those of a full man in love 
with a girl, not those of a transvestite in love with a transsexual.”32 
 
The judge drew comparisons between the alleged marriage in front of him, and ‘normal’ 
heterosexual marriages but concluded that the Corbetts’ marriage had little or nothing in 
common with ‘normal’ heterosexual marriages. Court instructed doctors found that Mrs 
Corbett had breasts, no penile remains, and a vagina “of ample size to admit a normal and 
erect penis.”33 Despite this, the court requested chromosomal analysis, which came back 
male. Scientific researchers provided evidence which explained that anomalies of sex are 
broadly divided into two categories- those that are psychological in nature, for example 
gender dysphoria; and those that are developmental in nature, for example someone who is 
intersex. Ormrod J. further broke these down to demonstrate the criteria that the medical 
profession takes into account when assessing the sexual condition of the individual. These 
criteria are: 
 
(i) Chromosomal factors. 
(ii) Gonadal factors (i.e., presence or absence of testes or ovaries). 
(iii) Genital factors (including internal sex organs). 
(iv) Psychological factors 
 
Some...would add: 
 
                                                 
32
 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) op cit n11 at 92  
33
 Ibid at 96 as per the Court’s medical inspectors.  
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(v) Hormonal factors or secondary sexual characteristics (such as 
distribution of hair, breast development, physique etc., which are 
thought to reflect the balance between the male and female sex 
hormones in the body).34 
         
Ormrod J. concluded that Mrs Corbett was a man. Her chromosomes were male, she was 
born with male sexual organs and she had no internal female organs to support a suggestion 
of intersex, thereby suggesting that her psychology led her to be declared transsexual.35 This 
case shows sex is determined at the time of birth, rather than say the time of the marriage, or 
the date of the trial. This is a key difference with consummation law which examines the 
possibility for consummation, at the date of marriage, at least until the incorporation of wilful 
refusal. As regards consummation, the case law outlined showed that the capacity for vaginal 
penetration could be achieved naturally or artificially (through medical intervention), where 
surgery has been available to cure a physical impediment, and so “the onus was on the spouse 
seeking to nullify the marriage to prove that the physical defect was incurable by surgery.”36 
However, prior to the GRA, no amount of surgery would allow a transsexual person to claim 
that they were capable of marriage and consummation.  
 
Mrs Corbett’s counsel argued that her doctors had assigned her to the female sex, and the 
court should also recognise this. Ormrod J. commented that “the word “assign,” although it is 
used by doctors in this context, is apt to mislead since, in fact, it means no more than that the 
                                                 
34
 Ibid at 100  
35
 Kennedy has argued that the finding of April Ashley as male was ‘unnecessarily conservative’: Kennedy, I.M. 
‘Transsexualism and Single Sex Marriage’ (1973) 2 Anglo-American Law Review pgs 112- 137 at pg 114: 
Muller, V. ‘“Trapped in the body”- Transsexualism, the law, sexual identity’ (1994) 3 Australian Feminist Law 
Journal pgs 103-116 pg 103  
36
 Fishbayn op cit n10 pg 423 
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doctors decide the gender, rather than the sex, in which such patients can best be managed 
and advise accordingly.”37 He held that marriage is one area of society and law in which sex 
is fundamental, and it is necessary to have one man and one woman for the “capacity for 
natural hetero-sexual intercourse,”38 which is essential to marriage, and to fulfil this essential 
role, a woman “must have the genitals of a woman, implying that having her vagina 
penetrated is one of the essential roles of woman in marriage.”39 Gilmore also explored the 
‘essential role’ and summarised; 
 
if it referred to the respondent’s ability to have sex as a woman it was 
contradicted by the medical evidence. If it referred to an ability to look and 
act like a woman, it was contradicted by his own finding that she lived as a 
female. If it referred to the ability to procreate, it ignored the law of nullity 
which does not make such ability a condition of a valid marriage.40 
 
Ormrod J. held that the role and definition of ‘woman’ in marriage was so specific that he 
would not determine whether Mrs Corbett was a woman for other purposes, but purely 
whether or not she could be a woman in marriage. He concluded that women have an 
essential role in marriage41 but did not define this essential role, only to say that a transsexual 
person is not capable of it. A person’s sex should be decided on the first three criteria above 
(i)-(iii), based upon biological factors. Where these criteria are not congruent, emphasis 
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 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) op cit n11 at 104  
38
 Ibid at 105 
39
 Diduck, A., & Kaganas, F. Family Law, Family Law, Gender and the State: Text, Cases and Materials (2nd 
ed) London, Hart, 2006 pg 49 
40
 Gilmore, S., ‘Bellinger v Bellinger- Not quite between the ears and between the legs- Transsexualism and 
marriage in the Lords’ (2003) 15 Child and Family Law Quarterly 3 pgs 295- 311 pg 310  
41
 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) op cit n11 at 106. Despite declaring the judgement was in reference to 
marriage only, it was also upheld in the criminal case of R v Tan [1983] QB 1053 
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should be placed upon the genitals. This focus on the ‘appearance’ of heterosexuality is 
addressed below, but the judge’s contention seems to be in direct opposition to his view that 
“marriage is a relationship which depends on sex and not on gender.”42  
 
Poulter criticises the Corbett decision, arguing the judgement focused on physical criteria too 
much, thereby determining sex at the expense of psychological factors which were 
acknowledged but not thought to be determinant. He criticised Ormrod J.’s acceptance of 
gender as essential- especially when in connection with certain sexual offences. Poulter 
argues that the refusal to acknowledge sex change in these areas will lead to what he calls 
“absurd results. On this basis [she]... could neither be the victim of rape nor could she be 
charged with soliciting as a prostitute...”43 Poulter also suggested that it was not correct for 
the judge to identify marriage with a capacity for heterosexual intercourse, as one spouse 
might have knowledge of the other spouses incapacity, and the marriage would not 
automatically be void. Poulter’s final criticism recognises the inconsistency in judgements 
between Corbett and S.Y v S.Y,44 where it was held that a wife with a small vagina was 
capable of consummation, as she was able to enlarge her vagina by undergoing an operation.  
 
The judgement in S.Y v S.Y45 was passed down just before that of Corbett, and demonstrates 
the conflict and difficulties in transsexual case law. In S.Y the court had to decide whether to 
issue a decree of nullity on the basis of non-consummation due to a defect in the wife’s 
sexual organs. The court found that enough scope had been left in D-e v A-g to argue that as 
the defect was curable by surgery, that an artificial vagina in this instance would be deemed 
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 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) op cit n11 at 107 
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 Poulter, S., ‘The Definition of Marriage in English Law’ (1979) 42 Modern Law Review pgs 409-429 pg 423  
44
 S.Y v S.Y (Orse.W.) [1963] P. 37 
45
 Idem   
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the same as a natural one. The wife was a woman from birth, and was held to have a natural, 
but abnormal vagina which would not allow for full penetration, but could be corrected by 
surgery. As such, the marriage was valid. The court in this instance felt that even if she had 
had no vagina, intercourse would be achieved if she underwent an operation to construct one. 
Poulter states it was inconsistent at the time of Corbett to not allow a post-operative 
transsexual to marry, but to take no action against someone who underwent the operation 
after the marriage, thereby allowing a ‘same-sex’ marriage.  
 
Some thirty years after Corbett came the House of Lords case of Bellinger v Bellinger.46 Mrs 
Bellinger- a post-operative transsexual woman- sought a declaration that her marriage was 
valid and subsisting since its inception. She had been designated male at birth, but had 
undergone gender reassignment surgery, and subsequently married her husband, as a woman. 
The courts’ held that Mrs Bellinger’s sex was correctly determined at birth, and she was 
unable to marry a man. The decisions were based upon the biological factors outlined in 
Corbett, and s11 (c) MCA 1973. The House of Lords did however make a declaration of 
incompatibility in respect of Mrs Bellinger’s rights under Articles 8 and 12 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights: the articles which address the right to a private and family life, 
and the right to marry. Having undergone surgery, Bradney asks “in such a situation what 
else can ordinary language do but accord her the gender by which she herself wishes to be 
known and by which she is in fact known?...Indeed, if ordinary language does not label Mrs 
Bellinger as female, one might wonder, given the binary nature of the choice available, what 
label it does accord to her.”47 Mrs Bellinger’s constructed vagina was deemed unable to fulfil 
                                                 
46
 Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21  
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 Bradney, A. ‘Developing Human Rights? The Lords And Transsexual Marriages’ (2003) 33 Family Law 
Journal 8 pgs 583-595 pg 587 
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the ‘essential role’ of a woman in marriage, which seems to suggest a functional test, but “the 
essential role of a woman in marriage is also related, according to Ormrod LJ, to having 
female gonads, although the non-functioning of these sexual reproductive organs does not 
preclude a valid marriage being contracted by a person who is sterile.”48 
 
The Lords felt unable to read into s11 (c) MCA the necessary criteria which would then allow 
Mrs Bellinger to be a woman. Further, s11 (c) uses the present tense, indicating that the date 
of marriage is not key, but that at all times a marriage must be between a man and woman. 
When it comes to marriage, “Parliament regards gender as fixed and immutable.”49 It is 
noteworthy that Thorpe LJ was a dissenting voice in this case at the Court of Appeal stage. 
The issues raised by Thorpe LJ are analysed in reference to their impact upon the 
consummation debate below. Interestingly, in Bellinger the court gave consideration to the 
point at which a person acquires a new gender in the reassignment process, yet their 
Lordships “were not required to decide at what stage it would be necessary to conclude that a 
person’s sex was re-assigned, merely whether Mrs Bellinger’s re-assignment treatment was 
sufficient to be able to so conclude.”50   
 
The earlier case of Goodwin51 in the European Court of Human Rights declared that English 
law violated Articles 8 and 12 in relation to transsexual people. Goodwin was part of a 
succession of cases that went through the European Court arguing that transsexual people 
were deprived of their convention rights; “they suffered a series of losses at Strasbourg, but 
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 Diduck & Kaganas op cit n39 pg 49 
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 Bellinger v Bellinger op cit n46 at 83  
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each time... the judges urged Britain to reconsider its stance in the light of changes in social 
and medical opinion”52 until the European Court ran out of patience in Goodwin.  
 
Further reference needs to be made here to the intervening key cases before the judgment of 
Goodwin, some of which were heard in the European Court of Human Rights. The first of 
these is Rees v United Kingdom53 which concerned a postoperative transsexual man who 
argued that the UK’s refusal to alter his birth certificate constituted a violation of Article 8 
and 12 of the Convention on Human Rights. Failure to amend the birth register limited the 
applicants integration into social life, prohibited him from marrying as a man, and opened 
him up to embarrassment and humiliation whenever he had to produce his birth certificate. 
The court held that the right to marry in Article 12 referred to marriage between people of the 
opposite biological sex as defined by Corbett, and that the right to marry is not completely 
impaired, as a transsexual person can marry someone of the opposite biological sex. 
Similarly, the court held that it was up to each member state to determine how to meet 
demands of transsexual people. There was no positive action required to amend the way in 
which we organise and use birth certificates.   
 
In Cossey v United Kingdom54 the same arguments regarding Articles 8 and 12 were invoked 
by a postoperative MtF. However, whereas in Rees where the judges had been unanimous in 
dismissing the claim under article 12, the judges here held by 14 votes to 4 that there had 
been no violation of article 12. The court felt that the reasoning given in Rees was still 
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relevant and was not prepared to change its findings and reliance upon biological criteria for 
sex, and marriage. There was no legal impediment to Miss Cossey marrying a woman, and as 
regards her inability to marry a man, it was felt by the court that “the criteria adopted by 
English law are in this respect in conformity with the concept of marriage to which the right 
guaranteed by Article 12 refers.”55 Although it was recognised that some member states 
would allow a marriage between Miss Cossey and a man, it was held that this was not 
indicative of a general abandonment of traditional marriage. The court further reconfirmed 
the biological criteria of Corbett for the purposes of continuing traditional marriage.  
 
Goodwin v United Kingdom56 concerned a postoperative MtF woman who had been unable to 
change a number of official documents which still stated her sex as male, for the purposes of 
social security, national insurance, her pension, and the age at which she would be considered 
a retiree. She had suffered “feelings of vulnerability, humiliation and anxiety”57 as her 
employers, for example, could identify her as transsexual. She had suffered harassment at 
work, but was unsuccessful at an industrial tribunal, as she was legally a man. Goodwin 
argued that failure to allow her to amend her documents constituted a violation of her rights 
under articles 8 (right to respect to life), 12 (right to marry and found a family), 13 (right to 
an effective remedy), and 14 (freedom from discrimination), of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The European Court for the first time unanimously held that there had been a 
violation of Articles 8 and 12, (dismissing the claims under articles 13 and 14). The court felt 
that issues such as changing records, social security and insurance were surmountable, 
“particularly if confined to the case of fully achieved and post-operative transsexuals... as 
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regards other possible consequences, society may reasonably be expected to tolerate a certain 
inconvenience to enable individuals to live in dignity and worth in accordance with the sexual 
identity chosen by them at great personal cost.”58 
 
It was held that birth certificates are amended after adoption, and that to do the same after 
gender reassignment would not “pose the threat of overturning the entire system.”59 This case 
does not refer explicitly to consummation, however, it is important to note European 
displeasure and pressure on the UK to enact legislation that addressed these issues. The court 
observed that in 2002, having regard to societal and scientific developments, one could no 
longer claim that ‘man’ and ‘woman’ could be solely defined by biology. For the first time, 
the court held that it was now artificial to argue that, post-operative transsexuals had not been 
deprived of marriage rights. “The applicant in this case lives as a woman, is in a relationship 
with a man and would only wish to marry a man. She has no possibility of doing so. The very 
essence of her right to marry has therefore been infringed.”60 
 
Following Goodwin, it was thought that “domestic law, including section 11(c) of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, will have to change.”61 However, marriage is so ingrained into 
our society’s foundation, that Parliament did not change the MCA. Instead, the GRA was 
enacted, which consequentially impacted upon marriage anyway; allowing a man with a 
vagina and a woman with a penis to contract a marriage. Can this end result truly be deemed 
more desirable than just abolishing marriage and all the legal privilege that goes hand in hand 
with it? I argue not.  
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Whereas the UK courts have felt unable to progress the law themselves, and have referred the 
issue back to the legislature, other common-law jurisdictions have dealt with this through 
judge made law. A New Jersey court in M.T v J.T62 considered whether or not a two year 
marriage between a man and a post-operative MtF was valid, and rejected Corbett’s 
biological criteria, shifting to focus on promoting psychological and anatomical factors when 
determining sex. Given that M.T was postoperatively anatomically in harmony with her 
psychology, the court had no trouble declaring M.T a woman. However, the court did take 
time to assess her sexual capacity as a woman. Having examined medical evidence, the court 
concluded that M.T had “a vagina and labia which were adequate for sexual intercourse and 
could function as any female vagina, that is, for traditional penile/vaginal intercourse.”63 As 
such, despite moving away from a purely biological understanding of sex and gender, this 
case then adds a further requirement in the need to be capable of heterosexual intercourse. 
Sharpe argued this “law reform reproduces the gender order along phallocentric lines.”64 The 
true capacity of a woman in marriage appears to be the ability to be penetrated. The court 
extensively analysed the surgery M.T had undergone, and the characteristics of her vagina, 
perhaps suggesting an attempt to ‘naturalise’ her vagina, and heterosexual intercourse. “That 
is to say, medico-legal discourse, in emphasising textural, spatial and sensual similarities 
between M.T’s vagina and that of biological women, attempts to rearticulate the relation 
between the transgender body and the ‘natural’.”65 
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In New Zealand the Attorney General sought to obtain a declaration as to whether a 
transsexual person could contract a marriage with someone of their own biological sex.66 The 
court found that recognition was dependent upon surgical reassignment, though the judge 
found that whilst a couple wishing to marry had to appear as man and woman, they did not 
“have to prove that each can function sexually.”67 The emphasis was placed upon the 
appearance of heterosexuality, if not the functionality of it: “If the law insists that genetic sex 
is the pre-determinant for entry into a valid marriage, then a male to female transsexual can 
contract a valid marriage with a woman. To all outward appearances, such ‘marriages’ would 
be homosexual marriages. The marriage could not be consummated.”68 
 
The reference to consummation is confusing here, as the judge had made clear that sexual 
function was not of importance. Sharpe argues that consummation is deployed here in order 
to denaturalise the homosexual body, and I argue that it further reinforces the heterosexual 
nature of marriage, and the physical appearance of heterosexuality.69 The judge made clear 
that unclothed, each partner in a marriage should physically appear male and female. This 
appearance trumped any kind of functionality found in the new genitalia. Penetrative ability 
has been seemingly removed from this judgement, replaced instead by a strong desire for 
aesthetics. In the UK this marriage could fail the existing consummation requirement, despite 
one partner undergoing expensive and risky surgery, though of course unless challenged, the 
marriage will remain valid. Previously it would have been void.  
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In the Australian case of Re Kevin and Jennifer v. Attorney-General for the Commonwealth,70 
Kevin a FtM transsexual man was held to be a man for the purposes of marriage. Kevin had 
not had a penis constructed, though he had undergone breast reduction surgery and a 
hysterectomy. Kevin would clearly not be capable of heterosexual intercourse as a man. 
Chisholm J. introduced two further criteria necessary for determining sex: those of brain sex, 
and social and cultural factors. As regards brain sex, this seemingly progressive judgment 
flounders back into the discussions entertained by Ormrod J. in Corbett, and confirms that 
sex is determined at birth. Further, the introduction of social factors is problematic. The judge 
heard a substantial amount of evidence from people involved in Kevin’s life- friends, family, 
work colleagues etc- to reiterate that he had always been perceived as a man. The expansion 
of the law in this way seems to create a further element for recognition- one of ‘passing’ as 
the other sex.71 This is explored below with reference to Butler’s work and the view that this 
perhaps creates a pastiche of masculinity and femininity.  
 
4.3: Conclusions to be drawn from case law  
The case law outlined demonstrates the primary aim of trying to avoid the appearance of 
same ‘sex’ (biological) marriages. It seems that worries about same-sex marriage have 
overshadowed understandings and judicial decisions about transsexual people. The focus on 
biological factors, and the decision of Corbett “says much about beliefs in biological 
determinism and the immutability of sex and their reinforcement through the legitimising 
authority of law, as well as about the nature of the legal marriage relationship.”72  Radical 
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feminism talks in essentialist terms when it comes to sex.73 Women and men are different. 
But radical feminists are disappointed most by the gender definitions that are attached to 
these differing bodies. 
 
Before the introduction of the GRA, rulings in the UK courts reinforced the connection 
between sex and gender, whilst the European Court of Human Rights “demonstrated an 
understanding of lived gender identities and experiences that are distinct from those defined 
at birth, and of the need for state recognition of these identity practices. Thus, European 
universal human rights discourse has often had an advantage over state law in its more 
flexible reading of gender and of gendered intimate relationships.”74 Sex has been shown to 
be immutable. A transsexual person can undergo surgery, take hormones and live in their 
acquired gender. If we could remove a need for consummation in marriage, we would remove 
sex, and by extension, gender from marriage, and therefore gender itself would become a 
mute point. If the foundation institution of society does not make a sex/gender distinction, it 
would then be difficult to try to extend this distinction to other areas of law.   
 
The courts have treated those who are intersex with a sympathy and compassion that has not 
been extended to transsexual people in the same way,75 though in later cases it was 
acknowledged that courts wished to act, but could not do so. Ormrod J. in Corbett held that 
sex was to be determined at birth and no amount of surgery or hormones could change that 
sex. However, if a mistake had been made at birth (usually in the case of intersex people), he 
held that a ‘change of sex’ could then occur, perhaps contradicting the scientific nature of 
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Ormrod’s decision.76 In the context of intersex, he made clear that genitals not chromosomes 
would be decisive if a choice had to be made. In other words, the normative seemed more 
important than the scientific analysis when it came to the crunch. This is confusing because 
the judgement in Corbett extensively explains that the medical profession often struggles to 
draw a line between transsexual and intersex.77 Perhaps this sensitivity had extended to the 
medical profession, explaining why no intersex party in the UK felt they had to go to court on 
marital validity until 2001: the case of W v W.78 The medical profession has often hidden the 
intersex status from the patient, and been more willing to “find ways of allowing the patient 
to continue as a member of their social sex through surgical intervention,”79 if it is deemed 
that doctors made an incorrect determination at birth. Fishbayne suggests that the non-
consummation cases discussed in Chapter 2 are perhaps about intersex people, but have not 
been overtly expressed as such. Until Corbett, “all matrimonial cases arising out of 
developmental abnormalities of the reproductive system had been dealt with as cases in 
which the marriage was void because one party lacked the capacity to consummate the 
marriage.”80 The existence of intersex case law provided the opportunity to talk about gender 
as nature or choice.  
 
The case of W v W81 involved a woman who had been registered male at birth, but declared 
intersex as a result of ambiguous external genitalia. As she grew, she began to develop 
female characteristics, and underwent surgery and married. Upon the termination of her 
marriage, a case was made by her husband that she was not a woman, and was unable to 
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consummate the marriage. The court held that as she was born intersex, there could not be a 
definitive determination of sex at birth, and she was to be declared female, and further that 
the surgery she underwent made her capable of consummation.82 If one compares the cases of 
Mrs Bellinger and Mrs W, “although different medical labels are attached to... [them]... their 
subsequent state post-operatively is remarkably similar.”83 Sharpe too argues that 
“distinguishing between transgender and intersex cannot be reduced to a purely descriptive 
act... the distinction....proves to be an effect of medico-legal constructions of (bio)logical sex 
and judicial concerns over demarcating the realm of the ‘natural’.”84 
 
4.4: Current legislation  
The legal recognition of those who are diagnosed with gender dysphoria is now encapsulated 
in the GRA, which goes “further than strictly required by the European Court, in that 
entitlement to recognition is not limited by the G.R.A. to so-called ‘post-operative’ trans 
people.”85 Sandland argues that the GRA reads as “a blunt, pragmatic and somewhat amoral 
response to the decision of the European Court in Goodwin...In its detail it is dry and 
legalistic.”86 
 
Under the GRA, a person with gender dysphoria (over the age of 18) can make an application 
for a gender recognition certificate on the basis that they have been living in the other (legally 
recognised) gender, or have changed their gender under the law of a country or territory 
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outside the UK.87 The application is then considered by a Gender Recognition Panel, who 
will grant the application if they are satisfied that the applicant has or has had gender 
dysphoria;88 that the applicant has lived in the acquired gender for two years;89 and that the 
applicant intends to continue to live in their acquired gender for the rest of their life.90 
Jeffreys states MtF transsexuals “must learn and practice feminine traits. Not surprisingly 
they choose to imitate the most extreme examples of feminine behaviour and dress in grossly 
stereotypical feminine clothing.”91 This could be a reaction to having to ‘prove’ their genuine 
desire to transition, and a wish to not challenge views of femininity in case they risk 
rejection, or could be a desire on the part of male transsexuals “to become their image of 
what women can and should be, not a liberated or feminist version.”92 Although there is no 
insistence upon surgery or hormonal treatment, decisions about whether or not to grant a 
certificate are predicated upon “a clear match between gender identity and presentation.”93 
This is constructed upon a medicalised understanding of gender dysphoria, and serves to 
privilege “a connective relationship between gender identity, bodily appearance, and 
presentation.”94 
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The application must contain evidence from two medical practitioners, one of whom needs to 
be a registered medical practitioner from within the field of gender dysphoria or a report from 
a chartered psychologist in the field. The reports must include details of the diagnosis of the 
applicant’s gender dysphoria;95 and detail any treatment the applicant has undergone, is 
undergoing, or plans to undergo in order to modify their sexual characteristics.96 The GRA 
requires medical input, and requires explanation when transsexual people have not undergone 
surgery, indicating that though surgery is not required, it is expected.97  
 
After a successful application the applicants birth registry entry will be amended, their status 
as a mother or father will not be affected and their rights to succession under wills created 
before their certificate will not be affected.98 The GRA does not require sterilisation, though 
this has been required in other countries (e.g Denmark and Sweden). The Act also states that 
the fact that an applicant has changed their gender will not prevent them from being 
prosecuted for attempted or committed offences under their old gender.99  
 
Probert explains that the process for gender recognition has become a medical one, rather 
than a legal one.100 Doctors have moved on from defining ‘natural’ sex, to now involving 
themselves in legislation for transsexual people. Probert points out that problems may arise if 
transsexual people are not encouraged to undergo surgery, which is used as evidence of the 
“applicant’s intention to live in the acquired gender until death.”101 Sandland states that the 
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GRA demonstrates “the truism that any act of inclusion also excludes.”102 The Act creates a 
new binary- those who will cross and live as the acquired gender for life, and those who 
won’t; a divide between “conformity and deviance.”103 This denial of access for some, means 
that the law has still left some people ‘out of the loop’, but might also “allow real freedom, a 
lived reality of the deconstruction of the dyads male/female, conformity/deviance, for others. 
In ontological terms, the G.R.A. marks a new openness of texture, a new fluidity, to the legal 
construction of gender.”104 The Act is representative of existing social realities, in that most 
people live as either male or female, but the GRA could have been used to challenge this. The 
Act is not retroactively applicable, because to do so would effectively have declared the 
relationships prior to gender certificates as same-sex relationships which enjoyed the legal 
benefits of marriage.  
 
Heterosexuality has been “constructed as a coherent, natural, fixed and stable category; as 
universal and monolithic”105 and prior to the GRA, transsexual people posed a threat to this. 
Rather than change existing marriage law, Parliament chose to create new ‘transsexual 
specific’ legislation. The characteristics of law are not appreciated by feminists and radical 
feminists in particular. If law did not engage with male values of certainty, and the male 
patriarchal gender binary, the life path for transsexual people would undoubtedly be simpler. 
It is this drive for certainty, and insistence upon proffering differing rights to the two genders, 
that has left us with a system (even after the introduction of the GRA) that still requires 
gender to be registered at birth. The House of Lords calls the assessment of gender 
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“essential”.106 This essential character, and desire for certainty led to the court in Bellinger 
concluding that to declare Mrs Bellinger a woman “would necessitate giving the expressions 
‘male’ and ‘female’... a novel, extended meaning: that a person may be born with one sex but 
later become, or become regarded as, a person of the opposite sex.”107  
 
4.5: Socio-legal understandings of transsexual issues 
Legal understandings of transsexual bodies have emerged from medico-legal arguments and 
contemporary law reform in this area which “operate within a frame established by the 
imprint of sexual science.”108 It is this balance between law and medicine that seems to be 
engrained in the GRA. But, Hines argues that the GRA’s provisions mark “a sea change in 
socio-legal attitudes to gender.”109 If the aim of transsexual people is recognition and 
harmonisation of their gender and sex, then why has the law not required 
(physical/anatomical) harmonisation? The post-operative transsexual has most effectively 
tried to harmonise their sex and gender. Radical feminists and others would question whether, 
for example a MtF transsexual could truly understand the world as a female? This relies on 
some general accepted definition of the term ‘female’, and implicitly claims a universal 
understanding of the world by genetic females. In Bellinger’s Court of Appeal hearing, it was 
noted that “the words ‘male’ and ‘female’ are obviously broader than ‘man’ and ‘woman’, 
since they encompass the entire animal world. Among humans, it includes those who are not 
yet adults.”110   
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The reliance upon Hyde111 historically excluded transsexuals from marriage.112 This is an 
unfortunate, and inaccurate reading of the law as expressed in Hyde.113 The insistence of a 
union between one man and one woman, was not focused upon the biological, although this 
was the legacy that this case produced, but rather was a result of the courts insistence that a 
marriage could only be between two people. The court was assessing the validity of a 
polygamous marriage, not the gender of the parties. The configuration of ‘one man and one 
woman’ was about numbers, not genders.114 
 
One cannot discuss the impact of the GRA without some examination of the conflicting 
understandings and discourse surrounding sex and gender. The GRA could be seen as a state 
shift from sex to gender as the defining element between males and females, as there needs to 
be no physical (biological) change as such, but rather an outward change. The categorisation 
of transsexual people as suffering from gender dysphoria creates a biological explanation 
which in itself “seek[s] to confirm a naturalised binary gender system by constructing 
transsexualism as an anomaly, that can be treated by medical science.”115 The radical feminist 
perspective deems sex an essence, but the meaning of this essence, and the gender written 
over this female body, is one which is defined by patriarchal society.116 There are two 
preeminent views of sex- the biological determinist view, and the social constructionist view.  
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The biological determinist view “posits that sex is biological, and gender is an affect of 
sex.”117 There is an acceptance here that human beings have a fundamental biological nature. 
The courts have held in Bellinger and Corbett for example, that with reference to the criteria 
set out in Corbett, one can never truly change ‘sex’: “the change of body can never be 
complete.”118 The social constructionist view on the other hand, “posits that the meaning of 
sex is historically and politically specific. Its meaning shifts across time and cultures 
according to particular political impulses.”119 In this way, there is no universal understanding 
or meaning of sex. Corbett demonstrates the biological determinist approach as it accepts the 
notion that “destiny is determined by biology and in its refusal to recognise the social and 
psychological aspects of sex as being material to the determination of sex.”120  
 
Fishbayn felt that the Corbett judgement paints transsexual people as ‘pastiche’.121 Butler too 
has commented on transsexual people creating a pastiche: the notion that they are trying to 
copy or imitate the gender they acquire, whilst subtly suggesting that the imitation is not 
believable.122 Corbett was an expression of the judges discomfort at “Mrs. Corbett’s aesthetic 
enterprise... [in] the commingling of male and female elements in a single individual.”123 This 
commingling fundamentally questions the notion of essential sexual identity and sexual 
capability. Essential sexual identity is often cited as a radical feminist characteristic, and I 
now outline the uneasy relationship between radical feminism and transsexual people.  
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4.6: Reconciling radical feminism with understandings of transsexual issues 
Transsexual people can be seen as separating sex and gender; “rather than biological ‘sex’ 
being the marker of identity, ‘gender’ recognizes that identity is more fluidly experienced and 
practised.”124 Under Beauvoir’s understanding of sex and gender, “gender was seen as subset 
of sex: ‘sex’ defined the parameters, ‘gender’ was the free play available within those 
parameters.”125 Firestone also used a biologically determined understanding of sex, 
contending that procreation provides a natural block to women’s equality, and outside factors 
such as improved reproductive technologies are needed in order to free women from this 
oppression.126 Gender is therefore reproduced, generationally.  
 
Following this understanding of gender and sex, the terms went through a time of being used 
interchangeably, until the Butlerian construction of gender understandings. Butler created a 
view (heavily influenced by Foucault) in which “sex had increasingly come to be seen as a 
subset of gender, with the body... produced by gendered ideas and actors.”127 She argues that 
second wave feminism served to make sex essential, and viewed gender as constructed upon 
this. She argues that sex and gender are both equally linguistically constructed.128 Chapter 1 
outlined my unease with this construction of sex and gender, so here I will only say that there 
are clear physical and biological differences between the accepted sexes- men and women. 
Understandings of gender emerge from this difference. For Beauvoir, this understanding is 
historical in nature. From birth, the female body is treated differently from the male, and as 
such what it means to be a woman emerges, under the construct of a patriarchal society. We 
                                                 
124
 Hines op cit n2 pg 90  
125
 Sandland op cit n6 pg 47  
126
 Firestone, S., The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution London, Women’s Press; Grenfell op 
cit n19 pg 91  
127
 Sandland op cit n6 pg 47 
128
 Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the discursive limits of “sex” op cit n125 pg 6  
230 
 
are not born as ‘women’ but rather become (are made) such.129 A transsexual person can 
undergo the surgical procedures that will allow them to look like the acquired gender, but the 
process which begins at birth has not been present.130 This gender anxiety appears often in the 
context of transsexualism, but not in comparable situations, for example where a 2year old 
girl is in a coma and awakens at age 20. She too will have missed the gender socialistion 
which creates woman. Legally speaking, “gender seems to be the only paradigm of difference 
within which ‘self’ is authoritatively permitted to be at odds with ‘body’.”131 In the context of 
transsexualism, this probably has more to do with homophobic attitudes than those of sex and 
gender.132 
 
Butler argues that gender is performed in all aspects. She asks transsexual people to 
demonstrate the effect of this performity.133 Not only is this an unfair request, it also naively 
purports to demolish the gender binary. There seems to be inconsistency between those who 
argue that transsexual people wish to ‘effectively’ transition from one gender to another, 
whilst Califia for example, suggests that transsexual people, 
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direct their political efforts toward eliminating the notions of “men” and 
“women,” rather than working to be perceived by nontranssexuals as a 
member of either gender... [there has been] an increase in the numbers of 
people who label themselves as third-gender... and insist on their right to 
live without or outside of the gender categories that our society has 
attempted to make compulsory and universal.134 
 
Rather than breaking down gender, Butler’s configuration serves to add further categories to 
our gender understandings. We would end up perhaps with men, women (as other), and 
transsexual (as a further other). Butler holds that gender performatives seek to harmonise the 
‘inside’ with the ‘outside’; a discourse created to provide the concept of a gender-core, 
primarily to protect heterosexuality. Radical feminists would however suggest that gender 
stereotypes start from birth when male and female babies are treated differently. As such, in 
later life to try and claim a gender change, is incompatible with radical feminist 
understandings even though transsexuals may argue that their early gender socialisation is a 
coerced gender performance which they feel they fail. Radical feminists take issue with 
Butler’s work as it flies to such abstract heights that it produces further theoretical questions 
that never seem to be adequately answered in a way that feels like it refers to women on the 
ground, and their everyday experiences.135 Butler’s insistence upon differentiating herself 
from the biological determinism found in radical feminism results in an intruiging discussion 
about power, but does not clearly conclude why there are two sexes.136 
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Sandland argues that the GRA is the institutionalisation of the Butlerian view, whereas 
Fishbayn argues that the GRA allows for gender transition but “conceptualizes transsexuality 
and intersexuality as pathological and repudiates the performative nature of gender.”137 I 
agree with Sandland’s analysis and take issue with several parts of the legislation enacted, not 
least perhaps that the GRA serves to reinforce heteronormativity, and does not seem to 
address all the issues that transsexual people experience.  
 
The Butlerian approach is most clearly seen in s9 (1) GRA which reads: 
 
Where a full gender recognition certificate is issued to a person, the 
person’s gender becomes for all purposes the acquired gender (so that, if the 
acquired gender is the male gender, the person’s sex becomes that of a man 
and, if it is the female gender, the person’s sex becomes that of a 
woman).138 
 
In this way, gender becomes the key dynamic, and sex becomes a by-product. The 
transsexual person is expected to now effectively ‘perform’ the new sex’s characteristics. 
Feminist theory in general and radical feminist theory in particular has accepted that gender is 
understood as the social meaning attached to sex. Radical feminism tries to separate this 
‘female’ gender role that is attached to the female body. Butler on the other hand states that 
this does not go far enough, and feels that sexed bodies are created through discourse. The 
existence of transsexual individuals, for her, allows the discourse to shift and change, as we 
learn gender, and the very existence of transsexual people can teach us new things. As it is, 
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we are aspiring to idealised forms of ‘male’ and ‘female’ that Butler feels we cannot achieve. 
As Johnson explains, “this ideal is maintained through the reiteration and embodiment of 
gender norms cemented together by heterosexuality.”139  
 
Even if one accepts that gender is performed, the Corbett judgement is still none the clearer. 
Although the court found Mrs Corbett’s genitalia looked female, and would probably allow 
penetration (not constituting consummation), the  court found in other areas that she was 
perhaps not female enough, making assessment of her mannerisms and make-up. In fact, Mrs 
Corbett is one transsexual woman that has always passed extremely well, and so Ormrod’s 
comments suggest anxiety precisely because of this fact and his imagined proximity to 
homosexuality. Moi uses this example to show that to conclude that everyone who ‘performs’ 
femininity is a woman, 
 
is to blur the difference between a woman who performs femininity, a man 
(drag artist or cross-dresser) who does it, and a transsexual who has 
changed his or her body in order to achieve a more convincing 
‘performance’. Is the ‘gender’ performed really the same in each case? 
Even if we assume that these three people all perform the same script 
(which is by no means a foregone conclusion), does a different body really 
make no difference at all as to the effect of the performance?140 
 
Moi contends that someone who undergoes surgery demonstrates a greater commitment to a 
convincing ‘gender performance’. Under Butler’s contention, if all of our claims to be male 
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or female “are a fiction, it can be argued that transsexuals are embroiled in much the same 
process of attaining a ‘sex’ as non-transsexuals.”141 I cannot agree. Contrary to Califia, both 
the law and most transsexual people do not wish to challenge understandings of male and 
female.142 Instead, for many it is a change from one gender to the other. It is not about 
creating a third gender, or challenging understandings.143 It is about living in their true 
gender; living their lives in a way that is true to themselves. Butler fails to acknowledge the 
limitations of the body, and further relies heavily upon a community who already have 
enough issues to endeavour with- surgery, familial relationships, societal reactions, legal 
requirements, to name a few- to also impact, challenge and change the existing gender binary, 
when so few of us, who do not have these additional issues do not bother to do so.  
 
It has been argued that the GRA and the possibility of re-assignment surgery allow 
transsexual people the opportunity to be ‘whole’, reinforcing the idea that there must be 
uniformity or cohesion between the external and the internal. This flies in the face of radical 
feminist understandings, which try to distance the female body from ideas of femininity for 
example. The external body determines how woman are treated from birth, yet the GRA does 
not require the external body to necessarily match what is felt inside. It is within transsexual 
issues that “gender identity... is understood as stable and the body as more mobile: the body 
should correspond to the inner sense, the sense of being woman or man. The body is to be 
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modified, not vice-versa.”144 Radical feminists accept the possibility, and scientific 
knowledge available to now adapt physical appearance, but feel that the internalisation of 
gender which begins at birth has not been complete in a transsexual person.   
 
Butler’s view of the role of discourse does not allow most women who are not transsexual to 
ever escape the discourse that shapes them. Radical feminism however allows for the 
prospect that some women can escape ideas of femininity and female roles. This is through a 
spectrum ranging from consciousness raising, to separate living from men. Fishbayn claims 
that when you view Corbett and Butler together, “it is precisely because pastiche can have the 
effect of subverting the fixed binary frame of gender that the Corbett judgement sought to 
contain situations in which it occurs. The binary image is not displaced by the transsexual, 
but its purported naturalness is undermined.”145 Effectively, Butler is saying that the 
existence of transsexuals challenges the gender binary, whilst radical feminists would argue 
that not only can people not truly change from one gender to the other, but that that is the 
ambition of most transsexual people; not to try and create a challenge, but to fit in.146   
 
There is a strand within radical feminism which, given its preference for difference over 
equality, is hostile to MtF transsexual women. Raymond and Jeffreys for example are hostile 
to MtF lesbians in particular. Both have argued that men cannot overcome patriarchal 
privilege, nor can they overcome their male view of women, and Raymond has further argued 
that ‘sex-change’ in relation to women is another way for men to remove the inherent power 
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of female biology.147 Both conclude that “transsexualism is not consonant with lesbianism or 
women’s liberation”148 and that transsexualism has developed as a result of the limiting 
gender roles that exist under male supremacy.  
 
Califia is particularly critical of Raymond’s radical feminist work. Califia states that as a 
genetic woman, Raymond does not make space for transsexual women in lesbian-feminist 
media, and only genetic women, “who were adamantly opposed to the inclusion of 
transsexual women, and indeed, did not see them as women, lesbians or feminists,”149 were 
provided the space to talk about transsexual women. Califia concludes that the usual home of 
radical feminism, as an extreme left political movement, is abandoned when transsexual 
issues are discussed, and radical feminists set up home in the extreme right with the New 
Christian Right.150 This comparison is particularly troubling to an atheist, but I concede the 
sentiment of Califia’s point, if not perhaps the conclusion he comes to. Radical feminists are 
almost militant in their beliefs for furthering women’s issues, and I cannot purport to always 
agree with the ideas expressed, yet there are very few people who could say that they agree 
with every part of the spectrum of their chosen theory. Califia’s analysis demonstrates the 
difficulties faced in writing about the subject, even when writing from within the transsexual 
community, having been born female, and now living as a man. Whilst asking society and 
Raymond in particular to accept and embrace MtF as women, in his book, Califia refers to 
himself still as a woman when he feels it will suit his point better.151  
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Califia suggests that transsexual people will often tell doctors what they need to, in order to 
obtain the treatment they desire/need. Raymond has argued that in so doing, transsexual 
people have entrenched idealised forms of masculinity or femininity.152 Her research found 
transsexual women who said they would ensure that their children would learn existing 
gender roles. Califia stated that transsexual women have to say this, in order to be allowed to 
adopt or raise children.  
 
Radical feminist theory has posited that transsexual people are homosexuals who are 
uncomfortable with their sexuality, and wish to create a heterosexual reality,153 though there 
is no conclusive research to demonstrate how many transsexuals engage in homosexual 
relationships in their acquired gender. It seems too simplistic and somewhat insulting to claim 
that the two are automatically linked, but this is outside the scope of this research. Jeffreys 
and Raymond have shown that; 
 
Nothing upsets the underpinnings of feminist fundamentalism more than 
the existence of transsexuals. A being with male chromosomes, a female 
appearance, a feminist consciousness, and a lesbian identity explodes all of 
their assumptions about the villainy of men. And someone with female 
chromosomes who lives as a man strikes at the heart of the notion that all 
women are sisters, potential feminists, natural allies against the 
aforementioned villainy.154  
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I find it disappointing that radical feminism has not ‘radically’ suggested that the existence of 
transsexuals, rather than threatening femininity, demonstrates that patriarchal insistence upon 
sex as biological reinforces heteronormativity. I understand Sandland’s argument that this 
narrow stream of radical feminism is caught by its own argument. Transsexualism can be 
seen as the search for an essence- “to know that one is what one is not”.155 In insisting upon 
gender as an essence, Jeffreys argues that a man cannot know through some psychic 
projection, what it means to be a woman. The transsexual feels his or her essence is out of 
step with their body- but Jeffreys reads a MtF transsexuals essence as male.156  
 
Radical feminism protects and reinforces the existing gender binary in discussions of 
transsexuals. One would expect this theory to push through current understandings of gender, 
and promote and support the dismantling of the binary. I would expect something close to 
Derrida’s understanding of transsexuals as a destabilising force which impacts upon the 
gender binary “resisting and disorganising it, without ever constituting a third term.”157 I 
would not go so far as to argue that the GRA has allowed for this, nor would I argue that the 
GRA allows us to categorise gender as self-expression. Those who are diagnosed with gender 
dysphoria, are required to identify themselves as the opposite sex, in order to gain legal 
recognition.158 This is not to be read as an insistence upon transsexual people erasing the 
gender binary, but rather that their very existence should begin to do so.   
 
Radical feminism contends that sex is the primary way we create our identity, and the way in 
which society divides us. Radical feminists do not get too engrossed in a sex/gender 
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distinction, but rather argue that both are socially constructed, resulting in differential 
treatment/experience from birth as a consequence of patriarchy. However radical feminism 
does not believe that all women will blindly become ‘victims’. The very fact that radical 
feminist writers such as Daly, Beauvoir and MacKinnon can emerge, shows that patriarchy is 
perhaps not all consuming.  
 
The penchant for biological determination some feel is found in radical feminism creates an 
undeniable anxiety amongst radical feminists when it comes to discussing the impact of 
transsexual people upon gender and sexuality issues. Yet this reluctance does not extend to 
people who want plastic surgery for their noses, breasts, buttocks etc. The reluctance to 
accept surgically created/altered sexual organs could be seen as reluctance to amend existing 
social hierarchies; 
 
...women should not be passing as men because they would be usurping 
power to which they are not entitled and men should not be passing as 
women because they are thereby surrendering privileges of which they 
should not lightly dispose. Surgical alteration of both primary and 
secondary sex characteristics are viewed as fraught with meaning that does 
not attach to the surgical alteration of other body parts.159 
 
The disposal of a surgical/hormonal requirement and the refusal to incorporate ‘brain sex’ 
into the GRA is perhaps recognition that the extent of surgery undergone is not an adequate 
measure of a persons’ transsexualism. A transsexual person who has not undergone surgery, 
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for whatever reason, will still view themselves as a transsexual person. The feminist mantra 
“the personal is political”160 does not translate here for there are a great many transsexual 
people who do not wish to make gender understandings political. Where now for the 
relationship between feminism and transsexualism? Johnson explains that transsexual studies 
could move away from feminist theory and further into its own arena, but concludes that in 
fact “mutual recognition and collaboration might prove a more theoretically productive and 
politically effective philosophy.”161 
 
Beauvoir’s concept of women as ‘Other’ leads one to ask ‘why have men behaved like this?’ 
What have cases such as Bellinger, and Corbett secured for men? How has the GRA 
benefitted men? The answer seems to be a continuation of heteronormativity. Moi produces a 
theoretical understanding that effectively removes performance and biology from the 
equation when trying to determine whether or not a transsexual person has become their new 
gender; 
 
All that is required is that we deny that biology grounds social norms. It is 
neither politically reactionary nor philosophically inconsistent to believe 
both that a male-to-female transsexual remains a biological male and that 
this is no reason to deny ‘him’ the legal right to be reclassified as a 
woman.162 
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In this way, we would be rid of social gender norms, and would further enhance and realise 
Beauvoir’s emphasis upon men and women’s freedom to define their own sex. She 
emphasises the fact that sex is defined by the Other, so we cannot necessarily define our own 
sex in abstraction.  
 
Robson states, “as a matter of reform, it may be expedient to argue for the recognition of 
transgender marriages, but as a matter of critical change, the argument fails.”163 Rather, one 
needs to analyse how and where we have used sex and gender in society, particularly to 
discriminate. I believe that one can accept difference- that men and women are different- but 
this difference does not need to be a relationship of dominance/subordination. In the context 
of this thesis, I show that consummation is a legal entrenchment of patriarchy, domination 
and subordination. In removing consummation, and hopefully removing marriage, the 
importance of sex and gender will become mute. In fighting for transsexual marriage, we 
entrench the heterosexual, patriarchal, dominant/subordinate nature of marriage, even if the 
gender understandings have changed. The institution itself creates these limiting 
characteristics. In fighting for transsexual marriage, I like Robson, “am worried that only a 
few of the characters will be switched. And that nothing fundamental will be altered.”164 
 
In arguing for the removal of marriage, and by extension gender, anyone who feels their body 
does not fit who they are does not have to construct their argument in a way which labels 
them ‘ill’ or requires them to create a kind of pastiche that they believe represents the gender 
they wish to be. Taking radical feminism to its logical conclusion- that patriarchy determines 
women as other- leaves me open to a plethora of ways to explain transsexual issues. 
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However, transsexual people, especially prior to the GRA, shared the fact of ‘otherness’ in 
that men who wanted to become women were not deemed ‘real’ men by the ‘real’ men, and 
women who wanted to become men would never be ‘real’ men. If we can work backwards 
from a position of highlighting the disservice that gender and sex do in terms of 
consummation and marriage, then we can remove the idea of a ‘real/perfect’ man/woman.  
 
4.7: The impact upon the consummation debate 
Prior to the GRA and M(SSC)A, no amount of surgery would allow a transsexual person to 
claim that they should be allowed to marry as they were of the wrong gender, and held 
incapable of the consummation act. The insistence upon a male/female gender binary has 
meant that transsexual people have had to legally change from one gender to the other. The 
2004 Act has continued to perpetuate a binary system of gender, “by instigating a system to 
formally ‘recognise’ only men and or women.”165 Medicalised understandings of gender 
serve to present it as static- “bodily, psychically and temporally.”166 The insistence upon a 
binary understanding of sexuality and gender is however confused by transsexual sexualities 
and intimacies.  
 
In the case of Corbett, Ormrod J. noted that if for a moment one held that Mrs Corbett was a 
woman, she would still be incapable of ordinary and complete consummation as, “when such 
a cavity has been constructed in a male, the difference between sexual intercourse using it 
and anal or intra-crural intercourse is... to be measured in centimetres.”167 Sharpe argued that 
in juxtaposing her “vagina with the practice of anal intercourse, the judgement brings into 
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view the homosexual body and its assumed practices.”168 This propensity to analogise 
homosexuality and transsexualism is a theme that runs through much case law and 
surrounding literature. Also, this ignores the decision of S.Y v S.Y,169 and Ormrod J. justifies 
this by stating that the comments on this issue in that case should be regarded as obiter. In the 
case of S.Y v S.Y the court found that a constructed vagina- be it wholly or partially 
constructed- would still allow for vera copula.170 The judgement stated that the arguments put 
forward in D-e v A-g were so constructed because the judgement was given at a time where 
one could not contemplate surgical intervention to ‘correct’ any defects. For consummation 
purposes, this case is troubling because there is a large focus upon the sexual ‘satisfaction’ 
that will be achieved, or not, through an artificial vagina. However the case law shows that 
sexual satisfaction is not necessary for consummation. The wife in S.Y v S.Y had a vagina, 
which was not at a depth that would achieve full penetration. The case seems to indicate that 
the vagina should be big enough for a man, and further, the judges make a point to discuss the 
husbands sexual satisfaction but to not discuss the sexual satisfaction of the woman who has 
to undergo the operation.171  
 
Jeffreys describes the importance of female sexual satisfaction as innately intertwined with 
men’s. She explains that,  
 
in the twentieth century operations are carried out on women in the US and 
in Britain to make women’s vaginas fit their husbands’ penises, and to 
move their clitorises nearer their vaginas on the grounds that this would 
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make them more likely to experience pleasure whilst the husband 
experienced his own.172 
 
The excessive discussion within case law about natural and constructed vaginas hides the 
greater issue that even biological women are altering their biology for male satisfaction.173 A 
second worry that emerges from the dicta of Corbett is the court’s view that, 
 
sex is clearly an essential determinant of the relationship called marriage 
because it is and always has been recognised as the union of man and 
woman. It is the institution on which the family is built, and in which the 
capacity for natural hetero-sexual intercourse is an essential element. It has, 
of course, many other characteristics, of which companionship and mutual 
support is an important one, but the characteristics which distinguish it from 
all other relationships can only be met by two persons of opposite sex.174 
 
Though the law has changed in this area culminating in the GRA, it is not convincing to 
argue that marriage should not change because something simply ‘is’.175 It is likewise 
unconvincing to argue that marriage just ‘is’ the relationship upon which the family is built. 
The GRA implies that sexuality and gender are attached “so that sexuality transitions 
alongside gender to denote either same-sex or heterosexual desire and practice.”176 Hines 
argues that this insistence upon a gender binary is ironic, given that the GRA is supposed to 
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be addressing the rights of transsexual people.177 Although the ‘gender’ element has been 
privileged in both medicine and law, its main importance arises within the sexual and legal 
relationships it allows us to create. It is for this reason that such complicated transsexual 
legislation has been enacted; allowing the institution of marriage to remain intact.   
 
Consummations requirement of “ordinary and complete” heterosexual intercourse means 
there must be erection of the penis and penetration of the vagina for a reasonable amount of 
time. Neither the husband nor the wife has to achieve orgasm, and infertility is also irrelevant. 
Fundamentally, there has to be a man and woman who have the respective necessary physical 
attributes. Probert argues that this serves to “rob the requirement of consummation of any 
purpose, whether sex is regarded as either a matter of procreation or of recreation,”178 and a 
transsexual person’s (heterosexual) marriage could be challenged on the basis of non-
consummation. Any petition for nullity founded upon a gender reassignment that pre-dates 
the marriage will fail unless the petitioner can prove to the court that they were ignorant of 
the gender reassignment at the date of their ceremony.179  
 
The consummation requirement could be seen to have a very narrow purview in regards to 
transsexual intimacies. Hines contends that most transsexual people stay with their existing 
partners,180 and so the consummation requirement would only apply in a few instances. This 
would be the case where a man, who transitions into a legally recognised woman is with a 
male partner, or when a woman who is transitioning into a man is with a female partner. 
These couples could then fall prey to a consummation requirement, but no surgical 
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requirement. The GRA fails to update the MCA 1973 to allow for this anomaly, and the GRA 
has not effectively dispelled the importance of biological sex within marriage. As a result, 
although to date there have been no reported cases post-2004 legislation, in which a 
transsexual person has had their marriage nullified due to incapacity to consummate, this is a 
very real legal possibility (provided that the claim was sincere). In reality, if the non-
transsexual partner is aware of the gender history then s/he may be barred from relying on the 
non-consummation ground for nullity proceedings.181 If they were not aware then they could 
exit the relationship on the basis of non-disclosure of gender history.  
 
Medical understandings of consummation have not been addressed in the same way within 
discussions of transsexual people. The medical focus has instead been upon psychological 
factors, and that which is hidden- the sexual organs- are rendered irrelevant. This is an 
instance in which state strategy “operationalises the view that ‘gender’ is the government of 
minds not bodies.”182 Sandland argues that this creates a dichotomy between the public and 
private; 
 
The G.R.A. is concerned with a public politics of the presentational, the 
proper appearance of the gendered body, which trades only in that which is 
on public display, the various visible signs and indicators of gender identity 
that figure the interaction of gendered individuals.183 
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It is not clear how someone lives effectively in the acquired gender. I argue that this exerts 
ubconscious pressure upon transsexual people to undergo, or try to undergo potentially 
unavailable, painful and expensive surgery, or hormone treatment. Sharpe further states that, 
“while on its face the Act does not require applicants to undergo surgery of any kind, it is 
clearly the expectation of the government that surgery will occur,”184 as surgery is deemed 
the logical, medical end of the transsexual journey. This is evident in the requirement to 
change gender for life, as the law is troubled by the prospect of those who may choose to 
transition back.  
 
The GRA was based upon preservation of our heterosexual marriage understandings. 
Whether or not a transsexual person can physically consummate the marriage has been 
deemed of lesser importance than the appearance that the marriage can be consummated,185 
like in the case of S.Y v S.Y186 where the court still took account of the appearance of the 
wife’s external genitalia, in order to be sure that things ‘looked’ as they should. Thorpe LJ 
stated that the analysis provided in Corbett- the basis for the appearance of heterosexuality- 
should be questioned because of new social and medical policy.187 Thorpe LJ stated that we 
should embrace complexity, rather than insist upon superficial understandings, and accept 
that “within any marriage there may be physical factors on either or both sides that require 
acknowledgement and accommodation in the sexual relationship of the parties.”188 The 
requirement for consummation (or the appearance of it) has resulted in the requirement for 
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gender. If the law removed the capability or necessity for consummation, then gender would 
not matter to institutions.189 Thorpe LJ further held that “spectral difficulties are manageable 
and acceptable if the right is confined by a construction of section 11(c) to cases of fully 
achieved post-operative transsexuals...”190 concluding that an invisible factor (chromosomes) 
should not be the deciding factor for gender, and rather reference should be given to the 
gender of the person at the date of the marriage. The union of marriage is used to seek to 
“embody... an essentialist conjunction of genitals which then functions as the determinant of 
whether or not a marriage is to be possible between two individuals.”191 The omission of a 
surgical and hormonal requirement in the GRA serves to undermine this existing 
understanding of heterosexual marriage.  
 
Rather than focusing upon consummation as a factor for nullifying a marriage, the focus has 
shifted when it comes to transsexual issues. A person may seek to annul the marriage on the 
basis of not knowing that their partner was previously of another gender.192 It is not about the 
physical capability of the partners, but rather the honesty of one partner disclosing their past. 
Honoré states that this need for honesty does not extend to straight couples where “neither 
husband nor wife is bound to come to marriage a virgin and neither is bound to disclose to the 
other before or after marriage his or her sexual experience, if any, before marriage.”193  If 
transsexual people undergo transition as a way to enable expression of their true gender 
identity, then why should they have to disclose their prior, false identity? There is an 
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assumption that the transsexual person is a fraudster; a sexual deviant that is trying to trick 
potential future partners into homosexual relations. For Sharpe, the availability of annulment 
on this basis has a clear implication; that an undisclosed gender history is a deep breach of 
trust, possibly resulting in an unknown homosexual encounter, and the risk of this is worthy 
of ‘institutionalised outing.’194 Sharpe summarises: 
 
Through the issue of non-disclosure of gender history, we glimpse that an 
ostensible commitment of the law to present surgical and/or psychological 
realities is rendered inauthentic. For in this context, legal concern over non-
disclosure serves only to reinscribe the ‘truth’ of the past and the past as 
‘truth’.195  
 
It is this ‘truth’ that radical feminists have also seized upon, not as a way to entrench 
discrimination, but to try and protect women from a further set back. Much has been said of 
feminism’s understanding and acceptance of transsexual people. But if we recognise that law 
is mostly reflective of male views, the focus needs to lie upon how men conceive of these 
transsexual bodies. The amount of male socio-legal research in this area does not begin to 
compare to the amount of research in other gender sexuality areas such as domestic violence 
or rape. Could one conclude that men who wish to become women are not seen as true men? 
And that as such they should be confined to the weaker, emotional, irrational sex? If this is 
the case, what then of the woman who wishes to gender transition to become a man? Little 
evidence exists (even within feminist writings) as to how this person will be received by 
other men.  
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Marriages entered into after the receipt of a full gender certificate are to be given the ‘respect’ 
marriage deserves, as they conform to heteronormative ideals to have a man and a woman. 
Sharpe argues that the need for consummation precipitates any discussion of heterosexual 
intercourse, yet non-consummation makes a marriage ‘voidable’ not ‘void’. It is only when 
the parties elect to part that the consummation element becomes important: “thus if, for 
example, a (male-to-female) transgender woman were to be considered female in law, the 
rules of consummation would not affect her ability to enter and remain in a lawful 
marriage.”196 In this way, Sharpe argues that consummation alone is not enough to locate the 
MtF transsexual woman outside marriage. As discussed, it is the honesty (or not) of the 
transsexual partner which is under scrutiny. It could be argued that whilst on face value a 
transsexual person is not always capable of consummation, if their partner is aware, and leads 
them to think it will not be used against them, a decree of nullity will not be made. However, 
this puts unfair duress on a transsexual person to reveal their ‘true’ identity based on 
biological understandings of sex.197  
 
4.8: Conclusions 
The GRA recognises and medically pathologies’ the existence of transsexual people. It has 
created consistency in a state which allowed for the treatment of gender dysphoria through 
the health service, but no legal recognition for the final result. The involvement of the 
medical profession serves to render gender transition as a medical solution, offering 
transsexual people an “end to their exile from their true home in the heterosexual binary 
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paradigm.”198 In not requiring surgery, the GRA has reinforced the public/private divide; 
requiring the person to publicly appear to be of the acquired gender, but does not concern 
itself with whether the person can sexually function as such. It seems that transsexual reform 
jurisprudence, whilst purporting to provide legal relief to transsexual people, has in fact been 
“animated by the twin desires of reproducing the gender order and insulating marriage from 
the stain of homosexuality.”199 It would have been more practical to remove s11(c) MCA 
1973 rather than go through the lengthy process of enacting legislation specifically for 
transsexual people. 
 
It has been shown that transsexual people do not sit comfortably within radical feminist 
understandings of sex and gender. As regards consummation, whilst the GRA’s silence on the 
issue could be taken to demonstrate a ‘moving beyond’ from the consummation requirement, 
it in fact reinforces the requirement by failing to remove it. If the transsexual partner has not 
undergone surgical reassignment, and hidden their past from their spouse, their marriage 
remains liable to falling foul to non-consummation legislation, again reinforcing the 
consummation requirement within heterosexual marriage.   
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FIVE  
 
THE IMPACT OF CIVIL PARTNERSHIP AND SAME SEX  
MARRIAGE UPON CONSUMMATION 
 
This chapter explores the complex relationship schemes legally created to address same-sex 
couples, and how these developments effect consummation. These legislative developments 
are the CPA (the first legally recognised relationship status for same-sex couples, intended to 
work in tandem with the GRA1), and the recently enacted M(SSC)A.   
 
In 2005 Peter Tatchell commented that the enactment of the CPA marked “the first time in 
modern British legal history, [in which]...instead of repealing discrimination parliament has 
reinforced and extended it.”2 This chapter analyses arguments which claim that civil 
partnership was gay marriage in all but name, to assess the role of consummation in this 
‘marriage-like’ institution. I address the omission of a consummation requirement from the 
CPA, and focus on the impact of feminist theory in this area, and the insistence upon 
heterosexuality, conjugality and concepts of ‘romantic’ love within relationship law in the 
U.K. Finally, I examine the omission of consummation in the M(SSC)A and other legal and 
political developments challenging civil partnership and marriage. The M(SSC)A is a very 
recent development, and as such, the Chapter focuses predominantly on the established 
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institution of civil partnership. My conclusions on the M(SSC)A are only initial remarks, 
based on Hansard debates, but without the benefit of any case law about the Act.    
 
The CPA did not include a consummation requirement. It will be shown that the government 
felt that “adultery and consummation are defined by heterosexual intercourse; lesbians and 
gay men do not have heterosexual intercourse, therefore Civil Partners cannot commit 
adultery or consummate their relationships.”3 These conversations also took place around the 
enactment of the M(SSC)A, and consummation and adultery were again omitted. The 
previous chapter demonstrated the inconsistency in demanding consummation within 
marriage whilst allowing people to legally (though not necessarily physically) change their 
gender and enter a marriage union physically incapable of consummation. On face value this 
could be seen as a challenge to the consummation requirement by suggesting consummation 
may no longer be necessary, yet heterosexual marriages are still voidable if they have not 
been consummated. The omission of consummation from civil partnership and same-sex 
marriage can only be seen as a superficial challenge to consummation and the preferential 
treatment of conjugal relationships. The omission of consummation serves to further 
emphasise the primacy of the conjugal marital union as the relationship to aspire to, rather 
than demonstrate a time in which we have moved ‘beyond consummation’.  
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5.1: ‘Welcome to segregation, UK-style’4: Development of civil partnerships in English law 
Gay men and lesbians have historically suffered from second class status in British law. 
There was legislative silence in issues of same-sex relationships, and criminalisation of 
(male) homosexual acts. The Courts took the lead,5 until the enactment of the CPA, which 
provided the first legally recognised relationship between people of the same sex. The 
relationship is formed through the signing of a civil partnership document in the presence of 
witnesses and a registrar. The ceremony for the signing should have no religious elements, 
and should not be undertaken in a religious building,6 signifying the political power that some 
religious institutions still have. Conway stated that at the time, “objections from religious 
groupings influenced the political decision to prevent same sex couples from having a 
marriage. However, wide amending of legislation... ensured that the effect of a civil 
partnership is to endow on the participants the same legal status as spouses.”7 This new 
relationship form was not extended to include people of the opposite sex, as it was felt that 
marriage already fulfilled their relationship requirements.  
 
There are several differences between civil partnership, and heterosexual marriage (the 
institution it was supposedly mirroring), but for the purposes of this thesis, the key difference 
between the two relationship forms is that sexual activity is not a factor in civil partnerships. 
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Consummation is not required to seal the union,8 and further, adultery is not a basis upon 
which the relationship can be legally ended.9 The Act therefore served to de-sexualise 
homosexual relationships.10 Monogamy is required and a person entering a civil partnership 
cannot already be married or in a civil partnership.11 The CPA’s omission of adultery as a 
cause for dissolution deems homosexual adultery acceptable (or invisible), but heterosexual 
adultery serious enough to constitute the basis for a divorce. This omission demonstrated “the 
most significant way in which lesbian and gay relationships remain(ed) unassimilated to an 
unchallenged norm of heterosexual marriage.”12 The government argued that adultery was 
omitted due to its specific meaning within heterosexual relationships, and that “it would not 
be possible nor desirable to read this across to same-sex civil partnerships,”13 though no 
reason was given for its lack of desirability. Instead, sexual promiscuity could be dealt with 
as ‘unreasonable behaviour’.  
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At its point of inception, the CPA was supposed to assimilate same-sex couples into a 
heterosexual norm, emulating marriage, and aiming to prevent any further need to discuss 
extending marriage to same-sex couples.14 Gay rights campaigners and others fought to 
ensure the same or similar rights as those found in heterosexual relationships. In order to 
achieve this, arguments of ‘sameness’ were used to demonstrate the similarities between 
same-sex and opposite-sex couples, in an attempt to emphasise the ‘functional equivalence’ 
of both types of couple.15 Yet how can one argue sameness when the “contorted conceptual 
objective of Civil Partnership appears to have been how to ‘make it look like marriage’ 
without it being named marriage and preserving the distinct institution of marriage for 
heterosexuals[?]”16 Auchmuty argues that in fact the difference in name meant that the Act 
could go as far as it did in providing rights, and one must acknowledge that this was the first 
time that the views of those who favoured legal recognition of same-sex relationships were 
accepted.17 Despite arguments of sameness, it took a further 9 years for marriage to be 
extended to same sex couples.18  
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In the government consultation report for civil partnership, the Government acknowledged 
that there were three concerns expressed regarding the introduction of civil partnership: 
concern that a secondary institution would be inferior, and instead marriage should be open to 
all; concern that gay marriage should not exist, and that a separate institution was appropriate, 
and finally concern that civil partnerships were too similar to marriage, and effectively 
created gay marriage.19 Graham explains that at the time, ‘gay marriage’ was seen to have 
“symbolic clout precisely because it acknowledge[d] that queer sex is not incompatible with 
an institution charged with the task of national reproduction. Indeed, the nation itself might 
start to look a little queer. Therein lies the rub.”20 This is why the two institutions remained 
‘symbolically’ different. The government’s response to concern was to state that they had “no 
plans to allow same-sex couples to marry. The proposals are for an entirely new legal status 
of civil partnership. Same-sex partnership registration schemes already operate alongside 
opposite-sex marriage in some other countries.”21 Yet in the lesbian and gay consciousness 
civil partnership and gay marriage had, to some extent, become one and the same. In 
interviews conducted with same-sex couples who had already, or intended to register their 
partnerships, Shipman and Smart found that their interviewees “slipped easily into the 
terminology of ‘marriage’ which in turn makes the Government’s insistence on maintaining 
the difference between CP and marriage seem pedantic and unworkable.”22 
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Commentators unconvinced of the legislative value of civil partnerships have argued that 
lesbians and gay men now “run the risk of losing the distinctive identities that lesbians and 
gays have been able to evolve out of pejorative discourses and exclusionary treatment, such 
as affirmative cultures, egalitarian practices and supportive community structures.”23 
Conservatives who argued that homosexuals should not be allowed into the marriage 
institution based their claims on a number of factors. Religious groups that were called on to 
give feedback on civil partnerships emphasised their scriptures dislike of homosexuality, 
whilst others felt gay marriage would violate their freedom of religion, as they would have to 
tolerate a situation their religion deems immoral.24 Further, notions of homosexuals as 
promiscuous and ‘unfit’ for marriage are deep-rooted in some areas of society.25 If civil 
partnerships are just marriage by another name, they serve only to absorb lesbian and gay 
relationships into a heterosexual norm. 
 
Conservatives realised that diminished numbers of people marrying could signify that the 
institution is in trouble. There was therefore an argument for “extending the right to marry to 
gays and lesbians. History shows that when ideologically significant institutions find 
themselves under threat, the solution that often presents itself is to strengthen them by 
opening their ranks to new blood.”26 The Lord Bishop of Oxford also acknowledged that the 
similarities to marriage had been troubling to some in the Church, but that marriage is under a 
great strain. He continued, 
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the Church has failed to communicate its sublime vision of faithful loving 
human relationships as reflecting the divine love; or our conviction that that 
is what leads to human flourishing both for society and individuals. If the 
prime responsibility of the Church today is to communicate something of 
that vision, the possibility of fully committed, faithful same-sex 
relationships, or covenanted partnerships, will, I believe, strengthen rather 
than undermine what is at the heart of the Christian faith as it is reflected in 
the marriage covenant.27 
This extension could be seen to bring monogamy and traditional values to an element of 
society which has not historically been attributed with these values.28   
 
Beresford and Falkus have argued that marriage should be abolished, and all relationships 
should be governed by the CPA. They argue that marriage is deeply flawed and civil 
partnerships are a better form of regulation.29 Yet this ignores the fact that civil partnerships 
are based upon the marriage model. Through the extension of civil partnerships to encompass 
opposite-sex couples, the authors feel the flaws of marriage would be overcome. In so doing, 
marriage would become a symbolic, religious institution only. I argue that the problems of 
marriage were entrenched in civil partnerships as the two institutions are too similar, and the 
M(SSC)A serves only to bring gay couples further into a heterosexual mould. If civil 
partnerships are marriage in all but name, then we do not overcome the basic problems found 
in the family and “the oppression of gay people starts in the most basic unit of society, 
                                                          
27
 Lord Bishop of Oxford, HL Deb 22 April 2004 vol 660 cc 399  
28
 Glennon, L. ‘Strategizing for the Future through the Civil Partnership Act’ (2006) 33 Journal of Law and 
Society 2 pgs 244-276 pg 253 
29
 Beresford & Falkus op cit n3 
260 
 
consisting of the man in charge, a slave as his wife, and their children on whom they force 
themselves as the ideal models. The very form of the family works against homosexuality.”30 
Beresford and Falkus argue that civil partnership has its own flaws, and an amalgamation of 
the two institutions into civil partnership would perhaps not address heterosexism. What 
remains disappointing to me is the decision to advance this argument rather than one in which 
marriage and marriage-like relationships are abolished completely. However, there are of 
course those who wish to make a public statement about their relationship. Before same sex 
marriage, Card stated: “if marriage is a deeply flawed institution, even though it is a special 
injustice to exclude lesbians and gay men arbitrarily from participating in it, it would not 
necessarily advance the cause of justice on the whole to remove the special injustice of 
discrimination.”31 
 
Civil partnerships could more broadly be seen to challenge definitions of the family, which 
for some is easily defined as “a heterosexual conjugal unit based on marriage and co-
residence,”32 though of course other definitions exist. Weeks, Heaphy and Donovan found in 
their research that most in the gay community have families of choice- which often include 
friends.33 These relationships are generally non-sexual, non-binary, and have not been 
recognised by the CPA, which surely should have acknowledged the reality of same-sex 
relationships on the ground. This is a result of the desire to mirror marriage’s structure of two 
parties. In the case of civil partnerships, partnerships which are impliedly sexual have been 
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protected by the law. This implied sexual element is also evident when one sees that civil 
partnerships can only have two parties to the agreement- a structure reflective of the marriage 
model.34 Although the CPA does not explicitly require sex in the way that marriage does, 
Lord Goodhart explains the purpose of the Act “is to give same-sex couples- who will 
normally, although, as in the case of marriage, not invariably, be people who are having or 
have had a long-term sexual relationship- the right to legal and public recognition of their 
status.”35 The continued emphasis on a ‘couple-based’ relationship has “helped to maintain 
responsibility for financial support and caretaking within the private family.”36 The Act has 
served to increase the scope of state intervention and regulation of relationships, and has now 
been able to encompass a previously untamed section of society within its aim of privatising 
care.37 Not only is the married-nuclear family expected to look after its members, there is 
now a greater expectation on those in civil partnerships to do the same. Though it could be 
argued that people choose to live in twos to manage the complexities of relationships, radical 
feminists argue that there is “no particular reason why people should live in twos, except in 
so far as this arrangement has served patriarchy by ensuring that each woman is kept under 
the personal control of a man.”38  
 
Feminist theorists have highlighted the different legal rights that come with being part of the 
public and private sphere. Marriage and civil partnerships are thought of as private 
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relationships, yet are partially state regulated.  If one wished to claim that civil partnership 
was a way in which to dramatically change family forms, it failed on the basis of its implied 
sexual element, through its insistence and protection of duality in relationships and on its 
insistence upon the union being between two people who are within the allowed degrees of 
relations. It further fails on the basis that it maintains the public/private relationship of family 
regulation.  
 
The CPA was not the first attempt in the UK to legislate for relationships outside of marriage. 
The registration scheme offered by Lord Lester in 2002 was intended to apply to same-sex 
and opposite-sex couples, but concern that the bill would undermine marriage led to it being 
withdrawn.39 Lord Lester withdrew his bill on the promise that the government was looking 
into enacting legislation. Instead, the final Act that emerged shifted the focus to address those 
who were unable to enter marriage unions. Prior to Lord Lester’s bill was Jane Griffiths’ 
Relationships (Civil Registration) Bill of 2001-2, which was also never enacted. The 
governments final version of civil partnership was considerably ‘less radical’ than these 
earlier proposals.40 
 
Soon after the ratification of the Act, it faced its first legal challenge from a lesbian couple.41 
Wilkinson and Kitzinger had married legally in Canada. Upon relocating to the UK, they 
went to Court to argue that their marriage should be recognised, or in the alternative, they 
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should be given leave to marry in the UK. Failing this, they sought a declaration of 
incompatibility, stating that s11(c) of the MCA 1973 was incompatible with the Human 
Rights Act 1998. The couple argued the classification of their relationship as a civil 
partnership served to ‘downgrade’ their relationship status. The court declared that same-sex 
couples could not marry under English law, but were able to enter into civil partnerships, and 
no breach of human rights existed, for the protected marriage was of the traditional sense- 
between a man and a woman. The creation of civil partnership was deemed an effective and 
appropriate format to provide legal rights, without threatening the existing understandings of 
marriage. Disappointingly, Wilkinson and Kitzinger did not highlight the disparities between 
marriage and civil partnerships, the two most obvious of which, Auchmuty argues, are 
‘religious sanction’ and the ‘requirement’ of monogamy. Auchmuty argues that the claimants 
avoidance of these two points meant that they “wanted a ‘marriage’ shorn of the two 
attributes that distinguish it from a civil partnership in English law. In other words, they 
wanted something that looked like a civil partnership... but was called a marriage.”42  
 
Beresford and Falkus state that the Wilkinson case “could have provided a much needed 
opportunity to reappraise some of the heterosexist assumptions pertaining to marriage, such 
as adultery and consummation.”43 Instead, Sir Mark Potter P returned directly to the Hyde44 
definition of marriage. Probert suggests that invocation of this case was not necessary to 
reach a decision as the provisions of the CPA were clear. Rather, Hyde “was used to bolster 
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the argument that marriage was intrinsically a heterosexual institution.”45 Auchmuty argues 
that the very essence of the case served to reinforce the conservative idea that marriage had 
primacy over all other relationship forms.46 
 
Although Stonewall was involved in the creation of the CPA, Barker, Shipman, and Smart 
have all stated that they feel the public debate surrounding the construction of the Act was 
removed from the everyday experiences and concerns of lesbians and gay men.47 Shipman 
and Smart summarise the Stonewall campaign as one in which civil partnership was 
emphasised as “preferable to marriage because it should be seen as a twenty-first century 
means of recognising modern relationships and that this was preferable to attempting to 
radicalise the traditional notion of marriage. They developed a basic ‘equal’ but ‘different’ 
position in which CP was positioned as separate from marriage but equal to it, and with a 
more modern flavour.”48 Stonewall focused on emphasising the ‘straight’ nature of these 
relationships, to encourage the passing of the bill, and to avoid too much criticism from the 
religious right.49 If groups such as Outrage! had been consulted, it would have been apparent 
that many in same-sex relationships were anxious about ‘falling into line’ with a heterosexual 
institution.50 These anxieties re-emerged during discussions for the enactment of the 
M(SSC)A. No-one disputed that same-sex couples deserved legal rights. The form those 
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rights should take was disputed. To be ‘co-opted’ into a heterosexual institution is deeply 
concerning.  
 
Queer theory has been used to dissect the binaries of hetero and homosexual.51 Stychin 
suggests that there are six binaries that could be read into the CPA: marriage/not marriage; 
sex/no sex; status/contract; conjugality/care; love/money; responsibilities/rights,52 and that 
the CPA uncomfortably straddles both sides of these dichotomies. I dispute the assertion that 
civil partnership can be both marriage, and not marriage, and the enactment of same sex 
marriage shows that it is not the same. Whilst I risk opening myself up to the oft cited 
criticism of essentialism levied at radical feminists, it seems apparent to me that something is 
either a marriage or it is not. Stychin’s argument of ‘marriage in all but name’ does not 
convince me that this is enough to state that a civil partnership is not a marriage. It is 
‘inferior’ marriage. The Hansard debates show that the institution was modelled completely 
upon marriage. Baroness O’Cathain said “let there be no mistake- this is a gay marriage Bill 
in all but name.”53 The only significant difference is the sexual element, which had been 
reserved for heterosexuals, but which is implied through the insistence upon relationships 
being between two people who are not allowed to be blood relations etc. Civil partnerships 
emulate a ‘stable couple form’ and so further the aims of marriage, and society. Effectively, 
civil partnership allowed those unable to marry to “further the same social policy goals.”54  
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In respect of the sex/no sex binary, Stychin argued that the discussions surrounding the Act 
made clear that “civil partnerships are sexual relationships, and that they will be entered into 
by people who define themselves as lesbian or gay.”55 Yet the Act does not explicitly speak 
of sexual actions. Stychin argues that the partnership must contain sex, rather than render it 
invisible; “surprisingly, then, we find that implicitly lesbian and gay sex (provided it is 
contained and disciplined within this relationship form) is one of the prime justifications for 
the privileging of the relationship. Sex has its privileges.”56 In this sexualised context, 
Stychin then turns his attention to consummation, to argue that consummation and gay people 
are the apt context in which to evoke queer theory; 
...the non-consummation problem concerns the indefinability of gays as a 
category, and this is a point that connects very closely to the concerns of 
queer theory, which is aimed at fostering category crises as a way to de-
naturalize the hetero/homo binary.57  
 
Radical feminism strongly disagrees with this perspective and I argue it is not a matter of 
being unable to identify gays, but rather that there is discomfort and unwillingness to enter 
into a protracted technical legal debate about the actions that would constitute sexual 
intercourse for gays, as again evidenced in the consultation process for the M(SSC)A.58 
Stychin argues that sexuality is a matter of discourse, asking “when is the elderly spinster 
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couple also a couple of lesbians?”59 As such, as much as there is no explicit sex, there has to 
be sex to distinguish these relationships.60 Lord Tebbit found this incomprehensible. In 
arguing for siblings to be allowed to enter into civil partnerships, he stated; “we know why 
there is a consanguinity rule for heterosexual marriage. It is for the protection of potential 
offspring. That is the basis of it. In a marriage between persons of the same sex, there will 
clearly be no offspring, so why is that rule included? All it does is to prohibit siblings 
entering a civil partnership.”61 The unmarried sister example is also utilised to demonstrate 
the status/contract binary. It is argued that if civil partnership does not convey the status of 
marriage, can it be considered anything more than a domestic contract of sorts?62 I would 
argue that civil partnership does convey status- the status of ‘marriage-like’. It does not allow 
for the partners to create their own contracted relationships. It implicitly requires sex, without 
defining homosexual sex acts.  
 
I do accept Stychin’s binary of conjugality/care. This binary addresses the CPA’s need to 
insist upon conjugality, whilst effectively pushing care and economic dependence further into 
the private sphere. The discourse surrounding the Act emphasised this caring role, in trying to 
demonstrate gay relationships similarities to marriage, and to do this effectively, the language 
of ‘love’ was used to demonstrate the financial convenience that occurs: “money must follow 
from love (status) rather than from tax planning (contract), in large measure because of the 
desire to control the potential cost to the state of this legislation.”63  
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5.2: Role/absence of consummation within the CPA 
A conceptual gap between partnership and marriage is... suggested by 
partnership law not acknowledging that relationships can be sealed by 
bodily consummation.64 
 
Within the civil partnership provisions, a sexual element is perhaps inferred through duality 
and the degrees of relationship allowed, but not explicitly required. It is not a factor in any 
suit for nullity. Humphreys states that “there can be no ambiguity”65 that the legislature 
intended civil partnerships to be sexual. Could the ‘functional equivalence’ of homosexual 
and heterosexual relationships as loving, nurturing and ‘caring’, imply that same-sex couples 
view their relationships as necessarily conjugal for civil partnership? As an institution based 
on marriage, perhaps participants feel that sex is necessary just as it is in marriage.  
 
I argue that consummation was not omitted as a result of thorough investigation of case law 
and feminist critique, resulting in an understanding of the heteronormative role of 
consummation, and the damage that it does to women in particular. Neither was it a 
realisation that not all families involve a sexual couple. Parliament failed to define gay sexual 
acts because they were unable to do so in a positive way.66 In the House of Lords Lord St 
John of Fawsley argued that he was happy that the term ‘relationship’ was not defined within 
the proposed legislation; 
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if a relationship were to be defined... one would be in very deep waters 
indeed. There is no reference to homosexuality in the definition in the bill, 
and a very good thing too. People have a rather limited idea of any 
relationship where sex is involved. After all, there are relationships that can 
be loving, committed and celibate. If one attempts to define the nature of 
“relationship” by words of one kind or another, one will merely create a 
harvest of difficulties for the future.67 
 
Civil partnership’s omission of any sexual element indicates that it was felt that these sexual 
acts were not ‘real’ sexual acts, indefinable, and incapable of producing ‘ordinary and 
complete’ intercourse. Rubin contends that western society in the past generally considered 
“sex to be a dangerous, destructive, negative force... It may be redeemed if performed within 
marriage for procreative purposes and if the pleasurable aspects are not enjoyed too much.”68 
Same-sex acts are not procreative and therefore could be left undefined, yet required. It is 
precisely because sex is viewed in the way outlined by Rubin that the consummation act is so 
prescriptive. It is also because of this view of sex, that civil partnership was created 
separately from marriage, as there was “distaste for sharing the institution with couples who 
challenge gendered domestic arrangements and do unimaginable things in bed.”69 Whilst 
heterosexual acts have long been defined, by the law and church for example, what is 
required of same-sex couples remains ambiguous.  
 
                                                          
67
 Lord St John of Fawsley, HL Deb 24 June 2004 vol 662 cc 1356  
68
 Rubin, G., ‘Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality’ in Vance, C.S (ed) 
Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984 pgs 267-319 pg 278  
69
 Auchmuty op cit n16 pg 117: Graham op cit n20 pg 25  
270 
 
Barker called the omission of defined sexual ability a “negative gap... a place where lesbian 
and gay sexuality is left unspoken. Members of Parliament avoided having to discuss, 
identify, and legally define, lesbian and gay sexual acts (within a positive, non-criminal 
context).”70 The Government justified omission of a consummation requirement with 
reference to consummation having a specific heterosexual meaning. They held that the 
“absence of any sexual activity within a relationship might be evidence of unreasonable 
behaviour leading to the irretrievable breakdown of a civil partnership, if brought about by 
the conduct of one of the parties. However, that would be a matter for individual dissolution 
proceedings.”71 Failure to consummate due to wilful refusal would perhaps have been easier 
to establish within civil partnerships than incapacity to consummate, but the legislature did 
not make any attempt to assimilate these criteria into the CPA.  
 
I believe the emergence of the CPA was not a positive acceptance of homosexual couples, but 
rather a bowing down to European pressure to acknowledge relationship discrimination based 
upon sexual orientation.72 It was this pressure to conform to the growing trend of same-sex 
relationship legislation that led to the emergence of the CPA, rather than Parliamentary 
enthusiasm to recognise family structures or relationships that are not based upon 
heterosexual conjugality. Shipman and Smart assert that it is likely the Government were 
observing other countries developments, and “would have seen that the introduction of gay 
marriage into other similar liberal democratic societies had not led to the immediate loss of 
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power for the party in government, nor to huge civil unrest and discontent.”73 Were the aim to 
be recognition of non-traditional family structures, one would hope we would have seen an 
extension of the legislation to encompass family structures that for example involve more 
than two people or involve people who are related, for the creation of civil partnership left 
some family forms in the cold.74 
 
Rather than argue that the lack of a consummation requirement in the CPA means that we 
have moved beyond sexualised understandings of relationships, I would instead agree with 
Barker’s contention that the omission of an explicit requirement reconfirmed that “the only 
‘legitimate’ sexual relationship is a heterosexual one... therefore same-sex civil partnerships 
do not need to be [visibly] sexual; conjugality being reserved for the pinnacle institution in 
the hierarchy of relationships: marriage.”75 Any extension of familial rights is premised upon 
accepting the rights and obligations of marriage, rather than legal expansion recognising the 
peculiarities of the alternative relationship forms. Graham argues that same-sex relationship 
recognition has only been achieved through talk of “loving relationships, caring respect for 
gays and lesbians, economic benefits, and rights of various kinds,”76 rather than an 
acknowledgement of any peculiarities of these relationships. ‘Loving’ relationships are 
deemed a less controversial topic than homosexual sex acts. Supporters of the CPA such as 
Lord Alli and Lord Lester often couched their arguments in language of ‘loving’ 
relationships. Lord Higgins voiced the concern felt by many, including myself regarding the 
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discrepancy between the implicit sexual requirement, but the lack of an explicit demand for 
it; 
The trouble is that the Bill implies, to some extent, that these civil partners 
will have a sexual relationship. However, other speeches have suggested the 
opposite; namely, that the Bill does not do so... It is not all clear why a 
same-sex couple in a sexual relationship entering into a civil partnership 
should enjoy the tax and other benefits which a same-sex couple entering 
into a civil partnership which does not have a sexual relationship would not 
have.77 
 
The Act only requires the participants to be of the same sex. There is no explicit sexual 
requirement, or a requirement for the partners to love each other. There are married couples 
who also could be best described as friends, and who do not have a sexual relationship. Yet 
no reasonable excuse is given as to why there is still a sexual element required of opposite-
sex couples, when many of them will not fulfil it.   
 
Law’s continued insistence “on interpreting concepts such as adultery and consummation 
according to heterosexual parameters,”78 suggests that these concepts have clear, and factual 
meanings. Beresford and Falkus argue that terms such as ‘consummation’ can be interpreted 
in flexible ways, and the fact that they are interpreted in such a stringent way is “therefore 
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due to choice, not inevitability.”79 The legislature’s refusal to be flexible demonstrates its 
insistence upon, and preference for heterosexuality.  
 
In Canada, the case of P. (S.E) v P. (D.D)80 held that the definition of adultery did not need to 
automatically mean penile penetration; in fact it was held that the law does not need to define 
sexual activity. Rather, the court held that the key to adultery was the betrayal of trust. If this 
definition of adultery were to be extended to civil partnership, and marriage, we could 
dramatically reduce the impact of sex in these relationships. Again, true equality would only 
exist through the abolition of both marriage and civil partnership, rather than an antiquated 
understanding of what goes on in the bedroom. Both relationship forms serve only to bolster 
heterosexual coupledom, and patriarchal domination of women. To even begin to 
contemplate a consummation requirement for civil partnership would serve only to further 
entrench civil partnership as an alternative form of marriage.  
 
Civil partnership created somewhat of an anomaly wherein heterosexual couples were 
discriminated against; since “heterosexual couples are excluded from civil partnerships, a 
married couple could claim discrimination on the basis that their marriage would be voidable 
by non-consummation whereas a civil partnership is not.”81 If we demanded a consummation 
requirement in civil partnership, we would be playing into the notion of heterosexuality as 
respectability and legitimacy. The inclusion of an inherently heterosexual requirement into a 
homosexual institution could be seen as creating ‘good’ and ‘bad’ queers, who are either 
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respectable, or not.82 By creating a ‘silent’ sexual element, “fear and hatred of queer 
sexuality remains unaddressed. In fact, this absence leaves the cultural basis for homophobia 
largely intact.”83 Homophobia is not the result of gay marriage, or a lack of gay marriage. 
Yet if one were to discuss the reality of homosexual sexual acts, in conjunction with legal 
recognition in a non-heterosexual model, perhaps progress could be made. Unbelievably, 
Lord Lester argued that it was inappropriate on privacy grounds to inquire whether a couple 
is sexually active or intends to be.84 He states that before his marriage, no one asked if he 
intended to be sexual, and this sexual silence should be extended to civil partnership. 
However, married couples can exit their relationship on the basis of a lacking sexual 
element- non-consummation- and civil partners, who are supposed to be receiving a 
relationship standard comparable to marriage, do not have this specific ground as an exit 
clause. 
 
5.3: Development of same sex marriage in the UK, and the role of consummation 
Following the enactment of the CPA, two developments emerged. Under the ‘Equal Love’ 
campaign, Peter Tatchell and others launched a bid to have marriage opened up to same-sex 
couples, and civil partnership opened up to opposite-sex couples.85 This was the first 
challenge to the ban on heterosexual couples entering civil partnerships.86 The campaign 
challenged the separation of two “legal institutions, with different names but identical rights 
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and responsibilities,”87 by enlisting eight couples, (four same-sex and four opposite-sex) to 
apply for access to the institution from which they are excluded.88 Upon receipt of their 
rejections, the case was to be taken directly to the European Court of Human Rights on the 
basis of violations of Article 14 which protect against discrimination, the right to marry 
(Article 12) and the right to respect for family life (Article 8), the argument being that if both 
institutions must exist, then access to them should be equal, as the institutions are the same.89 
Had consummation and adultery just been removed from marriage, then the CPA would not 
have been necessary.90 In the House of Commons, Sir Roger Gale suggested that same-sex 
marriage was not the way forward, and actually the best solution would be to withdraw same-
sex marriage, abolish the CPA “abolish civil marriage and create a civil union Bill that 
applies to all people, irrespective of their sexuality or relationship... That would be a way 
forward.”91  
 
Auchmuty states that “the addition of heterosexual couples who positively choose... [civil 
partnership] could elevate its status to one of equality by removing the sense of being a 
consolation prize for the different or non-heterosexual”92 though as O’Donovan argues, one 
should not view desire for inclusion as confirmation of an institution.93 The CPA has to date 
not been expanded to allow heterosexual couples.  
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The more recent development comes from the current coalition governments enactment of the 
M(SSC)A, finally confirming that marriage and civil partnership were not equal 
relationships.94 It was argued in the House of Commons that these legal partnerships were not 
perceived in the same way as marriage and nor did they contain the same “promises of 
responsibility and commitment as marriage. All couples who enter a lifelong commitment 
together should be able to call it marriage.”95 During consultation for the new law, the 
government acknowledged that consummation and adultery had been hitherto heterosexually 
defined. They proposed that non-consummation and adultery would need to be extended to 
same-sex couples, and these concepts would need to be defined by case law, as they had been 
for heterosexual couples.96 They offered no guidance for how these definitions would 
develop. However, between consultation and enactment, consummation and adultery were 
removed from the final legislation.97  
 
During Parliamentary discussions for same-sex marriage many of the same arguments 
engaged for civil partnership were utilised, most of which focused upon equality, and the 
similarities between same-sex and opposite-sex couples. Hansard references many MPs who 
highlighted the need to equally recognise love in this form. MPs made statements which were 
supposed to reassure opponents that marriage would not be distorted beyond all recognition, 
and that this would be a small change, the same as all changes before it.98 As regards 
consummation, when asked about its omission (as well as that of adultery) the Minister for 
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Women and Equalities responded that “there is already no legal requirement for 
consummation. Our provisions will mean that adultery stays as it is and that couples will have 
the opportunity to cite unreasonable behaviour, as do many already.”99 As argued throughout 
this thesis, the mere existence of a consummation clause creates a consummation 
requirement. In removing consummation and adultery, same-sex marriage appears to suggest 
no need for monogamy, and the impression that “gay couples are not as well considered.”100 
A same-sex marriage can only cite adultery as a reason for separation when the adulterous 
relationship is with a person of the opposite sex.101 Same-sex adultery is deemed invisible. 
Parliamentary discussion seemed to imply that this is not of importance, and the use of 
‘unreasonable behaviour’ would suffice for both adultery and non-consummation.102 But 
radical feminism highlights the importance of discussing social phenomena, through 
methodology such as consciousness-raising.  
 
Whilst I argue against the consummation requirement, its inclusion in the new legislation 
would have provided an interesting legal development for equality. However, this would have 
still amounted to state defined and state required sexual activity. Further impact would 
include for example, a revisiting of rape definitions. Unfortunately the omission of 
consummation appears to be a result of continuing governmental inability to produce a legal 
definition of sexual intercourse for same-sex couples,103 rather than as a result of 
consideration of the fact that consummation is state required intercourse; intercourse which is 
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male defined;104 and heavily reliant upon medical understandings of female bodies and male 
‘needs’. When discussing the omission of consummation from the new legislation, Stonewall 
joked that its members were more concerned about extending marriage rights as a whole, and 
that “perhaps sex is something that heterosexual people are slightly more fixated about than 
homosexuals.”105 Whether true or not, it is disappointing that the leading LGBT pressure 
group felt this to be worthy humorous matter, rather than worthy or further investigation. 
Governmental refusal to include consummation was surely not a result of a sudden disinterest 
in sex. Out4Marriage followed suit in their analysis of the place of consummation in the new 
legislation; 
 
Consummation- the heterosexual community seems obsessed with the way 
that we consummate our marriages. Consummation is different for every 
LGBT couple. There is no need to be sexually active or inactive in a 
relationship and I do not think we should be legislating for that. From my 
point of view, when we have weddings that are varied out last-minute 
because someone is on their deathbed, they are not consummated, so we do 
have some sort of precedent in law. The whole issue itself needs to be put to 
one side, because I think what people do in the privacy of their own 
bedroom is their own business.106  
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5.4: What do the CPA and M(SSC)A mean for feminists? 
Card has expressed concern that the radical feminist perspective on marriage is in danger of 
being lost through the couching of same-sex marriage in equal rights discourse.107 Whilst 
writing for the legal recognition and regulation of lesbian marriage, Robson stated that legal 
marriage for same-sex couples would resolve three desires:  
 
First, we want our relationships not to suffer in comparison to heterosexual 
relationships. Second, we want the legal system to be responsive to solving 
disputes among ourselves. And third, we want the reality and perception of 
equality.108 
 
Same-sex marriage has been enacted, but it remains to be seen whether these aims will be 
fulfilled. Robson concludes that these aims could just as readily be achieved through the 
abolition of marriage. As such feminists face the unenviable dilemma “of whether to support 
gay marriage to promote these individual civil rights or whether to critique marriage as a part 
of the patriarchal system that oppresses women.”109 Whilst some feminist theory has argued 
that women should only engage their sexual energies with other women, this argument has 
never stretched to an insistence on that relationship being marriage-like. Card’s reluctance to 
support gay marriage is “not because the existing discrimination... is in any way justifiable 
but because... [marriage]...is so deeply flawed that... [it seems]... to me unworthy of 
emulation and reproduction.”110 As Auchmuty concludes, the idea that second wave feminists 
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“would ever want to claim the right to marry is a bizarre one.”111 As such, the M(SSC)A does 
not sit comfortably with radical feminist views on marriage or consummation.  
 
Radical lesbian feminists have found the notion of ‘natural’ coupledom- that of a man and a 
woman- distasteful and degrading. The Leeds Revolutionary Feminist Group for example 
claimed that men and women should not be sexually involved with each other because “every 
man knows that a fucked woman is a woman under the control of men, whose body is open to 
men, a woman who is tamed and broken in.”112 For these women, a marriage-like relationship 
is the pinnacle of hell, and they have advocated for separatism. Auchmuty argues that the 
emergence of a case like Wilkinson demonstrated, 
 
a different strategic decision from the second-wave feminists and those of 
their successors who have pursued an anti-marriage, pro-alternatives 
agenda. Specifically, Kitzinger and Wilkinson believe that it is better to go 
for inclusion first and deconstruction after... I do not think it is the right 
strategy in the UK, because marriage no longer has the meanings they (or 
indeed Sir Mark Potter) ascribe to it. And the reason for this, I would argue, 
is because those second-wave feminist critiques have entered public 
consciousness over the 20 or 30 years since they were first made, to the 
extent that they are now mainstream social knowledge.113 
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Humphreys’ research claims that prior to the M(SSC)A, most civil partnerships were viewed 
as “gay marriages,”114 and that legally speaking, it made sense to consider them as such.115 In 
extending marriage, there was a serious failure to take the opportunity to extensively 
challenge existing relationship forms, and we have again ended up with “nothing more than 
an attempt to perpetuate a social policy of segregation”116 and a continuation of the 
assumption that marriage is the institution to aspire to.  
 
Auchmuty, writing after the publication of the UK government’s proposal for civil 
partnerships, argued that lesbians and gay men should not be assimilated into a heterosexual 
marriage-like model, but should emphasise gay relationships as a better model for all 
relationships.117 She argued that civil partnerships would amount to almost marriage, but that 
name is important. Even if the aims and objectives of civil partnership and marriage were the 
same, Auchmuty argued that the difference in name was symbolically important and “exists 
beyond, and sometimes in spite of, the legal and material reality. Marriage confers upon 
individuals the highest social status and approval. That is what makes the concept of 
registered partnerships or civil unions qualitatively different from marriage, even if, legally 
speaking, they guarantee the same rights.”118 This was confirmed by the extension of 
marriage legislation.  
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I argue that although the institutions create the same results, civil partnership was a secondary 
(and by extension, inferior) institution built on marriage principles, and at the time of its 
enactment, it was easy for feminists to argue that “gender roles have been an impervious 
feature of marriage for so long that it seems very unlikely that the institution will ever 
change.”119 Could it be categorically determined that same-sex couples will not fall into the 
same patriarchal pitfalls? For both ends of the spectrum of radical feminists- those who have 
encouraged optional lesbianism, and those who have encouraged women to abstain from 
marrying- civil partnership and gay marriage have fallen short of any possible positive 
revolutionary effect. 120   
 
Glennon suggests that civil partnership allowed for a “levelling out of relationship forms 
from which a more streamlined debate on family obligations can take place.”121 I disagree. 
Civil partnerships were modelled upon marriage, so the use of plural ‘forms’ is 
unsubstantiated, and the extension of marriage curtails further discussion. Rather, I would 
have used civil partnerships to further bolster the argument for abolishing marriage. 
Returning to consummation for a moment, civil partnership implicitly required sexuality that 
it cannot describe whereas heterosexual marriage has required sexuality of a very particular 
nature, and same sex marriage also implies undefined sex. Both institutions are sexually 
prescriptive (whether expressed or implied), and oppressive. The formulation of civil 
partnership in this way, and the inability to prescribe sexual activity in same sex marriage 
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does nothing but confirm that anything short of penetrative sex between a man and a woman 
will be deemed inadequate.122  
 
Same sex marriage, which appears to offer the same legal privileges as heterosexual marriage 
advantages those who have “jobs offering spousal health benefits and property and incomes 
where tax liability made a difference- that is, middle-class white men.”123 When vocal 
opposition to marriage began to appear in the 1970s “most of the marriage advocates were 
gay men unconnected to feminism, while most lesbians, newly emerged from consciousness 
raising groups that actually supported sexual and family choices not involving men, along 
with feminist gay men, fought for broader definitions of family,”124 beyond the scope of 
heterosexuality.  
 
One could argue that lesbians should rejoice at the prospect of legal entry to a relationship in 
which they do not need to be legally tied to a man. However, when that institution is an 
extension of an institution in which men have been superior and have shaped the way in 
which the institution works- could a civil partnership or marriage between two women ever 
truly be a ‘marriage’ of equals? Auchmuty explains that “heterosexual marriage [has] 
purported to be a union of equals but, however ‘equal’ husbands and wives were in the eyes 
of the law, they were far from being so politically, socially or economically.”125 
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Whether we accept that civil partnerships and same sex marriages are sexual or not, their 
formation upon the heterosexual marriage model is concerning. For years, “feminists fought 
the routine social channelling of women into marriage as the only legitimate forum for sexual 
and intimate expression.”126 Glennon argues that the introduction of the CPA was a 
continuation of family recognition policy that has “never been...clear or coherent.”127 This is 
evident from piecemeal legislative developments like the GRA and CPA, and now the 
M(SSC)A. Ettelbrick argues that anything resembling gay marriage is bad for lesbians and 
gay men for three reasons. Firstly, if viewing this as family policy, one should make sure 
support is provided for all families. Secondly, she does not believe that the family structures 
of lesbians and gay men neatly fit into the marital model which prioritises heterosexuality and 
procreation. And thirdly, the marriage institution is not consistent with the call to end 
discrimination and establish family equality. She argues that if gay marriage were to be 
extended across America, many people would still choose not to marry.128 Effectively, 
marriage is not a ‘good enough’ institution, and its previous conception as ‘civil partnership’ 
does not make it any better.  
 
Feminists have repeatedly explained that the marriage model means that women are not equal 
to the men they are with and this inequality is also present in the bedroom. Ferguson has 
argued that rights in the bedroom exist only “if Big Brother is allowed to watch to ensure you 
are supporting the national imaginary of the heterosexual nuclear family.”129 This 
governmental and societal gaze is inescapable. Radical feminists have consistently argued 
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that all women should be allowed the choice to “remain single, not to become mothers, or to 
be lesbians”.130 The very possibility of these choices, let alone if women actually take them 
up, serves to undermine patriarchal heterosexuality. Civil partnership and same sex marriage 
do not undermine patriarchal heterosexuality, as the partnerships created are trying to emulate 
the pinnacle of heterosexual patriarchy. I agree with Ferguson that same-sex couples “should 
not marry, not just because marriage is a risky institution for women, but because the right to 
form democratic queer families ought not be tied to one’s marital status and the implicit 
social hierarchies this assumes.”131  
 
The essentialist critique of radical feminism (collective identity) could now be said to be 
symptomatic of civil partnership and same sex marriage, which requires cohesion of same-
sex couples into a heterosexual mould. Radical feminism demands that a woman is a 
‘woman’ first, before any other title or label. Civil partnership and same sex marriages 
demand several labels such as ‘marriage-like’ and ‘silently homosexual,’ for the necessary 
sexual activity is undefined. Another disturbing element is the discourse that surrounded the 
emergence of these developments. Discussions of ‘sameness’ were utilised to demonstrate 
that there were no logical reasons to exclude same-sex couples from marriage. This strategy 
ignored the effects of marriage upon women, and instead suggested that anyone excluded 
from marriage is inherently socially and legally disadvantaged.132  
 
It seems that just as with the GRA, the silence surrounding consummation within the CPA is 
as troubling as the vocal expression for it within the MCA 1973, let alone the confusion 
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added by its omission from the M(SSC)A; a supposedly ‘mirroring’ legislation. The final aim 
must always be the realisation that the legislature has no place in prescribing sexual activity. 
Consummation’s construction of two bodies becoming ‘one flesh’ has not been transferred to 
civil partnerships, nor to same-sex marriages, and the idea of losing your identity or 
individuality thorough becoming ‘one flesh’ is not perpetuated.133 Unfortunately, this is not a 
conscious consequence, but rather one of circumstance- in that Parliament did not wish to 
entertain which acts would be necessary to become one flesh within a civil partnership. Even 
ten years later, parliamentarians were unwilling to debate the sexual activity necessary to 
consummate a homosexual marriage. In 2004, this overt absence of sex and religion allowed 
the Church of England to support civil partnership legislation. Once sex was omitted from the 
Act, the Church was able to emphasise that civil partnership “is not based on a presumption 
of a sexual relationship between the couple. Hence the Church argued that it was possible for 
couples to enter into Civil Partnership while still living within the teachings of the 
Church.”134 The same arguments were made use of for discussions of same-sex marriage.  
 
Harding is one of very few academics who have tried to assess the impact of various 
relationship registration schemes upon everyday life for lesbians and gay men. Using legal 
consciousness studies, Harding examined the way in which “ordinary people approach, use 
and think about law in everyday life,”135 and mapped the ways in which couples had 
undertaken ‘commitment ceremonies’ in jurisdictions that have not extended legal 
recognition to same-sex couples. She argued an emerging theme of her research was the 
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“perceived power of legal change to create social change, and to ‘normalize’ same-sex 
relationships,”136 and some of her respondents thought that attaining legal rights was more 
important than achieving acceptance of lesbians and gay men in society.”137 
 
 
5.5: Insistence upon heterosexual conjugal relationships and romantic love 
Advocates of the CPA and the M(SSC)A argued that the aim was to treat same-sex couples 
“as far as we possibly can, as though they were heterosexual so far as the recognition in law 
of their relationship is concerned.”138 In keeping with this aim, a potential benefit of the 
expansion of marriage is its ability to closet homosexual relationships. When declaring 
oneself to be in a civil partnership- it is clear that the person speaking is in a same-sex 
relationship, for opposite-sex couples are still excluded from civil partnerships. In now 
declaring oneself ‘married’ it is assumed that the speaker is heterosexual. Could one then 
argue that these Acts are an effective challenge to marriage and conjugality as previously 
understood?  
 
What does it mean to be in a ‘conjugal’ relationship? I use the term ‘conjugal’ to denote a 
relationship differentiated from other relationships in life through sex. Heterosexual marriage 
has explicitly required conjugality. Conjugal relationships are “marriage or marriage-like 
relationships... [which prioritise] sexual-coupledom to the exclusion of other emotionally and 
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economically interdependent adult relationships.”139 I explore the form and regulation of non-
conjugal relationships in the next chapter. At this stage I wish only to explore the emphasis 
upon sex as a criterion to distinguish relationships in our lives. These sexual relationships 
have been legally prioritised through marriage and civil partnership, as demonstrated in the 
parliamentary discussions surrounding same-sex marriage. Opponents of the new legislation 
reiterated that state involvement in marriage was due to its child-centred nature. It was stated 
that “if marriage were simply about love and commitment, we would first have to define love 
as being sexual love, because otherwise non-sexual relationships that are based on love and 
commitment would also have to be treated as marriage on the basis of the definition of 
equality.”140  
 
These sexual relationships have become one and the same as romantic relationships within 
the public conscience, and it is “axiomatic that all married couples are in love with each 
other.”141 Geller explains that    
 
the idea that romance-based marriage is the highest human aspiration and 
the ultimate female good pervades... [our] culture... bolstered by the notion 
that individuals- especially women- find ultimate fulfilment in a sanctioned, 
monogamous, sexual partnership and that those without spouses are 
fragmentary ‘single’ beings whose lives are in error... The sense of the 
couple as a unit so basic, so intrinsic, and so mystical that it defies analysis, 
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is everywhere. The belief that all other forms of attachment are of lesser 
importance is so deeply ingrained that it generally requires no defence.142 
 
When asked why the new institution of civil partnership was modelled on heterosexuality, the 
government responded; “civil partnerships are designed to support stable families and to 
recognise committed, interdependent and loving relationships. The Government does not 
believe that any of these characteristics or qualities are exclusive to heterosexual people’s 
relationships,”143 yet took another 9 years to prove this with marriage legislation. If one could 
formulate the argument that civil partnership was progressive in ending the emphasis upon 
conjugality, it would serve to actually weaken civil partnership. It would signal that it was not 
deemed necessary to change the most important heterosexual institution- marriage- but rather 
to introduce a separate, less important institution which did not warrant a sexual element. The 
symbolism of marriage as the pinnacle gesture of love “renders the legal aspects... [of 
marriage] incidental to a more fundamental impulse which may be so strong as to make 
marriage inevitable, whatever the conditions.”144  
 
In conjunction with abolishing marriage and marriage-like relationships we need to educate 
people in protecting their own rights, and creating their own individual relationship 
arrangements, whilst bearing in mind the fact that women in particular have not usually been 
equal participants in contractual agreements (see Chapter 1). The consummation requirement 
in marriage is a form of expressing ‘ownership’ upon the body, and in this light, the 
homosexual body is not deemed worthy of ownership.  
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This thesis has strongly argued against marriage. Glennon accepts that marriage holds an 
idealised position in society, yet argues that it is in fact a “moving target... [I]ts content is 
contested through fluid patterns of spousal expectations and interdependencies and increased 
reliance on ‘personal fulfilment’ when making choices about the continuation of 
relationships.”145 This is a romanticised conception of marriage, and the very fact that 
consummation still remains a legal requirement means that marriage is an extremely 
dangerous institution, requiring heterosexuality or the attempt at a heterosexual norm from its 
participants. This legitimising power of the law has now been extended to same-sex couples, 
but only to those who conform to heterosexual ideals of aspiring to marriage.  
 
 
5.6: Conclusion 
 
It is very important for us to understand that what same-sex couples seek is 
an acknowledgement that their relationship is real, has legal significance 
and carries rights and responsibilities. It is not a commercial contract; it is 
something very different.146 
 
What is clear is that whilst the idea of marriage does not sit well with radical feminists, 
historically “the fact that lesbians and gays... [were] prevented by law from doing what 
heterosexuals can do almost without even thinking about it prompts equally strong 
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feelings.”147 It is therefore equally ‘feminist’ to both agree and disagree with gay-marriage.148 
Unfortunately the CPA and M(SSC)A fell short of any revolutionary impact gay relationship 
legislation could possess, as they were both drafted to reflect marriage.149 Even if same-sex 
marriage could undermine “compulsory heterosexuality, this should not immunize marriage 
itself from interrogation. Marriage, as much as- if not more than- heterosexuality, is a 
political institution,”150 and this is why I have included an analysis of same-sex marriage in 
this research.  
 
The creation of civil partnerships, and the expansion to same sex marriage, with their implied 
sexual element has left unchallenged the base assumption that “there should be a distinction 
between the ‘benefits’ that conjugal and non-conjugal relationships are entitled to (that is, 
that conjugal relationships should be privileged), and that conjugal relationships are more 
easily definable and identifiable than non-conjugal relationships.”151 The line drawn by the 
state in protecting and prioritising conjugal relationships means that the sexual relationship is 
still at the top of the hierarchy.152 
 
I argue that all civil partnership status and same-sex marriage achieve is the extension of 
definitions of sex and love. The couples at the top of the hierarchy are still expected to love 
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one another, and are still expected to be having sexual relations.153 Anything short of this 
would be deeply troubling for a society that still believes that marriage creates the most stable 
environment for children, love and sex. Yet sex and love are the most difficult elements of a 
marriage to prove. One can show financial dependence through bank accounts for example. 
One can show whom they nominate as next of kin, through forms provided by employers or 
hospitals. Yet the romantic mythology of love and sex play a key role in relationship forms, 
despite being ‘invisible’. Shipman and Smart claim, “love and marriage are seen as the 
cultural justification for each other and marriage is taken to be the demonstration of love.”154 
The aim of creating equality seems to have fallen short, for consummation and adultery are 
not deemed equal concepts, and further, some churches can refuse to conduct same-sex 
marriages. More than this, same-sex couples now have a choice of one institution, whilst 
opposite-sex couples are still refused entry to civil partnerships!  When challenged on this, 
the Government argued that there is no need to extend civil partnership to heterosexual 
couples. Civil marriage and religious marriage already exist, which provide the benefits of a 
civil partnership.155 Yet this fails to acknowledge that marriage “is not good for queers, it is 
not good for unmarried heterosexuals, and it is often not good for heterosexual women.”156  
 
Same sex marriage and civil partnership further privatise care, imitate heterosexual marriage, 
and forgo “the perfect opportunity to rethink in a radical way the institution of the family in 
law.”157 The extension of marriage to same-sex couples has furthered the advantages 
associated with marriage. There are the personal advantages- for example those provided by 
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the work place for those in marital relations- and there are family benefits that all who are 
linked by marriage are entitled to. Boyd argues that whilst the struggle for recognition has 
been a legitimate and necessary cause, she feels it “ought not to be seen as sufficient to 
achieve social equality across class, race and gender differences as they intersect with 
sexuality.”158   
 
It appears evident that the government has extended the scope of a discriminatory and 
harmful institution to encompass a larger portion of society, whilst expressly claiming that 
the extension is an attempt to create equality. Polikoff contends that “the desire to marry in 
the lesbian and gay community is an attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream society, an 
effort to fit into an inherently problematic institution that betrays the promise of both lesbian 
and gay liberation and radical feminism,”159 though Eskridge has argued the converse in that 
gay marriage is a radical challenge to the traditional gender roles of marriage.160 I cannot 
believe that the inherent patriarchy of the marriage institution will be dispelled by having 
partners of the same sex. Patriarchy is entrenched, and will only be compounded rather than 
disrupted with gay marriage. Auchmuty states that the problem with marriage is not just the 
mere presence of men, but the 
 
privileged status of the institution over all other lifestyles and statuses 
(especially for women), its role in the privatisation of care, the relentless 
cult of love and romance, so often followed by disappointment and 
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disempowerment, and... the extent and seriousness of domestic violence 
within marriage. Second-wave feminism was also characterised by a deep 
suspicion of the State.161  
 
Radical feminism has been under-utilised in the debate, and could further be utilised by gay 
and lesbian people to create a “political and cultural project... there is [for example], virtually 
no public critique of pornography and, more generally, the sex industry in the gay male 
world.”162 In effect, whether gay marriage or civil partnerships are viewed as marriage or not, 
“the goal should surely be to get rid of it, or at least to let it die out of its own accord- not to 
try to share in its privileges, leaving the ineligible out in the cold.”163  
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SIX 
 
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
 
Preceding chapters have shown that family forms/relationships which contain a conjugal 
relationship at their core are privileged by law. Law makers assume that there should be a 
difference in legal provision to conjugal and non-conjugal couples.1 This chapter assesses 
what, if any, impact non-conjugality and the removal of consummation would have on 
understandings of family and sex. The radical feminist aim here is to build on the observation 
that “power differences are routinely sexualized... [and we should] engage in critical self-
reflection about the way those power relations affect the most intimate aspects of our lives 
and ask if there not other ways to structure our lives that will be more satisfying.”2  I outline 
the legal challenges to marriage that have emerged which serve to question the legal 
privileging of sexual relationships, and then provide analysis as to the value of the marriage 
institution today. This chapter also assesses the importance of including non-consummation 
as a ‘voidable’ factor, rather than one which renders a marriage ‘void’. The chapter concludes 
with an argument for the dissolution of marriage, whilst providing some suggestions and 
examples of alternative understandings and conceptions of relationships, commencing with 
the removal in law of sex and the primary act of marital sex- consummation.  
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Conjugal (nuclear) ‘normal’ relationships are no longer the norm. In fact “the norm seems to 
be the diversity of family form, not the one-size-fits-all structure of marriage...”3 There is 
now a diverse spectrum of households which contain multiple generations, single parent 
households, siblings, friends or senior citizens who live together, to name a few, the primary 
relation of which is not based on sexual intercourse.4  But the legislature has been particularly 
slow at keeping up with familial changes, in the hope perhaps, that a failure to change might 
encourage people to engage with marriage, as in the case of M(SSC)A. Chapter 5 
demonstrated that when expansion has occurred, it has been modelled upon marriage, and 
serves to bolster marriage and marriage-like relationships alone. Instead of trying to fit more 
and more relationships into the marriage model, we should “abolish marriage as a legal 
category... All relationships between adults [should] be nonlegal and, therefore, 
nonprivileged- unsubsidized by the state. In this way, “equality” is achieved in regard to all 
choices of sexual relational affiliations. I suggest we destroy the marital model altogether and 
collapse all sexual relationships into the same category- private- not sanctioned, privileged, or 
preferred by law.”5 
 
Society and law have created a situation in which all sexual acts, whether viewed through the 
lens of feminist theory, medical perspectives or religion for example, are deemed acceptable 
(legally privileged) or not. Rubin states, “heterosexual encounters may be sublime or 
disgusting, free or forced, healing or destructive, romantic or mercenary. As long as it does 
not violate other rules, heterosexuality is acknowledged to exhibit the full range of human 
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experience.”6  The CPA and M(SSC)A implicitly moved ‘homosexual acts’ to the legally 
acceptable sphere though the sexual acts were rendered invisible, perhaps indicating that 
homosexuality was not felt to encompass the opportunity to ‘exhibit the full range of human 
experience.’   
 
 
6.1: Is non-conjugality a threat to the ‘family’ and sex? 
Despite changes, sexual acts have remained a key way to distinguish relationship forms. 
What importance does the sexual element of a relationship hold for law? If one holds that 
procreation and inheritance is the key, then what of impotent or non-conjugal units? There 
does not appear to be a clear reason for requiring sex in legally privileged relationships, nor a 
reason for requiring consummation as consecration of a marital union and the first instance of 
marital sex. Family forms that are not built upon heterosexual intercourse fulfil many of the 
functions that conjugal units do, and could be further beneficial to women who are subjected 
to second class status within matrimonial relations. Alternative family forms are also capable 
of family functions such as love, emotional and financial support, and the bearing and raising 
of children. Chapter 2 outlined the existence of marriages in which the male partner was 
impotent for example. These marriages are not automatically void, but are voidable if the 
husband remains impotent with his wife for the duration of the marriage. What would be the 
harm in all marriages being non-sexual in the eyes of the law? Clearly humans would not fail 
to continue repopulating the earth, as many children are born outside of marriage, and no 
longer suffer the stigma of illegitimacy. Jensen argues that whether or not we manage to end 
up in a conjugal relationship should be of less importance than the feeling of community. He 
argues that the objective for all should “not simply be finding that “special someone” but, 
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rather, helping to build such a community based... on principles of justice and equality as 
understood within a radical [feminist] framework.”7 A shared radical feminist outlook will be 
more fulfilling than a conjugal relationship. 
 
Conjugality has been most openly challenged at “crucial points in the evolution of the 
relational status of same-sex couples,”8 and it seems that the only threat non-conjugality 
would pose is one to the symbolism and discourse of marriage. Symbolically, marriage has 
always been the highest commitment (legally and emotionally) that one human can make to 
another. Because of this, our entire discourse surrounding relationships is built upon our 
understanding of marriage. Prior to the M(SSC)A, gay friends would often jokingly refer to 
their partners as their ‘husband’ or ‘wife’, utilising the very labels marriage has always 
attached to the durable relationship. The word ‘consummation’ is automatically associated 
with the first instance of sexual relations in marriage, even though the word can be used in 
other contexts. To remove the consummation requirement from law would lead eventually, to 
a different understanding of the word, and further, the breakdown of the sexual expectations 
of marriage. The symbolic threat is perhaps more serious when viewed from a religious 
perspective. Consummation is the Judeo-Christian consecration of the marriage; the instance 
upon which the husband and wife historically became one flesh. In practice however, 
religious groups that hold these values would continue to incorporate consummation within 
their religious marriages, and there seems no apparent reason not to remove consummation 
from existing marriage law on religious grounds.  
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6.2: Legal challenges to conjugal relationships 
Prior to the UK Government’s proposal to extend marriage to incorporate same-sex couples 
(thereby absorbing more couples into the existing marriage institution), legal challenges to 
the definition of marriage were generally brought by same-sex couples.9 As no case law yet 
exists to challenge the M(SSC)A, here I present some of the case-law that emerged in 
challenging civil partnerships and conjugal relationships in general. With the creation of civil 
partnerships, a new and weaker target emerged for the legal exploration of the discrimination 
against non-conjugal relationships. The CPA faced a legal challenge to its reliance upon 
‘couples’ in the case of Burden and Burden v. The United Kingdom10. Here, two cohabiting 
elderly sisters argued that the CPA was discriminatory in its omission of familial 
relationships from its scope of inclusion. The omission of an explicit sexual requirement 
meant that the sisters felt able to argue that all (sexual or non-sexual) same-sex relationships 
should be included in the Act’s provisions. The sisters argued that civil partners would not be 
liable for inheritance tax, yet when one of the sisters died, the remaining sister would be. 
Given that there was no sexual element encapsulated in the CPA, the sisters argued that their 
relationship was fundamentally no different from a civil partnership. The court dismissed 
their claim. Humphreys observed that, “it is hard to see why it would be a good thing for 
sisters who have entered a civil partnership for tax reasons to have to go through a process 
identical to divorce in order subsequently to marry.”11 The very fact that the case could 
emerge at all signifies the importance, and normalisation of consummation in marriage, in 
making legally privileged relationships easily identifiable, and the legal and societal 
confusion that ensues from its omission from relationship legislation. Had the civil 
                                                          
9
 Cases where there has been some success have been won through focusing on other matters such as rental 
agreements, or definitions of family, rather than definitions of marriage. Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza [2004] 
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partnership legislation bolstered its prohibited degrees of relationship clause12 with a non-
consummation one a case like Burden would never have materialised. As early as 2003 the 
government’s ‘Women and Equality Unit’ conducted research into the passing of the CPA, 
recording that, 
 
the proposed civil partnership registration scheme is aimed at addressing a 
specific shortcoming in the recognition of same-sex couple relationships. 
The Government believes that home-sharers, carers and siblings generally 
don’t have the same case for being recognised as a couple. In the case of 
siblings, they already have a legally recognised relationships to each other, 
and the rights to reflect that relationship, in areas such as inheritance and 
when visiting in hospital. This does not apply to a same-sex couple who can 
be treated as two strangers under current law.13 
 
It is clear from this that the key word/relationship is ‘couple’. The siblings in Burden were a 
couple, in that there were two of them, and they also cared for each other whilst sharing 
finances and a home. But the key component of a ‘couple’ in the governments thinking is a 
sexual element, despite the absence of a sexual requirement in the CPA to distinguish two 
same-sex people as a ‘couple’ or not. Pearce explains that the near-success of the Burden case 
can be blamed on the concessions made by the government when enacting the CPA. 
Religious lobbying meant that civil partnership became an undefined relationship, which 
lacked not only a sexual element, but also religious content, creating a status of “merely 
                                                          
12
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material implications,”14 though this situation has now changed with the enactment of s202 of 
the Equality Act 2010 which allows religious premises to voluntarily conduct civil 
partnership ceremonies.  
 
Prior to the M(SSC)A, discussions of same-sex unions were often linked to those of 
cohabiting couples who were not married, under the umbrella concept of ‘unformalized 
relationships’. Glennon argued that combining discussion of same-sex couples who could not 
marry, and opposite-sex couples who would not marry would lead to difficulty in trying to 
map a legal response. She explained that the “consultation paper on civil partnerships 
concluded that it was impossible to design a single framework to meet the needs of both 
same-sex couples who wanted to formalize their relationships and opposite-sex couples who 
did not want to marry.”15 As such, the scope of civil partnership was narrowly drawn. 
Glennon however, sees this as beneficial; 
 
...opening up registration to all couples could have permanently entrenched 
the use of relationship form in legal policy, perpetuated the exclusion of 
those who do not formalize their relationship, and hindered the 
development of a more beneficial long-term anti-essentialist strategy which 
demotes the significance of relationship status in favour of a functionalist 
approach which asks more critical questions about the legal obligations of 
family members.16 
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It was generally accepted that relationships such as the one evidenced in Burden were 
different from relationships that could constitute a civil partnership, the difference at the time 
being the “legal inability of same-sex partners to formalise their relationships, and if so then 
the government’s position seems to reinforce the view that opposite-sex partners should 
simply get married if they want the legal benefits and protection that comes with that 
status.”17 Again, this difference relies on the definition of two people as a ‘couple’, and the 
implicit sexual relationship this suggests. Parliamentary discussions surrounding the CPA 
ranged from those who wanted the legislation to reflect its primary purpose- that of providing 
legal rights to same-sex couples- to those who wanted the legislation to be a catch-all for 
relationship forms that fell outside of existing relationship legislation. For radical feminists, it 
was a very difficult time, as discussed in Chapter 5. Whilst radical feminists want women to 
have rights, they do not want those rights to be bound to a relationship status.  
 
There followed several anxious exchanges in the House of Lords, which led to Baroness 
Scotland of Asthal extensively outlining the “considerable rights already enjoyed by relatives 
who care for other relatives or live with them for significant periods before the death of one 
or the other.”18 She comprehensively detailed the existing arrangements, concluding that the 
new legislation was “specifically designed to meet the needs of same-sex couples. The 
solution to their problems has been determined by the particular nature of their 
relationship.”19 She was able to phrase her argument as such, because it was believed that 
civil partnership would negate the need to ever extend marriage to same-sex couples.  
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Baroness O’Cathain fervently argued for the inclusion of family members in civil 
partnership, and claimed that the Act would lead to “greater injustice than it claims to 
address”20 if they were excluded. Yet even the Baroness’ assertion that the scope of civil 
partnership should be wide would not effectively deconstruct existing understandings of 
relationships. She insisted that relationships are ‘partnerships’ between two parties.21 But 
there is no guidance as to what would happen if there had been three sisters involved in the 
Burden case? The Baronesses argument’s read as an attack on any forms of sex that do not 
conform to heterosexual understandings. She endeavoured to distil the ‘normalising’ effects 
of the CPA by drowning same-sex relationships out within legislation that is a ‘catch-all’ for 
those who do not live up to marriage. The same can now be said for the M(SSC)A, where the 
Government appears to be hoping that the sections of matrimonial law which have been 
omitted (consummation and adultery) will be forgotten, and as many same-sex couples as 
possible will be brought into the marriage mould. The Baroness was almost successful in her 
push to extend the Bill, save for the House of Commons, and impassioned speeches from 
Lord Alli for example, who explained that “this Bill is about same-sex couples whose 
relationships are completely different from those of siblings.”22  
 
 
Baroness O’Cathain’s supporters felt that the proposed legislation would result in further 
inequality to those who would now fall outside both marriage and civil partnership. Lord 
Maginnis stated; “the Bill undermines the traditional family in two ways: it creates a form of 
gay marriage and it ignores family relationships in the way that it distributes benefits.”23 
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However, these Lords’ true feelings were later revealed when Lord Maginnis stated that it is 
unfair to punish those who “are not indulging in an unnatural sexual practice.”24 The Lords 
wished to insulate marriage, and place further restrictions and pressure upon the gay 
community. Baroness Wilcox unbelievably required more of homosexual couples than she 
did of those within the ‘pinnacle’ relationship: marriage. She stated that “it is wrong for gay 
people, who have suffered for too long from discrimination, to secure for themselves what 
this Bill gives and to resist it for others, who are equally loving, equally committed and 
equally debarred from the ability to marry.”25 Why did she not demand the same from 
married couples?  
 
6.3: The value of marriage 
At its inception, marriage appeared to be “of considerable legal advantage to all women, 
unless they were prepared and could afford to remain celibate. The marital package deal 
could afford to be extraordinarily unfavourable to them.”26 Though times have changed, and 
women no longer need marriage, the institution does not reflect this and continues to be 
extraordinarily unfavourable to women. This thesis has examined just one small aspect in 
which marriage is unfavourable to women, and shown the inappropriateness of defining 
legally significant relationships through sexual contact. Consummation symbolises the core 
responsibility of marriage, and implies that the relationship will remain sexual. Whilst at first 
glance the GRA and the CPA seemed to herald an end to the sexual requirement, or perhaps a 
diminishing of its significance, the previous chapters and the recent creation of same sex 
marriage have shown this to be false.  
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Marriage is a primary institution of socialisation, a place where people learn the norms and 
values of their society.27 The most common definition of marriage is a legal tie based on 
religious doctrine, which symbolises commitment, and privileges (hetero)sexual affiliation. In 
the past, an exchange of vows was deemed more Godly than consummation, because “it had 
the decisive advantage over the principal alternative doctrine (which made copulation the 
initiant of marriage), that it made possible a true marriage between Joseph and Mary without 
impugning the perceptual virginity of the mother of Christ.”28 Marriage produces a hierarchy 
within the institution and amongst other relationship forms, and is the preferred institution for 
procreation. Of course there are a myriad of other meanings, “perhaps as many meanings as 
there are individuals entering, or not entering, the relationship,”29 but radical feminists argue 
that “no matter how much we try to avoid replicating patriarchal... relations, these are 
reproduced in the institution of marriage.”30 The very institution is borne of patriarchy, and 
although the language used in the consummation clauses is gender-neutral, and despite some 
women bringing forth claims of nullity, the research presented here has shown the falsehood 
of the MCA’s gender-neutrality. I have also demonstrated that whilst women have been able 
to utilise non-consummation legislation, the ‘type’ of woman has been closely monitored, 
with most declaring that they are normal women who wish to be able to reproduce.  
 
Marriage has perpetuated disadvantage against women and upheld patriarchal power relations 
most clearly identified by radical feminists, through its traditional structure of a male-headed 
household. Pateman argues society is built on the ‘original contract’ which is a “sexual-social 
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pact, but the story of the sexual contract has been repressed.”31 The society created through 
this pact is a patriarchal one: “it is sexual in the sense of patriarchal- that is, the contract 
establishes men’s political right over women- and also sexual in the sense of establishing 
orderly access by men to women’s bodies.”32 In patriarchal society, the public sphere is 
prioritised over the private sphere, and so “the story of the social contract is treated as an 
account of the creation of the public sphere of civil freedom. The other, private, sphere is not 
seen as politically relevant. Marriage and the marriage contract are, therefore, also deemed 
politically irrelevant.”33 But they are not, they are still interfered with and therefore to claim 
that the family is private is “an incoherent ideal and... the rhetoric of nonintervention is more 
harmful than helpful.”34 Because conjugal relations, (and consummation) are presented as 
natural in the private sphere, “so the law of male sex-right and the sexual contract completely 
disappear.”35 Pateman argues that marriage should not be replaced with civil contracts, for 
these are also imbued with patriarchal knowledge and inequality and so marriage and 
contract should be abolished.  
 
O’Donovan asks if marriage is a sacred union, or a determinable contract?36 She claims that 
marriage cannot stand as a legal contract: “its terms are not negotiated by the parties, but 
prescribed by law. It is not a contract freely entered into by any adult but is open only to 
certain persons under specified conditions according to law.”37 Marital roles are ascribed by 
the law on the basis of gender, not at the discretion of the partners. This results in the 
sacrifice of personal autonomy, and unequal partners. If marriage is not a contract, it becomes 
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an institution- something entered into under the rules of the institution. Even with the 
expansion of marriage, these rules are heteronormatively defined.  
 
Halley argues that marriage provides status, but incorporates elements of contract. She states, 
“depending on how many elements of contract we add, marriage moves down the spectrum 
towards contract. But everyone tacitly agrees that it can never go all the way, because some 
aspects of marriage are ineradicably different from ordinary contracts. It is status plus some 
fragmentary elements of contract.”38 Marriage and contract could be viewed as opposing 
formats. Marriage when controlled by state becomes public, (though it purports to be a 
private institution) which is the opposite of contract which is “variable, private, and 
controlled by the will of the parties not that of the state.”39 Marriage provides status, and 
there currently exists no “law of being single.” Single people are only subject to law in the 
case of “single fathers and single poor welfare recipients”40 and often these determinations 
are made on the basis that the rules of marriage don’t apply. 
 
Herring suggests four alternative ways the state and law might distinguish people who are 
strangers from those who are in a close relationship. Firstly law could rely on whether or not 
a couple have cohabited for two years or more, and/or have a child. If so “they are given the 
rights married couples and civil partners currently have... The difficulty is in defining 
cohabitation.”41 Secondly the focus could be on the kind of relationship the couple have 
developed. Here, one would question if the relationship had “reached a depth where it 
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deserves a particular benefit? ...The difficulty with this approach is that it is very difficult for 
a third party (e.g. a judge) to understand the nature of a particular relationship. Some people, 
for example, would attach great significance to a sexual relationship; others would pay little 
attention to this.”42 
 
Herring’s third suggestion is to shift the focus to the agreement made between the couple. 
Couples could be required, or encouraged to “prepare and sign a legal agreement. This is only 
satisfactory where the parties are aware of the benefits of doing so... even if such contracts 
were drafted there is a fear that they would too quickly become out of date. [Any change in 
circumstances would mean that] ...the contract would need to be updated.”43 This also 
assumes that women have equal power in contractual agreements, and does not prevent 
couples from specifying sexual requirements in their private contracts.44 Lastly, Herring 
argues that the state could create an alternative institution to marriage, “for example 
registered partnerships. However, it is unlikely that people who do not wish to marry would 
choose to register their partnerships,”45 and I would argue that this would surely end up 
amounting to marriage in all but name. The benefit of Herring’s suggestions is that at first 
glance, they do not require consummation.  
 
The French have a different system for relationship recognition and registration known as 
PACS (Du Pacte Civil de Solidarité et du Concubinage). “The PACS allows two people- 
whether living in a conjugal relationship or not- to register a contract in a municipality, which 
reduces to writing their commitment to each other, and which must include the obligation to 
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provide mutual assistance and support.... It is justified as a universally available contract to 
which all are equally entitled to participate on the basis of being members of the Republic.”46 
O’Donovan argues that “the problem with express contracts is that their usefulness is limited 
to the articulate middle-classes; the problem with implied contracts is that their interpreters 
are likely to be imbued with the patriarchal attitudes so rightly deplored in relation to 
marriage.”47 Yet marriage in its current form is already a contract (not in a traditional sense), 
which is severely detrimental to women who partake in it. A self-negotiated relationship 
agreement should be the result of discussion and compromise between all who are involved 
within it. Within these discussions, one envisions that discussions will occur surrounding the 
sexual expectations of those in the relationship.  
 
New South Wales has created new legal forms that acknowledge the limited and limiting role 
of sex.48 Cohabiting relationships have been designated two forms: those of a ‘domestic 
relationship’ nature which are between two adults who live as a couple, and a second 
category of ‘close personal relationships’ which are non-sexual and can be within the 
prohibited degrees of relationship for marriage. Whilst this may appear to be a radical 
feminists dream, there are still several issues such as the fact that there are two categories- 
those that are, and those that are not sexual- suggests that there are no other alternatives to 
adult relationships. Also these relationships are again based upon a relationship between two 
people. 
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So, why marry? O’Donovan claims that people continue to marry because “marriage has a 
sacred, magical status.”49 Marriage is legally the culmination of two free but unequal acts 
committed by the husband and wife uniting the pair and establishing legal regulation. “The 
performative acts by the couple are their voluntary taking of one another as husband or wife, 
with all that these terms connate; the sexual act, after the ceremony is the seal of the union. 
Law regulates entry into marriage, the ceremony and the validity of both. In that sense law 
constitutes the marriage.”50 This legally constituted marriage is sacred and magical because it 
is unchanging- an ‘emblem of continuity’.51 Even the creation of same-sex marriage has left 
the institution of heterosexual marriage intact. Instead of amending existing marriage law, a 
new law was passed, mirroring nearly all the features of marriage, except the most sacred- 
consummation. Marriage’s sacred element is found in its character “as an institution 
[that]...calls on a past, understood and shared tradition, and on an eternal future, a 
perpetuity.”52 I do not dispute this traditional element. The prioritisation of the married unit 
for the production of children and legitimacy of sexual relations is “learned yet known anew 
by each generation and in each generative act”53 within marriage. But marriage’s traditional 
elements stem from religion, and societal structures that are no longer the mainstream view. I 
advocate for the dissolution of marriage as an institution but do not deny its religious 
importance to some.   
 
Hyde54 relied on the belief that “legitimate unions endorse a ‘natural’ order of sexuality, and 
this assumption has shaped marriage law in profound ways.”55 Defining our (legal) 
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understanding of marriage on the basis of a case from the late 1800’s, has resulted in the 
continuing importance of the consummation requirement for heterosexual couples. Hyde56 
insists that the marriage union be undertaken voluntarily. Poulter has examined the few 
Victorian cases based upon the principle of voluntariness,57 finding that there have been cases 
which have granted decrees,58 and others in which decrees have been denied.59 Where 
decrees were granted, there were overt demonstrations on the part of the wife that she had 
been forced into the marriage, including duress by her husband during the ceremony, and 
examples of her throwing her wedding ring on the floor at the ceremony. Instances of these 
situations have diminished since the governments recognition of the need for protection for 
those who are being forced into marriages and enactment of the Forced Marriage (Civil 
Protection) Act.60 Where a marriage has taken place, the court tries to assess whether the 
person’s will was overborne. At one time, the courts would only provide a decree for nullity 
if there was a threat of immediate danger to life, limb or liberty. However this does not take 
account of people’s differing tolerance of threats. As such, the Court of Appeal has held that 
the test is a subjective one of whether the threats and/or pressure could be sufficient to 
destroy the consent given and to overbear the will of the individual.61  
 
The Hyde62 requirement of a union for life is also bizarre. At the time that the judgment was 
passed, the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 was the current law, and contained provision for 
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divorce decrees in English courts. As such, “how then could Lord Penzance have included 
within his definition of legal marriage the requirement derived from Christian doctrine that it 
be “for life”?”63 More to the point, how can this still be required today, in a society with 
diminished marriage rates and increased divorce rates? Poulter suggests that as a staunch 
Protestant, perhaps Lord Penzance in the case of Hyde felt that polygamy was morally 
abhorrent.64 This belief in marriage for life was earlier encapsulated in the case of Evans v 
Evans,65 where Lord Stowell claimed “the general happiness of the married life is secured by 
its indissolubility. When people understand that they must live together...they learn to soften 
by mutual accommodation... they become good husbands and good wives, from the necessity 
of remaining husbands and wives, for necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties 
which it imposes.”66 
 
Given societal developments (and the existence of divorce at the time), we could read Lord 
Penzance’s phrase ‘for life’ as; ‘for life, or until a decree of annulment or divorce is given’ 
though this idea could be attacked as “tending to sacrifice the quality of idealism for legal 
pedantry.”67 The retention of the phrase serves to ignore the reality of increasing divorce 
rates. Probert explains that although the number of divorces granted was a very small 
number, it was a dramatic increase to previous divorce rates, and it was possibly feared that 
the marital stability of the early 1800s had been lost.68  
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Marriage was also required to be a union between one man and one woman, legally 
reinforcing heterosexuality, and serial monogamy.  This requirement negatively affects those 
who wish (or are required by religion) to engage in polygamous relationships, as does the 
phrase ‘to the exclusion of all others’.69 A person who is lawfully married cannot contract a 
second marriage before the legal ending of the first. The historical reasoning for the 
declaration of marriage for one man and one woman was very much a result of the Victorian 
age, and perhaps an exaggerated response to the perceived threat of the other- Mormon 
polygamous marriage.70 The effect of polygamous marriages has been dealt with by statute,71 
but ironically, the use of ‘one man and one woman’ then became synonymous with cases 
involving transsexuals.   
 
The Canadian Law Commission provided a more efficient understanding of relationships 
within their research into adult relationships. I refer here to other jurisdictions solely because 
the U.K has not commissioned such research, and therefore it would be difficult to 
definitively speak about the UK. I point to the work in Canada and other jurisdictions, not to 
say that we should draw the same conclusions, but to say, these are alternatives being 
explored in other jurisdictions, and perhaps we should pay attention to the research they are 
producing. It would be naive to say that we should wholeheartedly adopt the suggestions of 
other jurisdictions.   
 
The Canadian Law Commission held that “state regulation of personal relationships should... 
seek to enhance other values: personal security, privacy and religious freedom, while 
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pursuing legitimate government objectives in a coherent and efficient manner.”72 If the state 
were willing to recognise these qualities over the qualities deemed to be associated with sex, 
eventually a community would emerge in which we would be encouraged to explore “non-
exploitative, non-abusive possibilities in love, gender, desire and sex- and in the creation of 
new forms of constructed families without fear that this searching will potentially forfeit for 
us our right to be honoured and valued within our communities and in the wider world.”73  
 
Marriage is such a fundamental part of society that it also holds discursive importance. 
‘Husband’ and ‘Wife’ have legal and symbolic meaning, as does the ability to live up to these 
labels. Brownmiller’s work argues that penetration is a word which describes “what the man 
does.”74 A proper (equitable) contract demands that no account is taken of substantive 
attributes- such as sex. “If marriage is to be truly contractual, sexual difference must become 
irrelevant to the marriage contract; ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ must no longer be sexually 
determined. Indeed, from the standpoint of contract, ‘men’ and ‘women’ would disappear.”75 
The language of consummation is also interesting. You can consume a body with your 
mouth- cannibalism. But consummation, gives a different form of pleasure, and a different 
discursive meaning. Marriage serves to provide sexual property in women, and the wife “has 
no corresponding right. After consummation further heterosexual acts are assumed to take 
place in accordance with male desire. It is evident that the law approves heterosexuality in 
marriage but withholds its constitutive power from other relationships not legally approved. 
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The requirement of consummation places primacy on penetrative sex, an act constitutive of 
masculinity.”76 
 
Through the insistence upon consummation as the final act in the heterosexual marriage 
ceremony, case law has created a body of knowledge of male sexuality, which serves to 
marginalise other sexual acts. Medical developments have also catered to this requirement 
with the development of Viagra for example. “The missionary position, in which the woman 
lies under the man and facing him in readiness for coition, has been privileged in this 
discourse... Although marriage law does not demand that the missionary position is adopted 
for consummation, it is clear that non-penetrative sexual activity is insufficient.”77 
Mackinnon takes this further and states that what is sexual is “what gives a man an erection. 
Whatever it takes to make a penis shudder and stiffen with the experience of its potency is 
what sexuality means culturally.”78 
 
Lord Penzance’s classification of the marriage formula is archaic but its use in law seems 
consistent in cases where traditional understandings of marriage are perceived to be under 
threat. Interestingly, all of the criteria required for Lord Penzance’s marriage are also 
applicable to cohabiting couples,  
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after all there may be cohabiting unions that are heterosexual, lifelong and 
monogamous, just as there may be marriages that do not fulfil all- or, in 
those jurisdictions that allow same-sex marriage, any- of these criteria. As a 
definition of marriage, then, Lord Penzance’s description of marriage is 
seriously flawed, since it is capable of encompassing a large number of 
persons who are not married while at the same time excluding a significant 
number of married couples.79  
 
To effectively change our conception of the consummation requirement, we need to start with 
changing, or preferably eradicating marriage. Probert argues Lord Penzance’s words were 
shaped by the historical context, and were not even immediately regarded as defining 
marriage.80 The criteria offered for a legally recognised marriage has not always been taken 
literally in all contexts: “when considering the availability of divorce, the courts have not 
insisted that a marriage be ‘for life’, nor has recognition been denied to ‘non-Christian’ 
marriages.”81 She concludes that Lord Penzance’s configuration of marriage be understood as 
a defence of the institution, rather than a definition of it. Understood in this way, modern 
judges could move away from the constraints of this case. Other than the few criteria outlined 
here for a valid marriage, there is not an all embracing definition that is consistently evident 
across all married couples which seems to make law’s embrace of the institution unusual. To 
                                                          
79
 Probert op cit n68 pg 323  
80
 In wasn’t until 1892 that a law textbook advocated the case of Hyde as the definition of marriage, and the case 
was not referred to by another court until 1888 in Re Bethell (1888) 38 Ch D 220. It was referred to in Armitage 
v Armitage (1866) LR 3 Eq 343- but had little influence upon that case. See further also: Probert op cit n68 pg 
322-325 
81
 Probert ibid pg 322 
317 
 
‘be married’ does not indicate how the couple are actually living their lives or expressing 
morality.82 
 
6.4: Arguments for the dissolution of the marriage institution and consummation 
 
While marriage is considered contractual rather than a consequence of 
status, there are three parties to this contract- the man, the woman, and the 
state. Although the man and woman have limited power to alter the terms of 
the marriage agreement, through prenuptial agreements, for example, the 
state retains enormous power.83  
 
What benefit is obtained through this state involvement? Could an institution that is so deeply 
embedded in society ever truly be removed as a social reality? I argue probably not, though 
this is not a very radical feminist view. I maintain that it is unlikely that marriage would ever 
lose its symbolic importance, but it could indeed lose its legal significance.84 The marriage 
rate has decreased, but not at a sufficient rate to claim a successful radical feminist campaign. 
Brook has argued that even if marriage were to be abolished, conjugality would still be 
“unavoidably inscribed in the body politic”85 purely as a result of the amount of time this 
institution has existed. Despite the drop in marriage rates, the extension of marriage to absorb 
same-sex couples demonstrates Governmental (and perhaps societal) belief that marriage is 
the ‘correct’ institution for the containment of sexual relations. Whilst purporting to examine 
alternative family forms, the report compiled by the Law Commission in Canada still ended 
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up referring to marriage in a way which suggested that the authors felt that marriage was the 
superior relationship form.86  
 
Throughout my research I have encountered the same two questions from most of the people 
I have explained my work to. Firstly, what is the point of writing a thesis on removing the 
consummation requirement when it will never happen? Marriage is too fundamental to 
society, and consummation is a fundamental element of it. Secondly, if it were to ever 
happen, what possible benefit could it provide to anybody? This thesis has suggested the 
abolition of marriage from within, starting with the most basic and most harmful function and 
assumption of the marital relationship- that it will be sexual in nature. When it comes to 
marriage, radical feminists should focus on forced sexual activity- consummation. The case 
law in Chapter 2 showed how non-consummation has been used to nullify otherwise loving, 
caring, and supportive marriages, some of which have even resulted in children, but no 
understandable reasoning for this is given by the courts or the legislation. Arguments calling 
for the end of marriage generate discussion about ensuring sexual promiscuity, and 
appropriate environments for the raising of children, neither of which are guaranteed by 
marriage. There appears to be no reason to still have a consummation requirement, even if it 
only serves to make a marriage voidable, rather than automatically void. This is argued from 
a radical feminist perspective because radical feminism most clearly provides a solution to 
the problem of legislating consummation. First wave feminism would argue that the non-
consummation clause be altered to better reflect the inclusion of women’s views. I disagree, 
for the very construction of sexual intercourse which defines consummation is patriarchal in 
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origin, and could not be overcome with a change in the formulation of the consummation 
requirement. Further, third wave queer theory is too engrossed in detailing the “complex 
network of social relations”87 that women are in. In breaking down female identity into many 
small components, no significant social change will ever occur. Radical feminism’s strength 
lies in its unifying force, uncovering the harm that non-consummation legislation does to 
women. Radical feminism most successfully traces the patriarchal development of law and as 
Chapter 1 showed, radical feminism also shows the ways in which heterosexuality reproduces 
itself, through consummation and marriage.  
 
I argue for the abolition of ‘sexually-defined’ relationships because society is too heavily 
reliant upon sexual definitions of relationships. The expansion of marriage to same-sex 
couples reinforces this view, and I argue that this further demonstrates that marriage will not 
become one option on a menu of relationships forms, but rather it is restating its primacy by 
becoming the only relationship form. In trying to eradicate the sexual element of marriage- 
and consummation as the primary instance of this- I am not ignoring the importance that sex 
can have for both homosexual and heterosexual couples, but rather using consummation to 
unmask the inherent sexism, patriarchy and subordination of women which lies in marriage. 
Furthermore, the very fact that a marriage could be nullified on the basis of non-
consummation alone is deeply troubling for understandings of marriage. In making the 
personal political, we have seen from the case-law alone that not all marriages are 
automatically sexual.   
 
In heterosexual relationships, social attitudes and the language of sex show that sex is done to 
women and does not encompass the many types of sex available, or the feelings that can exist 
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in a non-sexual relationship. In homosexual relationships there is sometimes the 
categorisation of one partner as more female than the other, with terms such as ‘camp’ or 
‘femme’, and so the gender connotations of sex filter into these relationships also. There are 
of course arguments which claim “widespread recognition that partnership relationships offer 
unique opportunities as well as challenges, for the exploration of love, sex and commitment, 
balancing the affirmation of one’s individuality with strong mutual involvement.”88 Yet the 
previous chapters have shown the inherent damage done to women by attaching notions of 
love and sex to marriage. I wish to eliminate the legal significance sex has in creating 
legitimacy for relationships. If one chooses to enter a relationship of this kind, then so be it, 
but to create statue that allows a get out clause as a result of no sex is an implied requirement 
of sex by the state. Cossman and Ryder argue that too much legal weight is placed upon a 
relationship status. They urge the legislature to ask itself if the status of an individual’s 
relationship is truly relevant.89 
 
The radical feminist position is often compared with that of marriage reform feminists, where 
the choice appears to be between rejecting marriage or hoping for change. Ferguson argues 
that this choice is too simplistic. Rather, “whether marriage is reformable in a feminist 
direction in a particular context depends on the other resources available to women through 
the legal system, as well as their options in the economic system, and their social and citizen 
status.”90 Whilst women continue to partake in marriage in its current legal form, their 
economic, social and citizen status will be governed by this choice. Clive too asks whether 
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marriage is unnecessary, not as a social or religious institution, but as a legal concept.91 He 
argues that the social institution is removable from the legal institution- suggesting for 
example that it is not needed to order the way we live, where we live, and what surname we 
use, concluding that “traditional obligations of married couples to live together and be 
sexually faithful to each other are manifestly unenforceable in modern conditions and could 
be discarded without any difficulty,”92 with tax relief and death benefits arranged through a 
system of nomination rather than spousal relations.  
 
Clive also examines bigamy and the exploitation of women: 
 
The real question is whether the abolition of marriage and bigamy together 
would leave a vacuum in which women would be dangerously exposed to 
exploitation by men falsely claiming to commit themselves to a long-term 
relationship. It is doubtful whether marriage and bigamy provide any real 
protection at present. The danger of exploitation in personal and sexual 
relationships is always present but there is very little that the law can do 
about it. My own guess is that the abolition of the legal concept of marriage 
and the crime of bigamy would make very little difference in this area.... 
The long-term goal in this area should be the abolition of private 
dependency, by encouraging independence and treating poverty as an 
individual rather than a family phenomenon.93  
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This long-term goal would be achieved with the abolition of marriage. In removing marriage, 
serious consideration would need to be given to the impact of Article 12 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which provides a right to marriage. If marriage were to be 
abolished as a legal relationship, where would the UK stand? Clive asks “would [the 
Convention]... be breached if a country abolished marriage as a legal concept but gave its 
inhabitants complete freedom to participate in such religious or social marriage ceremonies as 
they thought fit?”94 Arguably not. Marriage would still exist as the religious institution it first 
emerged as. Further, alternative legal relationships would be able to emerge which would not 
be contaminated with the historical patriarchies contained in marriage and would not be 
limited by the parameters of matrimonial law.  
 
For true equality and practicality, surely it has to be easier to remove marriage, than to try 
and extend matrimonial law to encompass all possible relationship forms?95 There is no legal 
requirement to marry or enter a civil partnership but state incentives exist for those who do 
continue the sex-based prioritisation of relationships. Within feminist academia, marriage has 
“been seen as prostitution, where a woman trades sexual servicing for shelter and food. Sex is 
compulsory in marriage for women, ensuring heterosexuality within the economic bargain.”96 
Marriage ‘protects’ women “in the same way that the institution of slavery was said to 
'protect' blacks- that is, that the word 'protection' in this case is simply a euphemism for 
oppression.”97 
 
The Canadian Law Commission recommended the elimination of “the distinctions between 
conjugal and non-conjugal relationships; to prioritise the function of relationships over their 
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form and to diminish government reliance on relationship status as the proxy for the 
conferment of rights and obligations.”98 If radical feminists were to be given a leading role in 
this elimination process, I argue our social landscape would look very different and 
relationships could be self-negotiated and regulated.  
 
People should be free to contract their own relationships of choice. The preference of radical 
feminists would be that those relationships of choice are not, and do not, resemble marriage. 
But, if those contracting into these relationships are truly educated in the many forms that 
relationships can take, and especially as women, are aware of the symbolic and historical 
significance of marriage as an institution in which women are subjugated, then radical 
feminists would have to rest easy, and hope that most women would not enter this type of 
relationship. Our want and desire to ‘save’ every woman cannot trump their free will once 
they have been presented with all the options available to them. It is the mentality of 
‘marriage as automatic and expected’ that needs to be addressed.  
 
The Canadian Commission argue relationships need to encompass “emotional and economic 
interdependence, mutual care and concern and the expectation of some duration.”99 These are 
values that are associated with marriage, again creating the feeling that marriage is the 
superior relationship form, and any new relationships should mirror these. Pleasingly, the 
Commission do acknowledge the laws ‘extensive surveillance’ of intimate elements of 
relationships- in the UK for example- investigating when claims for nullity are brought as to 
the occurrence or not of consummation.  
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This thesis has shown my unease at the existence of legislation allowing for voidable 
marriages, rather than full engagement with divorce law. Masson et al explain that the Law 
Commission in the UK have rejected any prospect of abolishing voidable marriage, and the 
medical examinations that often go with it; “and it seems unlikely that further reform of the 
law governing the annulment of marriage will be on the agenda in the foreseeable future. 
Indeed, it may be that reform of the law of nullity has become less likely in recent years 
because of the awareness that it is a more acceptable solution than divorce to certain ethnic 
minorities and those of strong religious belief.”100 The removal of ‘voidable’ marriages, 
especially on the basis of non-consummation is unlikely for two reasons: 
 
First, certain Christian denominations and their members draw a clear 
distinction between the annulment and the dissolution of marriage and 
would be offended if the distinction were blurred. Secondly, some people, 
associating divorce with stigma, preferred to keep matters involving no 
moral blame such as impotence and mental disorder as grounds for 
nullity.101  
 
One could suggest that consummation’s categorisation as ‘voidable’ rather than ‘void’ 
indicates that the law does not place as much importance upon consummation as I do within 
this thesis. But I suggest that further examination of the conditions upon which a marriage 
can be declared ‘voidable’ produces a list of strange bedfellows. An inability to consummate 
a marriage is deemed as serious as entering the marriage whilst pregnant by another man; 
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having a sexually transmitted disease; and suffering from a mental disease, yet Beauvoir 
states it is “absurd to make a duty of such a delicate and difficult matter as the first 
intercourse.”102 
 
Consummation’s categorization as ‘voidable’ demonstrates the belief that marriage does need 
sex, but the courts will only interfere when asked by one of the parties. This does not serve to 
diminish the importance this requirement has taken on. It is a codified sexual requirement 
that will serve to end a marriage without taking into consideration any other factors.103 In 
1970, a UK Law Commission report suggested (to no avail) that grounds of nullity of 
voidable marriages should be absorbed into the grounds of divorce.104 Divorce indicates that 
the marriage didn’t work out whereas claims for nullity imply that there was some kind of 
impediment to the marriage at the start. One could therefore argue that wilful refusal would 
perhaps more suitably fit as a ground for divorce, as the other grounds for voidable marriage 
exist at the time of marriage, whereas wilful refusal occurs after the marriage ceremony. Yet 
the Law Commission felt that the end result was always non-consummation, and it would 
seem strange to differentiate between the reasons that led to it: “From the parties’ point of 
view the relevant fact would be that the marriage had never become a complete one. To tell 
them that, in the eyes of the law, failure to complete it due to one cause results in their 
marriage being dissolved, would seem to them to be a strange result.”105 The desire of law 
makers to keep law certain and universal overrules any logistical issues that arise from the 
implementation of the law.  
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One could further ponder whether the removal of a consummation requirement would serve 
only to ‘closet’ marital sex the way domestic violence and marital rape were once closeted 
and silenced. I do not believe this would be the case. “Marriage is obscene in principle in so 
far as it transforms into rights and duties those mutual relations which should be founded on a 
spontaneous urge; it gives an instrumental and therefore degrading character to the two 
bodies in dooming them to know each other in their general aspect as bodies, not as persons. 
The husband is often chilled by the idea that he is doing a duty, and the wife is ashamed to 
find herself given to someone who is exercising a right over her.”106 This right is enshrined in 
consummation, and its removal -although symbolic, for marital sex will continue- serves to 
remove the ideological superiority of heterosexual acts, and the ‘necessity’ of sex in 
marriage. Consummation is a political issue, because sexuality and marital sex have been 
politicised. This is a key radical feminist concept: “Because of the radical feminist analysis of 
the oppression of women through male-defined sexuality and power, and because of the 
demand to take back our bodies, radical feminism has identified sexuality as political. The 
interrelationship between heterosexuality and power was named.”107  
 
Ettelbrick’s argument that we should pursue a course which “recognizes the caring and 
committed relationships of all families- not just those who wish to marry and not just those 
that include lesbian and gay couples”108 is a worthy notion, though I would add that we 
should positively ensure that any relationship recognition preserves women’s rights and 
freedom, without legislating for sexual conduct. There would undoubtedly be problems with 
this ‘recognition of all’. It would perpetuate the states intervention and role in creating 
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‘legitimacy’, and like Fineman’s theory, of prioritising the Mother-Child dyad, could result in 
the further privatisation of care. Barker suggests “we need to deconstruct the purpose and 
function of recognition/regulation and separate it from ideology and romantic mythology 
about what families and relationships are and should be.”109  
 
6.5: Conclusions  
Whilst some legal and social changes have taken place in the marriage (and marriage-like) 
institution, the radical feminist critique of marriage has “remained remarkably consistent in 
[its]... portrayal of the effects of its socially approved unequal dynamics of power on men and 
women.”110 Marriage, which is heterosexuality institutionalised, constrains and harms 
women- its requirement of heterosexual sex (for as yet homosexual sex remains undefined); 
an act which is done ‘by’ one man ‘to’ one woman for life- is at the core of that.111 Despite 
the removal of sex from the CPA and M(SSC)A, the institutions’ construction as a ‘mirror’ of 
heterosexual marriage automatically makes it an institution in which women, or the ‘femme’ 
partner will be held to be inferior. Marriage must be dismantled, and one of its most harmful 
requirements- consummation- needs to go first.  
 
I do not argue for a ‘closeting’ of sexual relationships. That is not the aim of the research 
presented here. In fact, research by other feminists writers has demonstrated the dangers 
inherent in privatising sexual relationships including the development of domestic violence 
and marital rape. I acknowledge that heterosexual relations are inherently dangerous for 
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women, but I cannot go so far as to claim that sexuality is a ‘choice’.112 Radical feminism 
allows for mutual support between women, and so this research demonstrates the 
rehabilitation of this theory, in allowing for relationships of mutual support- not based on 
sexual activity. I propose that the law should not demand the violation of women in this way. 
It is positive reinforcement of sex as something that is ‘done’ to women, and something that 
must be done to a wife. When combining society’s obsession with the marital relationship, 
and adding to this at least one instance of enforced heterosexuality, even in the twenty-first 
century one cannot claim that men and women possess equality within marriage or law.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In its broadest reading, this research aims to assess if understandings of relationships (in 
particular marriage) have moved beyond consummation, and if this question can be answered 
from a radical feminist perspective. Overall, the research demonstrates that we have not 
moved beyond consummation, as non-consummation is still a ground upon which a 
heterosexual marriage can be nullified (upon the insistence of one party to the marriage), 
where the sexual intercourse is judged to have not been ‘ordinary and complete’1 in the 
heterosexual understanding of penetrative sex. In this way, “sex simply becomes penetration, 
and pleasure is defined in terms of duration of tumescence, or simultaneous orgasm, or 
ejaculation in vaginam.”2 This conception of marital sexual intercourse has been used to 
define legally ‘meaningful’ relationships, and the subordination of other relationship forms.3 I 
feel very uneasy that as a society we could “want the courts to spend time on the mechanics 
of spousal sexual relationships, debating exactly how many inches of penetration are required 
for consummation,”4 and the use of radical feminist theory has proved useful for addressing 
underlying socio-legal explanations for the inclusion and maintenance of consummation in 
marital law. Below I outline some of the key themes and findings of this thesis and identify 
further research opportunities that emerge from these themes.  
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i: Why consummation?   
 
One of the aims of this thesis is to fill a gap in academic research by providing a socio-legal 
overview of consummation. The research has shown that there is very little academic (non-
medical) research into consummation; most references to non-consummation are made in 
passing in articles or textbooks predominantly focused on wider issues. This thesis provides a 
comprehensive overview of the current law in relation to consummation, and the case-law 
that has led to its definition. Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that the apparent gender-neutrality 
of the consummation requirement is symptomatic of the patriarchy that pervades law, as 
outlined in Chapter 1, and that the legal construction of consummation is particularly harmful 
to women, viewing all as sexual objects and potential mothers. In cases where there has been 
non-consummation, many of the wives for example have been labelled as emotionally 
unstable as a result of being denied a ‘normal’ marriage, and children.  
 
Consummation is presented as something that is natural, necessary, a husband’s right, and 
something that is done to women. Women who are unable or unwilling to conform to this 
have been medically constructed as unnatural or frigid. Men who have been unable or 
unwilling to conform are spoken of in sympathetic tones, for it is often the result of 
impotence. Where the wives in these cases have been granted a decree of nullity, it has not 
been as a result of a discussion or acknowledgement of a reciprocal ‘right’ to marital 
intercourse, but merely as a result of every woman’s desire to procreate. Even in cases where 
it is clear there is a physical impediment in the husband to sexual intercourse with any 
woman, courts have developed case law which makes clear that only the marriage in question 
is key, perhaps to maintain illusions of masculinity, and insinuate the fault lies with the wife.  
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The consummation requirement is used to discriminate between relationship forms, to 
reinforce the gender binary, and to justify legal privileging of marriage. Chapter 6 concludes 
that there is no legal reason to require state involvement in the sexual relationship of husband 
and wife (unless there is an issue of rape). It does not seem coherent that the possibility of 
infecting your spouse with HIV/AIDS5 (which should give a get-out quick path) should be 
held on a par with a marriage in which there is no sexual intercourse. Divorce is a long and 
costly process which does not nullify the marriage, and leaves a blemish on the parties 
romantic history. It is not comprehensible that a case of non-consummation can be 
justification to circumvent divorce law.  
 
The analysis of consummation in this thesis acknowledges that consummation is “an 
interplay of factors,”6 from gender and sexuality to medicine and legal privilege. Moran 
argues that consummation has shifted from a juridical matter to one of sexuality. The analysis 
provided in this thesis examines consummation from both of these spheres, though the 
absence of any recent case law7 could indicate a shift to the sexuality sphere. From both 
spheres, I conclude that consummation is detrimental to women, and reinforces the male (and 
marital) ‘need’ for sex.8 The only apparent difference between the two ways of analysing 
                                                 
5
 MCA 1973 s12(e)  
6
 Moran, L.J., ‘A study in the history of male sexuality in law: non-consummation’ (1990) 1 Law and Critique 2 
pgs 155-171 pg 167 
7
 Although the Court Statistics demonstrated the continued use of nullity clauses for non-consummation: 
Judicial and Court Statistics 2010 http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/statistics/courts-and-
sentencing/judicial-court-stats.pdf (accessed 10/10/12) 
8
 Jeffreys, S. Anticlimax- A feminist perspective on the sexual revolution London, The Women’s Press Ltd, 1993 
pg 145 
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consummation is the gender-neutrality9 with which it is presented in law, where as when 
viewed as an issue of sexuality, it is more clearly male.  
 
Two unexpected findings arise from the research. Firstly, at the outset I underestimated the 
extent to which the medical profession would be involved. Chapters 2 and 3 highlight that 
consummation was initially a religious requirement, which was subsumed into law. Courts 
then allowed the medical profession to provide a scientific definition of consummation, to the 
detriment of other sexual experiences. Secondly, Madden Dempsey and Herring10 provide a 
really interesting critique of penetrative sex, in which they explain that all penetrative sex 
requires justification. In this light, given their analysis, and the patriarchal basis of 
consummation, one could read the consummation requirement as state induced sexual activity 
that the state holds to be justifiable. As argued throughout, I cannot agree that requiring 
consummation is justifiable, and instead, under the Madden Dempsey/Herring logic, argue 
that consummation could be seen as state sanctioned rape.11 It is not the act itself which is of 
issue. It is rather that it is demanded by the state. The choice of married couples to engage in 
sexual intercourse or not, should not be legally demanded: “...we want to prohibit the state 
from enforcing its morality when that morality prohibits our sexual practices.”12 I found no 
case law in which it was claimed by the wife that consummation had occurred through rape. 
                                                 
9
 MacKinnon, C.A., ‘Liberalism and the Death of Feminism’ in Leidholdt, D. & Raymond, J.G., The Sexual 
Liberals & the Attack on Feminism New York, Pergamon Press 1990 pgs 3-13 pg 6 
10
 Madden Dempsey, M. & Herring, J. ‘Why Sexual Penetration Requires Justification’ (2007) 27 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 467-491 
11
 Lowenfeld has argued that the wedding night often amounts to rape: Loewenfeld, H.L. On Conjugal 
Happiness: Experiences Reflections and Advice of a Medical Man (3rd ed- trans by Krohn, R.E.S) London, John 
Bale, Sons & Danielsson, 1913 pg 200; MacKinnon has argued that the state has allowed for enforced sex by 
not engaging aggressively with incest, rape and pornography laws: Mackinnon, C.A., Toward a Feminist Theory 
of the State Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1989 at pg 244; Brownmiller, S. Against Our Will: Men, 
Women and Rape London, Secker & Warburg, 1975 pg 316 
12
 Robson, R., Sappho Goes To Law School New York, Columbia University Press, 1998, pg 133 
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It would be interesting to see if it would be held to constitute consummation, or if the rape 
would erase its consummative effect.  
 
ii: The CPA, GRA and M(SSC)A: relationships today 
This research fills a second gap in academic research by examining the CPA, GRA and 
M(SSC)A for their effects upon consummation exclusively. Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate 
that issues of non-consummation with respect to relationships that fall under these legislative 
developments have not been the exclusive focus of socio-legal research to date, but have 
rather again been mentioned in passing. As regards civil partnership, the parliamentary 
debates outlined demonstrate the deliberate omission of consummation from the CPA. The 
reason given is that consummation is heterosexually defined, and there is no benefit in trying 
to find its same-sex equivalent. Whilst this was to be initially overturned by the M(SSC)A, 
the final legislation followed suit with the CPA.   
 
As regards relationships of transsexuals, Chapter 4 shows that consummation has once again 
been ignored.13 The GRA did not incorporate any need for surgery, but the MCA 1973 s12(a) 
which addresses non-consummation on the basis of incapacity, was not accordingly altered. 
This has left transsexuals open to having their marriages nullified on the basis of their 
incapacity to consummate.14 A better solution to “the extension of the meaning of 
consummation or the manipulation of the statutory bar would simply be to abolish 
                                                 
13
 Probert op cit n4 pg 383 
14
 The Home Office ‘Report of the Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual People’  
www.webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/transsexual/wgtrans.pdf 
(accessed 12/4/11); Tobin, H.J. ‘Against the Surgical Requirement for Change of Legal Sex’ (2006/7) 38 Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 2 pgs 393-435 pg 419 
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consummation as a ground for nullity altogether. If this were done, there would be no need to 
debate the meaning of consummation in the context of same-sex relationships and the 
marriages of transsexuals would be secure.”15 
 
Marriage as an institution has been shown to have many negative and damaging aspects, most 
of which impact negatively upon women. Women have consistently shown that marriage is 
not an institution in which they are treated equally. This inequality starts from the ‘wedding 
night’, when women are supposed to submit to male dominance and power and need for sex.  
 
Why, then, would anyone marry? Because it is a tradition, glorified and 
romanticized. It grants status. It is a significant (social) mark of adulthood 
for women in patriarchy. It is a way to avoid certain hassles from one’s 
family of origin and from society at large- hassles to oneself, to one’s lover 
(if there is only one), and to children with whom one may live or whom one 
may bring into being. We need better traditions. And women have long 
needed other social marks of adulthood and ways to escape families of 
origin.16 
 
The removal of the consummation requirement would not generate equality between the 
sexes, but would address and highlight the patriarchal basis of law. Altering existing 
consummation law would not make women equal participants in consummation. It is already 
supposed to be a gender-neutral law. It needs to be removed. Sex may still be expected in 
                                                 
15
 Probert op cit n4 pg 384  
16
 Card, C., ‘Against Marriage and Motherhood’ (1996) 11 Hypatia 3 pgs 1-23 pg 9  
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marriage, but the consummation requirement makes it a legislative demand, and the end aim 
must always be the abolition of marriage to prevent the subordination of women.17 
Consummation in its current formulation is presented as something that women should do, 
should want to do, need to do, and that the sexual relationship should continue throughout the 
marriage. This leaves those unable or unwilling to submit themselves to this open to legal 
action by their partner. To remove consummation would not be just a simple re-formulation 
of heterosexual marriage, but a re-conceptualisation of expectations of women in general, and 
their bodily interactions with men. Oakley states that to-date, women’s sexuality “is supposed 
to lie in her receptiveness and this is not just a matter of her open vagina: it extends to the 
whole structure of feminine personality as dependent, passive, unaggressive and 
submissive.”18 
 
iii: Radical Feminism   
 
The secondary aim of this research was to assess the academic value of second wave radical 
feminism in issues of sexuality such as consummation, for it appears that recently there “has 
been a repudiation, or perhaps forgetfulness, of the feminist critique of marriage that was so 
well developed in the 1970s.”19 One might question how I can claim to write about the 
removal of consummation from a radical feminist perspective. Undoubtedly, the ‘radical’ 
perspective is to call for marriage to be abolished altogether, but this call has not been 
heard.20 The GRA has meant that more people can fit into the marriage model, and the 
                                                 
17
 Rowland, R. & Klein, R. ‘Radical Feminism: History, Politics, Action’ in Bell, D. & Klein, R. Radically 
Speaking: Feminism Reclaimed London, Zed Books 1996 pgs 9-36 pg 31; Auchmuty, R. ‘What’s so special 
about marriage? The impact of Wilkinson v Kitzinger’ (2008) 20 Child and Family Law Quarterly 4 pgs 475-
498 pg 492 
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 Oakley, A. ‘Sexuality’ in Jackson, S. & Scott, S. Feminism & Sexuality- A Reader Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University Press 1996 pgs 35-39 pg 36 
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 Jeffreys, S. ‘The Need to Abolish Marriage’ (2004) 14 Feminism and Psychology 2 pgs 327-331 pg 327  
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creation of the CPA and M(SSC)A have done nothing more than to bring homosexual 
couples in ‘from the cold’ into a heterosexual relationship ideal. With the research presented, 
I show that it is no less radical to suggest shifting the discussion to the abolition of 
consummation as a legal requirement. It is a way to break patriarchal marriage from within, 
whilst highlighting another example of the fallacy of gender-neutral law.   
 
Jackson explains that the,  
 
coercive equation of sex= coitus= something men do to women is not an 
inevitable consequence of an anatomical female relating sexually to an 
anatomical male, but the product of the social relations under which those 
bodies meet. Those social relations can be challenged... it is not male and 
female anatomy nor even... the act of intercourse itself which constitute the 
problem, but rather the way in which heterosexuality is institutionalized and 
practised under patriarchy.21 
 
 
The research presented demonstrates that second wave feminism usefully assesses current 
constructions of consummation, whilst explaining the patriarchal foundations of the 
consummation requirement. These definitions are more useful and relevant than those offered 
by first and third wave feminists, as demonstrated throughout the research presented. Further, 
                                                 
21
 Jackson, S. ‘Heterosexuality, Power and Pleasure’ in Jackson, S. & Scott, S. Feminism & Sexuality- A Reader 
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press 1996 pgs 175-179 pg 176; Jensen, R. ‘Homecoming: The Relevance of 
Radical Feminism for Gay Men’ (2004) 47 Journal of Homosexuality 314 pgs75-82  
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Chapter 1 demonstrates that radical feminism is not to be read as ‘lesbian feminism’. Radical 
feminism’s emphasis on,  
 
coercive aspects of sexuality and on the interconnections between sexuality 
and women’s oppression has also led to the charge that radical feminists 
cannot deal with sexual pleasure and are simply anti-sex. This caricature 
both ignores the diversity of opinion among radical feminists and equates 
opposition to specific sexual practice with an anti-erotic stance. What is the 
case is that radical feminists have problematised desire and pleasure and 
have suggested that they might be reconstituted.22  
 
Heterosexual women can engage with gender and sexuality issues from a radical feminist 
perspective because consummation is the same for all women, and is treated as such by the 
law.  Radical feminism works for social change, and that must include “healthy loving 
relationships with men, or there is no point in being part of a social movement for change.”23 
The “social and legal meaning of what it is to be a ‘wife’ [also] stretches across class and 
racial differences. Of course, not all married couples behave in the same way as ‘wives’ and 
‘husbands,’ but the story of the sexual contract throws light onto the institution of marriage; 
however hard any couple may try to avoid replicating patriarchal marital relations, none of us 
can entirely escape the social and legal consequences of entering into the marriage 
                                                 
22
 Jackson, S. ‘Heterosexuality and feminist theory’ in Richardson, D. (ed) Theorising Heterosexuality 
Buckingham, Open University Press, 1998 pgs 21-38 pg 24  
23
 Rowland op cit n3 pg 81. Of course radical feminism is not the only social theory to offer suggestions for 
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contract.”24 Radical feminism also treats women as one group and is therefore the appropriate 
theoretical method through which to conduct this research.25 
 
Radical feminism has argued that men control power, evident through their creation and 
control of the law. Given this, why would this thesis argue that a solution could lie in a law 
change? A law change of this nature would serve many functions. Firstly and most evidently, 
it would remove a legal requirement for sexual activity. Secondly, the removal would bring 
focus back to the patriarchal history of our laws, and the way in which they reinforce male 
supremacy.26 If the legislature could see the way that consummation law subordinates 
women, and change the law as a result of women’s experience, this could possibly lead to 
further developments for women, and an end to the silencing of women in law.27  
 
 
iv: Further research opportunities  
 
The research presented in this thesis is confined to the research questions outlined in the 
introductory chapter, and is of a theoretical nature. One could undertake the same research 
aims, but incorporate empirical research such as interviews with religious leaders and 
lawyers, and questionnaires could be distributed to couples who have registered to marry 
(perhaps in both religious and civil ceremonies) to assess contemporary views and 
understanding of consummation.  
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 Pateman, C., The Sexual Contract Cambridge, Polity Press, 1988 pg 18  
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Routledge 1995 pg 43-44 
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The research presented here argues that the consummation requirement is inherently 
patriarchal, and therefore beneficial to men and detrimental to women. Further research could 
perhaps build upon the existing literature of consummation in masculinities studies. In 
masculinities research where consummation is mentioned, it is often in passing (though in 
greater detail than any feminist analysis). The structure of this thesis could be used, and a 
replica analysis produced from a masculinities perspective. This could also be extended to the 
empirical research suggested above.  
 
At the legislative level, it would also be beneficial to interview those that were involved in 
the construction of the CPA, GRA and M(SSC)A as to their attitudes and governmental 
attitudes surrounding the effects of these legislative developments upon consummation, and 
the omission of non-consummation from the CPA and M(SSC)A. Chapter 4 could be the 
basis of an entire thesis and produce research incorporating field work and analysis into the 
lived experience of transsexuals and the consummation requirement.    
 
My aim was to provide the legal and social history of consummation, and present where it 
stands. “Now we must deny it a future.”28  
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